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Summary 
 
This thesis consists of three self-contained chapters. The first chapter is titled ‘A 
Theory of Divide-and-Rule: Kleptocracy and Its Breakdown’. The second chapter is 
tilted ‘Kleptocracy and the Benevolent Opposition Organizations’.  The last chapter is 
titled ‘Democratization, Revolution and International Interventions’. 
 
In the first chapter, I develop a theory of divide-and-rule, explaining how kleptocracies 
can be sustained in equilibrium by implementing a strategy of divide-and-rule. This 
chapter shows how this strategy is successfully implemented by a kleptocratic ruler, 
who is able to play one group of citizens against another. I explore the extent to which 
this is robust to a society with any number of citizen groups.  When there are large 
numbers of citizen groups, a small number of them may benefit from the 
discriminatory redistribution policies implemented by the kleptocrat, while the vast 
majority will become the victims of the kleptocracy. Consequently, sharp economic 
and political inequality between the citizen groups may arise because of the 
discriminatory policies resulting from the divide-and-rule strategy. Furthermore, this 
chapter examines two cases in which this strategy may fail and the kleptocracy will 
break down. Several results are obtained in this chapter, and they are applied to 
some real world cases. 
 
 
In the second chapter, I introduce a theoretical framework, based on the model 
developed in the first chapter, examining how the benevolent opposition organizations, 
such as trade unions and religious organizations, may constrain the strategy of 
divide-and-rule. This chapter shows that by punishing those citizen groups supporting 
the kleptocratic rulers, they may help strengthen the cooperation between them, thus 
improving the welfare of the civilians and even removing the kleptocratic ruler. 
However, compared to punishing the citizen group supporting the ruler, the 
benevolent opposition organizations could more effectively constrain the kleptocracy 
through rewarding the citizen group who challenges the ruler or supports another 
citizen group in challenging the ruler. 
 
 
In the last chapter, I develop a model for military interventions and economic 
sanctions respectively, examining their impacts on the process of democratization. In 
a dictatorial society or a weakly institutionalized society, the ruler and the opposition 
vie for social surplus, while the international community decide whether or not to carry 
out military interventions, or to impose economic sanctions in this society. The 
theoretical frameworks developed in this chapter formalize the interaction between 
the international community, the opposition and the ruler. This chapter shows that 
both military interventions and economic sanctions may help promote the 
democratization process in a state, while they may also induce the opposition to 
resort to a revolution to overthrow the regime, thus increasing the likelihood of a civil 
war and raising the uncertainty in the democratization process. Several analytical 
results in this chapter may shed light on the questions about the efficacy and impacts 
of international interventions on the democratization process in a state. Furthermore, 
this chapter introduces the military interventions in 2011 Libya and the economic 
sanctions against Burma as case studies. 
 
General Introduction
According to Huntington (1992), there have been three waves of democratization
since the early nineteenth century. The first wave starts with the suffrage extension in
the United Sates in the early nineteenth century and lasts until l922, which brings out
29 democracies in world. This wave of democratization ebbs with the rise of Benito
Mussolini in Italy in 1922, leading to a sharp decrease in the number of democracies
to merely 12 in 1942. The second wave follows the triumph of the Allies in World
War II in 1945 and continues until 1962, raising the number of democracies to 36.
Nonetheless, it drops down to 30 during the ebbing of the second wave between 1962
and the middle 1970s. The beginning of the third wave is marked by the Carnation
Revolution in Portugal in 1974, which brings out democratic transitions in more than
60 countries by the end of 1990s.
However, as we can see from Figure A1 (in Appendix A.1), there is no significant
change in the number of countries classified as ‘free’ or ‘partially free’ since 2000.
What is more, according to the report by Freedom House in 2011,1 the overall global
freedom declines in five consecutive years between 2005 and 2010, which ‘represents
the longest continuous period of decline in the nearly 40-year history of the survey’.
It has been around two centuries since the first wave of democratization, however 47
countries are still ‘not free’, while 60 are ‘partly free’, and about 55 percent of the
world population live in these 107 countries (see Figure A2 in Appendix A.2). In
2011 and 2012, there are pro-democracy political changes in a few countries, such as
Egypt, Tunisia and Libya, while at the same time, some authoritarian regimes, such as
China, Iran, Russia and Venezuela, continuously step up repressive measures against
the democratic oppositions.2 Nowadays, democracy promotion and consolidation
remain one of the major challenges for the world.
This thesis mainly explores the following four questions related to democratiza-
1‘Freedom in the World 2011’, Freedom House.
2Ibid.
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tion. Firstly, how does the strategy of divide-and-rule help sustain kleptocracies and
other highly corrupted authoritarian regimes? Secondly, what factors and measures
could serve to constrain the divide-and-rule strategy and promote democratization?
Thirdly, how may the benevolent opposition groups, like trade unions and religious
institutions, help constrain the divide-and-rule strategy? Lastly, what are the impacts
of military interventions and economic sanctions on the democratization process in a
society?
Kleptocracies and other highly corrupted authoritarian regimes usually result in
the implementation of inefficient and even disastrous economic and political polices,
leading to severe violation of human rights and the underdevelopment in these so-
cieties (see Sandbrook 1985, Turner and Young 1985 and Herbst 2000). However
after exhausting all the sources of legitimacy, many of these regimes still manage
to survive over long periods, examples including Moi’s Rule in Kenya (1978–2002),
Gaddafi’s in Libya (1969-2011) and Mugabe’s in Zimbabwe (1980-present).
The first chapter in this thesis develops a theory of divide-and-rule, explaining
how kleptocracies can be sustained in equilibrium by implementing a strategy of
divide-and-rule. And this chapter examines different environments in which this
strategy could be successfully implemented, and explores the extent to which this
is robust to a society with any number of citizen groups. Although the strategy of
divide-and-rule is powerful, it is not invincible. When there are large numbers of
citizen groups, a small number of them may benefit from the discriminatory redistri-
bution policies implemented by the kleptocrats, while the vast majority will become
the victims of the kleptocracy. Therefore, sharp economic and political inequality
between the citizen groups may arise because of the discriminatory policies resulting
from the divide-and-rule strategy. What is more, this chapter introduces two extended
models to illustrate how the strategy of divide-and-rule may fail and the kleptocracy
would break down.
2
In many European countries (including Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia and
Hungary) and a number of African countries (such as Niger, South Africa, Zambia,
and Zimbabwe), trade unions were crucial in the opposition to the dictatorships and
the democratic transitions between 1970s and 1990s (see Maarten 2008, Cirtautas
1997 and Kraus 2007). For instance, Solidarity spearheaded the peaceful democra-
tization in Poland in the 1980s (Maarten 2008), and MSZOSZ and LIGA promoted
the negotiated transition in Hungary (Bozóki 2002). What is more, according to
Huntington (1992), Catholic Church’s emphasis on individual rights and opposition
to authoritarian rule, was one of the major driving forces leading to the third wave
of democratization. Gifford (1995) points out that in several African countries, the
Christian Church has played a critical role in the democratization movements since
the late 1980s.
The second chapter introduces a theoretical framework, examining how those
benevolent opposition groups, like trade union and religious institutions may con-
strain the strategy of divide-and-rule. This chapter shows that by punishing those cit-
izen groups supporting the kleptocrats, these opposition groups may help strengthen
the cooperation between them, thus improving the welfare of the civilians and even
removing the kleptocrats. However, compared to punishing the citizen supporting
the ruler, the benevolent opposition organizations could more effectively constrain
the kleptocracy through rewarding the citizen group who challenges the ruler or sup-
ports another citizen group in challenging the ruler,
The first two chapters in this thesis focus on the interactions between the inter-
nal actors in a dictatorial society, examining how these interactions may result in the
survival of the dictatorial regime or lead to a democracy. While following the end
of World War II, democracy promotion has been put in the agenda of the interna-
tional community. Especially, since the end of Cold War, the traditional norms of
state sovereignty have been further challenged by the norms of human rights, leading
3
to legitimizing international interventions, such as economic sanctions and military
interventions, by the UN or the great powers for humanitarian purposes in conflicts
within a nation (Harris 1991, Boutros-Ghali 1992 and Conteh-Morgan 2001).
As a result, international interventions have been playing a more and more im-
portant role in the democratization process in a society since the end of World War II.
Examples include the military interventions in Yugoslavia in early 1990s (see Mayall
1996), Liberia from 1991 to 1996 (see Huband 1998) and Libya in 2011, and eco-
nomic sanctions against Rhodesia between 1965 and 1979, Malawi between 1992
and 1993 (see Posner 1995), Paraguay in 1996 (see Hufbauer, Schott, Elliott and
Oegg 2007) and Burma between 1988 and 2012. However, as we can see, disregard
whether they are carried out in the name of democracy promotion, do not necessarily
lead to the transition to a democracy or policy changes in favor of democracy. What is
more, besides the grand reasons justifying interventions (such as democracy promo-
tion and humanitarian purposes), the sender countries of international interventions
have their own utility functions, determining whether to carry out the interventions
and the strength of interventions.
In order to examine the impacts of international interventions on democratiza-
tion, the last chapter introduces the international community as an external actor in
the process of democratization in a society, and develops a theoretical model for mil-
itary interventions and economic sanctions respectively, formalizing the interaction
between the international community, the opposition and the authoritarian ruler. To
some extend, the process of democratization could be interpreted as the redistribu-
tion of economic resources and political power. In a dictatorial society or a weakly
institutionalized society, the ruler and the opposition vie for social surplus, while the
international community decides whether or not to carry out military interventions in
the case of a civil war, or whether or not to resort to economic sanctions to promote
the democratization process in this society.
4
This chapter shows that both military interventions and economic sanctions may
help promote peaceful democratization in an authoritarian state, while they may also
induce the opposition to resort to a revolution to overthrow the regime, thus increas-
ing the likelihood of a civil war and raising the uncertainties in the democratization
process. Several analytical results in this paper may shed light on the questions about
the efficacy and impacts of international interventions on the democratization process
in a state. And this paper introduces the military interventions in 2011 Libyan rev-
olution and the economic sanctions against Burma between 1988 and 2012 as case
studies.
The first chapter is related to the literature on the political economy of a weakly
institutionalized society, such as Amegashie (2008), La Ferrara and Bates (2001) and
Jackson and Rosberg (1982), and mainly contributes to literature study the survival
of the kleptocracy and other authoritarian regimes, examples including Acemoglu,
Robinson and Verdier (2004), Gandhi and Przeworski (2007) and Miquel (2006). The
second chapter mainly contributes to the literature studying the role of trade unions
in the process of democratization, such as Maarten (2008), Cirtautas (1997), Bozóki
(2002) and Kraus (2007), and the literature examining the role of religious institu-
tions in the process of democratization, examples including Huntington (1992) and
Gifford (1995). The last chapter mainly contributes to the literature examining the
impacts of military interventions on democratization, such as Mark Peceny (1999a
and 1999b), Hermann and Kegley (1996) and Dimitrov (2005), and the literature
studying the efficacy of economics sanctions on democracy promotion, examples in-
cluding Hufbauer, Schott, Elliott and Oegg (2007), Rogers (1996) and Elliott (1992).
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1 Chapter I: A Theory of Divide-and-Rule: Kleptoc-
racy and Its Breakdown
Abstract
How do non-democratic regimes, especially kleptocracies, manage to sus-
tain their rule over long periods? In this paper, I develop a theory of divide-
and-rule, explaining how kleptocracies can be sustained in equilibrium by im-
plementing a strategy of divide-and-rule. This paper shows how this strategy is
successfully implemented by a kleptocrat, who is able to play one group of citi-
zens against another. I explore the extent to which this is robust to a society with
any number of citizen groups. When there are large numbers of citizen groups,
a small number of them may benefit from the discriminatory redistribution poli-
cies implemented by the kleptocrat, while the vast majority will become the vic-
tims of the kleptocracy. Consequently, sharp economic and political inequality
between the citizen groups may arise because of the discriminatory policies re-
sulting from the divide-and-rule strategy. Furthermore, this paper examines two
cases in which this strategy may fail and the kleptocracy will break down. Sev-
eral results are obtained in this paper, and they are applied in the illustration of
some real world cases.
1.1 Introduction
It has been around two centuries since the first wave of democratization in the
early nineteenth century, however there are still a large number of non-democratic
regimes around the world nowadays. According to the annual survey by Freedom
House in 2011, 47 countries are still ‘not free’, while 60 are ‘partly free’, and about
55 percent of the world population live in these 107 countries3. Although the term
‘not free’ or ‘partly free’ cannot be translated directly to ‘a non-democratic regime’,
3Source: Freedom House, Maps of Freedom 2011, in Appendix A.2
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it is safe to say that a majority of these countries are under the rule of non-democratic
regimes. Many of these regimes have been sustained over long periods, despite their
being highly corrupted and incompetent in providing public services, abusing the
economic, social and political rights of the citizens.
Kleptocracy is one of the most notorious types of non-democratic regimes. The
rulers in these regimes take advantage of their control over the state apparatuses and
resources to extend their various personal economic and political interests, leading
to severe violation of human rights and the underdevelopment in these societies (see
Sandbrook 1985, Turner and Young 1985 and Herbst 2000). However after exhaust-
ing all the sources of legitimacy,4 many of these regimes still manage to survive
over long periods, examples including Moi’s Rule in Kenya (1978–2002), Gaddafi’s
in Libya (1969-2011) and Mugabe’s in Zimbabwe (1980-present). How do these
regimes, especially those kleptocracies, manage to survive over long periods?
Brumberg (2003) states that the leaders of many liberalized autocracies in Arab
countries, such as Morocco, Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen, are well placed by pursuing
a divide-and-rule strategy among different social groups, through which they blur the
line between friend and foe, making it possible to constantly build different alliances
with leaders inside and outside the regime. In many communist countries, in order
to strengthen the communist party’s control over the state, a significant proportion of
the population were classified as the enemies of the people,5 thus being deprived of
their livelihood, even imprisoned, tortured and killed.6
Acemoglu, Robinson and Verdier (2004) (henceforth ARV) state that the klepto-
crats use many tools to maintain power, while divide-and-rule is a key strategy for
4For more discussions about legitimacy, please refer to Weber (1978), Alagappa (1995), Lipset
(1959) and Dogan (2003).
5The classification is simply based on people’s social origin or profession before the communist
revolution. For example, those who are rich, owner of a large farm, merchants, worked in the previous
regime, hired labour, etc.
6For in-depth stories and discussions, please refer to Gao (1987) and Courtois, Werth, Bartosek,
Panne, Margolin and Paczkowski (1999)
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sustaining their rule, such as Trujillo’s rule in Dominica and Mobutu’s in Congo7 (see
Leslie 1987 and Turner and Young 1985). ARV construct a model of personal rule
with two producer groups and one kleptocrat, investigating how a divide-and-rule
strategy supports kleptocracies and developing some interesting comparative static
results on the likelihood of kleptocratic regimes and policies. The weakness of in-
stitutions in these kleptocratic societies enables the kleptocrats to defuse the coop-
eration intended to remove them from power, by imposing punitive rates of taxation
on any social group proposing such a move and redistributing the benefits to those
who are proposed. The authors point out that by implementing such a divide-and-
rule strategy, no one challenges the ruler and all social groups are exploited along the
equilibrium path.
One key feature of the model in ARV is that after the ruler’s power is challenged,
the ruler is restricted to impose a tax policy that punishes the citizen group initiating
the challenge and intends to buy off another citizen group. This implies that ARV in-
troduce an assumption in their model that the ruler is committed to punish whichever
citizen group who initiates the challenge, and this commitment is credible to both
citizen groups. However, we must note that it is not necessarily subgame optimal for
the ruler to punish the citizen groups initiating the challenge. Given that a citizen
group has initiated the challenge, it may be to the best interest of the ruler to buy
off this citizen group, instead of punishing him. This will be illustrated in details in
Section 1.3.
With the commitment assumption, the model in ARV may be applicable to a
kleptocracy, in which the ruler has created a political and social environment in which
they can punish any individual or social group without endangering his rule, and he is
able to make such a commitment that is credible all the citizen groups or individuals.
Examples of these rulers include Mobutu in Congo and Trujillo in Dominica (see
7In this paper, ‘Congo’ only refers to Democratic Republic of the Congo (Zaire), and should be
distinguished from Republic of the Congo.
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Turits 2003). However, some kleptocrats may not sustain their power without relying
on the support of specific citizen groups, and they are not able to make a credible
commitment to all the citizen groups that whichever challenges his power will always
be punished. Examples of these rulers include Moi in Kenya (see Nowrojee and
Manby 1993) and Saddam Hussein in Iraq (see Metz 1988 and Tripp 2010). How the
implementation of divide-and-rule strategy will be affected if the kleptocrats are not
able to make such a commitment credible to all the citizen groups?
Inspired by the observation of real world cases and the research in ARV, this
paper develops a theory of divide-and-rule, explaining how kleptocracies can be sus-
tained in equilibrium by implementing a strategy of divide-and-rule in various envi-
ronments. This paper shows how this strategy is successfully implemented by a klep-
tocratic ruler, who is able to play one group of citizens against another. As pointed
out in the above paragraphs, in order to understand the divide-and-rule strategy, it
is important to distinguish two different types of kleptocratic rulers: Strong Rulers
and Weak Rulers. In this paper, strong rulers refer to those who are able to make a
credible commitment explicitly or implicitly to all the citizen groups that whichever
challenges his power will always be punished; while weak rulers refer to those who
are not able to make such a commitment.
Therefore, the models of divide-and-rule in this paper are classified into two
strands: the models of divide-and-rule by strong rulers and the models of divide-
and-rule by weak rulers. The basic model of the former strand shares one common
feature to the one in ARV, in which any social group who challenges the ruler will
always be punished. The analytical results derived in the basic frameworks of these
two strands of models, show that when the citizen groups are relatively impatient and
heterogeneous, strong rulers may extract more tax from the citizen groups along the
equilibrium path, compared to weak rulers. Because the former enjoy more flexibility
in setting redistribution schemes that can sustain their power; while the latter have to
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implement a policy that may enable them to ally with one of the citizen groups. The
results also indicate that if the collapse of a kleptocracy will be followed by a state
of anarchy,8 the citizen group with stronger capacity of fighting is likely to suffer
greater loss under a kleptocracy, because the rulers can extract more surplus from a
relative weaker citizen group, thus more willing to ally with them and discriminate
against the stronger group in the redistribution.
What is more, this paper generalizes the model of divide-and-rule to a society
with any number of citizen groups, and examines the impacts of the increase in the
number of citizen groups on the implementation of this strategy. The analytical re-
sults show that the strategy of divide-and-rule could also be successfully implemented
by the ruler to sustain the kleptocracy in a society with any number of citizen groups.
The increase in the number of citizen groups, or the fragmentation in a society, can
increase the survivability of a kleptocracy. The ruler will impose the maximum tax on
a proportion of the citizen groups, and among the other groups, the ruler will ally with
a number of them by imposing zero tax or providing transfer to them, so as to extract
as much tax as possible from each of the rest citizen groups. Hence, a numbers of
citizen groups may benefit from the divide-and-rule strategy, while the vast majority
will be marginalized in the redistribution of political and economic interests. And
the citizen groups with high endowment are more likely to be marginalized. Conse-
quently, sharp economic and political inequality between different citizens or citizen
groups may arise, due to the discriminatory redistribution policies imposed by the
kleptocratic regime.
Furthermore, two cases are introduced to show how this strategy may fail and the
kleptocracy may break down. In the first case, I assume that the citizen groups believe
that they would receive some bonus from removing the kleptocratic ruler and intro-
ducing an alternative regime. In the second case, I assume that the utility function of
8In this paper, it is assumed that in the state of anarchy, a fight for the ruling power will break out
between the citizen groups, and the winning group will seize all the resources from the other groups.
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a citizen group does not only take into account its own payoff, but also that of another
group. The analytical results show that if the citizen groups expect that they would
receive some bonus from removing the ruler and introducing an alternative regime,
this may help constrain the kleptocratic policy and even help bring down the ruler.
What is more, if the citizen groups are closely connected to each other and mutually
care about each other’s interests, this may serve to improve the payoff for each of
them, and even remove the ruler from power. Nonetheless, if the citizen groups are
hostile to each other, this will enable the ruler to extract more resources from each of
them.
Miquel (2006) develops a model in which the presence of ethnic identities and the
absence of institutionalized succession processes enable a kleptocratic ruler to gain
the support from a sizable share of the population, despite large welfare reduction
for all the population. The ruler is able to gain the support from his ethnic group
and sustain his rule, by exploiting their fear of falling under an equally inefficient
and venal ruler that favors another ethnic group. In his paper, the ruler is labelled
with certain ethnic identity, and he has to secure the support from his ethnic group,
in order to sustain his power. While my approach abstracts from the ethnic identity
problem, the ruler can stay in power as long as he can prevent the cooperation be-
tween different citizen groups, thus unveiling a different mechanism of sustaining a
kleptocratic regime.
The theoretical models developed by ARV and Miquel (2006) is applicable to a
society with two major citizen groups, while as we can see, there are usually more
than two major citizen groups in a society. For example, there are four major tribes
(Mongo, Luba, Kongo and the Mangbetu-Azande) in Congo and five (Kikuyu, Luhya,
Luo, Kalenjin and Kamba) in Kenya. This paper generalizes the model of divide-and-
rule to a society with any number of citizen groups, which solves the above problem.
What is more, both ARV and Miquel (2006) suggest that there would be a welfare
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reduction for all citizen groups or all the population under a kleptocracy. While this
paper shows that this conclusion is generally not valid when there are more than two
citizens groups. By generalizing the ruled citizen groups from two to any number,
this paper shows the discriminatory redistribution policies are more likely to prevail
in a society with many citizen groups. When there are more than two citizen groups,
given the discriminatory redistribution policies, the majority of the citizen groups
will suffer from the kleptocracy, however a small number of the citizen groups may
benefit from it.
This paper is related to the literature on the political economy of a weakly in-
stitutionalized society, such as Amegashie (2008), La Ferrara and Bates (2001) and
Jackson and Rosberg (1982), and mainly contributes to literature study the survival
of the kleptocracy and other authoritarian regimes, such as ARV, Gandhi and Prze-
worski (2007) and Miquel (2006). This paper contributes to the literature by carrying
out extensive theoretical study on the strategy of divide-and-rule in a kleptocracy.
This paper not only explores how this strategy could be implemented by kleptocrats
in various environments to sustain their power, but also investigates what factors may
constrain this strategy and promote the democratization in such a society. Besides
kleptocracies, the analytical results derived in this paper could be applied to any
weakly institutionalized society with the following two features: a) the ruler is able
to redistribute the political or economic resources in a society at any time at his will;
b) and the ruler is able to implement discriminatory allocation policies at his will.
This paper will proceed in the following way. Section 1.2 develops the models of
divide-and-rule by strong rulers. Section 1.3 develops the models of divide-and-rule
by weak rulers. Section 1.4 generalizes the model of divide-and-rule to a society
with a large numbers of citizen groups. Section 1.5 examines two cases in which the
strategy of divide-and-rule may fail, thus leading to the breakdown of the kleptocracy.
Section 1.6 applies the main analytical results to some real world cases. Section 1.7
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concludes.
1.2 The Basic Framework
The society consists of a strong ruler and two groups of citizens: citizen group 1
and citizen group 2.9 It is assumed that there is no collective action problem within
a citizen groups, thus for sake of simplicity, ‘citizen’ and ‘citizen group’ are inter-
changeable in this paper. In every period, citizen i, where i = 1,2, is endowed with
certain amount of surplus, denoted by ωi > 0, which refers to the economic interests
(such as income and natural resources) and political interests (such as voting power
and other political rights or power). Without affecting the main analytical result, the
amount of the ruler’s endowment is normalized to zero. The consumption of a citizen
i, where i = 1,2, at time t is given by:
Ci,t = ωi−Ti,t ,
where Ti,t is a lump-sum transfer or tax imposed on citizen i at time t. If Ti,t > 0,
it means that the lump-sum tax imposed on citizen i is Ti,t units; if Ti,t < 0, it implies
that the lump-sum transfer to citizen i is (−Ti,t) units. The utility of citizen i, where
i = 1,2, at time t is given by ∑∞s=t βCi,s, where β ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor. Here,
I assume that there is no deadweight loss resulting from taxation. Thus, we have:
−ω j 6 Ti,t 6 ωi, and the government budget constraint (GBC) is given by:
CR,t 6 T1,t +T2,t and 06 T1,t +T2,t 6 ω1+ω2.
CR,t is the consumption of the ruler in a period. And the ruler is assumed to have
the utility function∑∞s=t β sCR,s. The political state is denoted by St−1, where St−1 =D
if it is a democracy; otherwise, St−1 =K. In a kleptocracy, the ruler decides T1 and T2
9Here, the word ‘citizen groups’ can be replaced by ‘ethnic group’, ‘producer groups’ or ‘interest
group’.
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in a period. In a democracy, the two citizens set T1 = T2 = 0, thus Ck = 0. Therefore,
the expected lifetime utility of citizen i, where i = 1,2, in a democracy is given by:
V Di =
ωi
1−β . (1.1)
In this section and all the following sections, all the lifetime utilities for the play-
ers are expected values, and for the sake of simplicity, I leave out the expectation
operator in the utility equations.
In this basic model, it is assumed that the strong ruler will always punish the
citizen who is identified as the one who proposes to him from power. Timing of the
events in the political game are as follows. In each period, t, the society inherits
a political state, either St−1 = D or St−1 = K. If St−1 = D, the society remains so
forever, and the two citizens play the game denoted by Γ(D), where they set T1 =
T2 = 0. If the society is a kleptocracy, i.e., St−1 = K, they play the following game,
denoted by Γ(K), in period t:
1) The ruler announces (T1,T2).
2) Given (T1,T2), the citizens decide simultaneously whether to make a proposal
to remove the ruler from power. If neither of the citizens make the proposal, (T1,T2)
is implemented and the political system remains at St = K. While if at least one
citizen make the proposal, the game moves on to the following stage
3) If citizen j, where j = 1,2, makes a proposal to remove the ruler, then p j = 1;
if not, then p j = 0. If both citizens propose, each of them would be identified as
the proposer with probability 12 , and there must be one and only one identified as the
proposer. Observing the action taken by the citizens, the ruler makes a new offer
(T r1 ,T
r
2 ). Citizen i, where i 6= j, responds to the proposal raised by citizen j and the
new tax policy (T r1 ,T
r
2 ).
4) Given (T r1 ,T
r
2 ) and (T1,T2), if citizen i chooses to accept the proposal, denoted
by di = 1, then the ruler is removed from power and the society switches to a democ-
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racy, i.e., St =D. While if di = 0, the political system remains at St =K, and (T r1 ,T
r
2 )
is implemented, and the stage game remains Γ(K) in the following period.
In this basic model and all the following extended models, the focus is put on
pure strategy Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE), which is a mapping from the cur-
rent state of the game and past events to strategies. Here, the only state variable is
St−1. I introduce a tie-break assumption:
TIE-BREAK ASSUMPTION 1:
If the expected payoff from raising a proposal is equal to that from not raising it,
a citizen will always choose not to raise it or support one raised by the other citizen.
It is assumed that in period t, there is no cost for setting a tax policy, however in
the following periods under a kleptocracy, if the ruler announces a tax policy different
from the initial tax policy in the previous period, this will induce a small cost ε > 0
for the ruler, where ε → 0. This is to ensure that in the next period, the ruler will not
change the initial tax policy implemented in the previous period without any gain.
Given tie-break assumption 1, it is clear that any of the tax policies in the following
tax policy will be sustainable in the stage game denoted Γ(K) in every period:
{(T1 = ω1,T2 = 0),(T1 = 0,T2 = ω2)}
The above tax policy implies that the ruler can sustain the kleptocracy by taking
all the endowment from one citizen, while allying with the other one by imposing
a lump-sum tax that makes this citizen indifferent to whether the ruler is removed
or not. In this basic model, it is assumed that following the collapse of the klep-
tocracy, the society will turn into a democracy, and each citizen keeps whatever he
is endowed. Therefore, the lump-sum tax that makes this citizen indifferent is zero.
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Either tax policy in the tax policy is called an ‘allying tax policy’, which makes at
least one of the citizens indifferent to whether the ruler is removed or not. I introduce
another tie-break assumption:
TIE-BREAK ASSUMPTION 2:
If the rules gets the same payoff from the allying tax policy as that from the non-
allying tax policies, he will always opt for the former.
Now, let’s examine the tax policy that could be imposed by the ruler when T1,T2 >
0. Following the ruler’s decision on (T1,T2), where Ti > 0 for i= 1,2, whether citizen
j, where j = 1,2, is going to raise the proposal will depend on his expectation on the
action taken by citizen i, where i 6= j. If citizen j expects that citizen i will not be
bought off by a new tax policy (T r1 ,T
r
2 ), he will raise the proposal and the ruler will be
removed from power; otherwise they will not, and the kleptocracy remains along the
equilibrium path. Therefore, when the ruler announces (T1,T2), he must ensure that
once he is challenged by either of the two citizens, a new tax policy (T r1 ,T
r
2 ) can be
raised to buy off the other citizen. As long as the above constraint can be satisfied, the
kleptocracy will remain and the initial tax policy (T1,T2) that maximizes the ruler’s
payoff will be sustained as the equilibrium tax policy (T e1 ,T
e
2 ) along the equilibrium
path of the game. The MPE in this game will be characterized by backward induction.
1.2.1 Strong Ruler and Equal Endowments
Suppose that ω1 = ω2, and without loss of generality, let ω1 = ω2 = 1. It is
obvious that if the ruler chooses the allying tax policy, his payoff in each period is
1. Now suppose the ruler announces a non-allying tax policy (T1,T2),where Ti > 0
for i = 1,2. Let’s start with the subgame in which citizen j, where j = 1,2, has made
a proposal to remove the ruler and he is identified as the proposer. Then given the
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initial tax policy, the ruler responds with T ri for citizen i, where i 6= j, so as to buy off
him; otherwise he will be removed. Given (T1,T2), let’s find out what is the new tax
policy (T r1 ,T
r
2 ) that maximizes V
K
i (T
r
i |Ti) subject to the GBC, where V Ki (T ri |Ti) is the
expected continuation value for citizen i under kleptocracy if he accepts the new tax
policy. This maximization problem can be written as:
V Ki (Ti) = MaxT r1 ,T r2
V Ki (T
r
i |Ti) (1.2)
s.t. GBC i.e. CR,t 6 T1,t +T2,t and 06 T1,t +T2,t 6 2.
Solving the above maximization problem, we have: (T r∗j = 1,T r∗i = −1), which
means that after a proposal is raised, the ruler will set the maximum tax 1 on citizen
j, where j = 1,2, and provide 1 unit of transfer to citizen i, where i 6= j, in order to
prevent him from supporting the proposal. Substituting (T r∗j = 1,T r∗i =−1) into the
above value function, we can derive the maximum off-the-equilibrium-path continu-
ation value for citizen i in period t, as a function of the tax policy (T1,T2).
V Ki (Ti) = 2+
β (1−Ti)
1−β . (1.3)
Given (T r∗j = 1,T r∗i =−1), if citizen i accepts the proposal of removing the ruler
in period t , i.e., di = 1, the continuation value for him is given by V Di . It is clear:
V Ki (Ti)>V Di if and only if −T r∗i > βTi1−β , which gives:
Ti 6
1−β
β
(1.4)
When Ti > 0 for i= 1,2, in order to extract as much tax as possible from both cit-
izens, the ruler will always raise a new tax policy such that given the original tax pol-
icy, the off-the-equilibrium path continuation value for citizen i will be maximized.
Since β ∈ (0,1), it is clear by adjusting the value of Ti, we can always ensure the in-
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equality (1.4) holds. Therefore along the equilibrium path, anticipating the response
from the ruler and the action taken by the citizen receiving the proposal, neither cit-
izens raises the proposal, thus the ruler can sustain the kleptocracy by the strategy
of divide-and-rule. Subject to the constraint that V Ki (Ti) > V Di , where i = 1,2, the
initial tax policy (T1,T2) that maximizes the continuation value for the ruler will be
sustained as the equilibrium tax policy along the equilibrium path of the game.
Here, the problem of maximizing the continuation value for the ruler along the
equilibrium path, is equivalent to maximizing his per period consumption along the
equilibrium path, i.e.:
Max
T1,T2
CR = T1+T2,
subject to the constraint: given the initial tax policy (T1,T2), once a proposal is
raised by one citizen, the ruler can always raise a new tax policy (T r1 ,T
r
2 ) such that
V Ki (Ti)>V Di for another citizen.
Given the symmetry between the two citizens, we can infer that when β 6 12 ,
T ∗i = 1, where i = 1,2. Given the tax policy T ∗1 = T
∗
2 = 1, we have CR = 2, which
is larger than the payoff from the allying tax policy. When β > 12 , T
∗
i =
1−β
β , where
i= 1,2. thus CR =
2(1−β )
β . It is easy to show when
1
2 < β <
2
3 , it is a dominant strategy
for the ruler to set (T1 =
1−β
β ,T2 =
1−β
β ); When β >
2
3 , it is a weakly dominant
strategy for the ruler to choose either of the allying tax policies, i.e.: (T1 = 1,T2 = 0)
or (T1 = 0,T2 = 1).
PROPOSITION 1.1:
a) When β 6 12 , the MPE tax policy is given by: (T e1 = T e2 = 1);
b) When 12 < β <
2
3 , there is a unique MPE tax policy: (T
e
1 = T
e
2 =
1−β
β );
c) When β > 23 , the MPE tax policy is given by either one in the following tax
policy: {(T e1 = 1,T e2 = 0), (T e1 = 0,T e2 = 1)}.
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According to the above analytical results, when the citizens are extremely impa-
tient, i.e., β 6 12 , the ruler will exploit this and maximize his payoff by imposing
the maximum tax on both of them. When the citizens are relatively patient, i.e.
1
2 < β <
2
3 , the ruler will impose equal positive tax on both citizens, which is mono-
tonically decreasing on the discount factor β . When the citizens are rather patient,
i.e. β > 23 , the ruler will ally with either of the citizens by imposing zero tax on him,
in order to extract all the surplus from another citizen. Because when the citizens are
extremely patient, if the ruler chooses to impose positive tax on both of the citizens,
the total amount of the tax collected from both of them is less than 1, which is below
the maximum tax that could be imposed on just one of them along the equilibrium
path. The rulers’ payoff in each period along the equilibrium path can be shown in
the following graph:
β 
CR 
2 
1/2 2/3 1 
CR=2 
CR= 
𝟐(𝟏−β)
β  
 1 
CR=𝟏 
Graph 1  
 
1.2.2 Strong Ruler and Unequal Endowments
In this subsection, I assume that the endowments for the two citizens are unequal.
Without loss of generality, I assume that citizen 1 has low endowment, and ω1 = 1;
while citizen 2 has high endowment, and ω2 = µ > 1. It is clear that either of the tax
policies in the following policy vector will be sustainable in the stage game denoted
by Γ(K) in every period: {(T1 = 1,T2 = 0),(T1 = 0,T2 = µ)}
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It is obvious that (T1 = 0,T2 = µ) brings higher payoff to the ruler, compared to
(T1 = 1,T2 = 0). Hence, it is a strictly dominant strategy for the ruler to ally with the
citizen with low endowment, compared to allying with the one with high endowment.
The tax policy (T1 = 0,T2 = µ) gives µ units of payoff for the ruler in each period.
Similar to the analysis in Subsection 1.2.1, it is easy to show if the ruler imposes
positive tax on both citizens, the optimal sustainable tax policy for the ruler is given
by: (T1 = min{1, µ(1−β )β },T2 = min{µ, 1−ββ }). (Please refer to Appendix I.1 for the
proof)
PROPOSITION 1.2: (Please refer to Appendix I.2 for the proof)
a) Given any value of µ , when β 6 11+µ , there is a unique MPE tax policy: (T e1 =
1,T e2 = µ);
b) If µ 6 1+
√
5
2 , i) when
1
1+µ < β 6
1+µ
1+2µ , there is a unique MPE tax policy:
(T e1 = min{1, µ(1−β )β },T e2 = 1−ββ );
ii) when β > 1+µ1+2µ , there is a unique MPE tax policy: (T
e
1 = 0,T
e
2 = µ);
c) If µ > 1+
√
5
2 , i) when
1
1+µ 6 β <
1
µ , there is a unique MPE tax policy: (T
e
1 =
1,T e2 =
1−β
β ); ii) when β >
1
µ , there is a unique MPE tax policy: (T
e
1 = 0,T
e
2 = µ).
Based on the above analysis, the rulers’ consumption in each period along the
equilibrium can be shown in the following graphs:
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In summary, in the case that the ruler imposes positive tax on both of the citizens,
a challenge from citizen j, j = 1, 2, is met by (T r∗i ,T r∗j ) such that V Ki (T ri |T ei )>V Di ,
as a result, citizen i, where i 6= j, would decline the proposal to remove the ruler, i.e.,
di = 0. Anticipating the response from the ruler and the action taken by the citizen
receiving the proposal, neither citizen raises the proposal and the kleptocracy remains
along the equilibrium path. In the case that the ruler imposes zero tax on one of the
citizens and maximum tax on another one, the former citizen is indifferent to whether
the ruler is removed or not, thus there is no chance for the other one to remove the
ruler. As a result, the kleptocracy will be sustained along the equilibrium path.
The above analytical results show that greater inequality between the endow-
ments of different social members may not necessarily decrease the ruler’s payoff
and constrain kleptocratic policies. Even if the citizens are identical, discriminatory
tax policies may be implemented by the ruler, in order to maximize his payoff.
1.2.3 Strong Ruler and Anarchy
In the previous subsections, it is assumed that after the kleptocrat is removed
from power, the society will switch into a democracy. But as we can observe from
numerous cases throughout history, a democracy does not necessarily follows the
collapse of a kleptocracy, instead, a society may fall into a state of anarchy after
a kleptocrat is removed from power. This subsection is going to examine how the
strategy of divide-and-rule could be implemented by the ruler, in the case that a state
of anarchy follows the collapse of the kleptocracy.
In this subsection, it is assumed that after the kleptocrat is removed from power,
the society will fall into the state of anarchy, in which a fight will break out between
these two citizens, and the winner will keep his own endowment and seize the entire
flow of the endowment of another citizen; while the loser will lose his endowment
21
forever.10
In this subsection, political regime is either a kleptocracy or an anarchy. The
political state is denoted by St−1, where St−1 = A if it is an anarchy; otherwise,
St−1 = K. In the anarchy state, a fight will break out between these two citizens, and
the winner will take all. Here, it is assumed that after a fight breaks out between these
two players, player i will win with probability Qi, where Q1 = q and Q2 = 1−q. Thus
the expected continuation values for the two citizens in the anarchy are given by:
V A1 =
2q
1−β (1.5)
V A2 =
2(1−q)
1−β (1.6)
It is obvious that when q = 12 , the analytical results in this model are exactly the
same as those in Subsection 1.2.1. Without loss of generality, I assume 12 < q < 1,
i.e., citizen 1 is relatively stronger than citizen 2. If the society is a kleptocracy, i.e.,
St−1 = K, they play the stage game denoted by Γ(KA). The stage game Γ(KA) is the
same as the one in the basic framework, except that after citizen j, where j = 1,2,
proposes to remove the ruler, if citizen i, where i 6= j, accepts the proposal, the ruler
is removed from power and the society switches to an anarchy, i.e., St = A, instead of
a democracy.
PROPOSITION 1.3: (Please refer to Appendix I.3 for the proof)
If the collapse of the kleptocracy is followed by the state of anarchy, there is a
unique MPE tax policy given by: (T e1 = 1,T
e
2 =
2q−β
β ).
We can infer that if the collapse of the kleptocracy is followed by the state of
10For more comprehensive and illuminating analysis on the strategic interaction between the players
in the state of anarchy(/nature), please refer to Hirshleifer (1995) and Muthoo (2004).
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anarchy, given any value of q and β , the ruler will always opt for the optimal allying
tax policy. Given this tax policy, the citizen who is relatively stronger will be deprived
of all of his endowment; while for the one who is relatively weaker, the cost to ally
with the ruler is Tˆ2 in each period. It is clear that ∂ Tˆ2∂q =
2
β > 0, which shows that the
cost is monotonically increasing on q, i.e., the weaker the ally, the more surplus the
ruler can extract from him. And it is easy to show that when the citizens are relatively
patient, i.e. β > 1−q, the ruler will be able to extract more total surplus, compared to
the case that the collapse of the kleptocracy is followed by a democracy. This implies
that if the citizens expect that the collapse of the kleptocracy would be followed by
an anarchy and wars, this may help sustain the kleptocracy.
1.3 Equilibrium without the Commitment Assumption
In this two-citizen model, I remove the commitment assumption that the ruler
will always punish the one who proposes, and allow the ruler to choose to punish or
buy off anyone after a proposal is raised. If the society is a kleptocracy, i.e., St−1 =K,
they play the game, denoted by Γ(Kˆ), in which all the other settings are the same to
those in Subsection 1.2.1, except the following two points:
i) After the ruler makes a new offer (T r1 ,T
r
2 ), both citizens respond to the proposal
and the new tax policy (T r1 ,T
r
2 );
ii) Given (T1,T2) and (T r1 ,T
r
2 ), if both citizens choose to accept the proposal,
denoted by di = d j = 1, then the ruler is removed from power and the society switches
to a democracy, i.e., St = D. Otherwise, the political system remains at St = K, and
(T r1 ,T
r
2 ) is implemented in this period.
1.3.1 Weak Ruler and Equal Endowments
Here, it is assumed that the two citizens have equal endowments, i.e., ω1 = ω2 =
1. The analysis will start with the subgame in which given the initial tax policy
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(T1,T2), where T1,T2 > 0, citizen j, where j = 1,2, has made a proposal to remove
the ruler and been identified by the ruler as the proposer. Then if the best response
by the ruler is to punish citizen j and buy off citizen i, i.e., (T rj,t = 1,T
r
i,t 6 0), no one
will raise a proposal again in any of the all the following periods. Thus the initial
tax policy (T1,T2) will be sustained in all the periods starting from period t + 1. In
period t, in order to prevent citizen i from accepting the proposal, we must have
V Ki
(
T ei,t
)
>V Di , which gives:
T ri,t 6−
βTi
1−β (2.1)
Since T ri >−1, we can infer that the new tax policy that punishes citizen j would
be applicable if and only if: βTi1−β 6 1. This means that given Ti 6
1−β
β , in order to buy
off citizen i, the ruler will seize one unit of endowment form citizen j, and transfer at
least βTi1−β unit to citizen i. Let T
r
i,t =− βTi1−β , we can derive that if the ruler chooses to
punish the proposer, the continuation value for him is given by:
VR,t(T rj,t = 1) =UR,t(T
r
j,t = 1)+βVR,t+1(T
r
j,t = 1)
= 1− βTi
1−β +β (
Ti
1−β +
Tj
1−β ) = 1+
βTj
1−β (2.2)
While if the ruler chooses to buy off citizen j in period t, i.e., (T ri,t = 1,T
r
j,t 6 0).
Then suppose that citizen j accepts T rj,t and chooses to support the ruler, i.e., d j,t = 0,
the payoffs for citizens j and i in period t are given by:
U j,t(T rj,t 6 0) = 1−T rj,t
Ui,t(T rj,t 6 0) = 0
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It is clear that if the transfer is sufficient to buy off the proposer, the kleptocracy
will be sustained and the political state remains at St = K.
LEMMA 2.1:
Since citizens 1 and 2 are identical, if it is the optimal strategy for the ruler to
buy off the one who is identified as the proposer in period t, in the stage game Γ(Kˆ)
in any of the following periods, given (T1,T2), no matter it is citizen 1 or 2 who is
identified as the proposer, the ruler will always choose to buy off the proposer.
Therefore, if the best response to p j,t = 1 is given by (T ri,t = 1,T
r
j,t 6 0), in the
stage game denoted by Γ(K) in period t and all the following periods, both citizens
will choose to propose, and the best response by the ruler is to buy off the one who is
identified as the proposer. In a period, with probability 12 , citizen j will be identified
by the ruler as the proposer. Therefore the expected payoff for citizen j in period
t+ x, where x> 1, is given by:
E[U j,t+x] =
1
2
(1−T rj,t+x)
Since at any period following period t, when the ruler makes a new offer to buy
off citizen j after he is identified as the proposer, the subgame between the ruler and
citizen j in the stage game Γ(Kˆ) is exactly the same as that in period t. Let T rj,t = T rj ,
then if T rj could be accepted by citizen j in period t, it will also be accepted by him
at any period following period t. Therefore, we can infer that:
T rj,t = T
r
j,t+1 = T
r
j,t+2 = ...≡ T rj
Hence we can derive that in period t, if the citizen j chooses to accept the new
offer made by the ruler, the value function for him is given by:
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Vj,t(d j,t = 0|T rj 6 0) = 1−T rj,t +βE[U j,t+1]+β 2E[U j,t+2]+ ...
=
2−β
2(1−β )(1−T
r
j ) (2.3)
It is clear that given T rj , citizen j will choose to decline the proposal raised by
citizen i, where i 6= j, if and only if Vj,t(d j,t = 0|T rj 6 0)>V Dj , which gives:
T rj 6
−β
2−β
Let T rj =
−β
2−β , we can infer that if the ruler chooses to buy off the one who is
identified as the proposer, a proposal would be raised in every period, and in order
to buy off the proposer, he will provide β2−β unit of surplus to the proposer in each
period, thus the value function for the ruler is given by:
VR,t(T rj,t 6 0) =
2
2−β (2.4)
It is easy to show: (2.2)>(2.4) if and only if:
Tj >
1−β
2−β (2.5)
LEMMA 2.2:
It is a weakly dominant strategy for the ruler to punish citizen j, where j = 1,2,
after he is identified as the proposer, if and only if the lump-sum tax that is imposed
on him and could be sustained by punishing him, is equal to or larger than 1−β2−β .
Similar to the analysis in Subsection 1.2.1, it is clear that given (T1,T2), where
T1,T2 > 0, if the ruler always chooses to punish the one identified as the proposer and
buy off the other one, the optimal tax policy can be sustained is given by:
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T1 = T2 = min{1−ββ ,1}
Since 1−β2−β < min{1−ββ ,1}, it is clear that for any value of β ∈ (0,1), in the stage
game Γ(Kˆ) at any period, after a citizen is identified as the proposer, the best response
by the ruler is always to punish the citizen who proposes and buy off the other one.
Therefore, given (T1 = 1,T2 = 1) when β 6 12 or (T1 =
1−β
β ,T2 =
1−β
β ) when β >
1
2 ,
anticipating the new tax policy imposed by the ruler after a citizen is identified as the
proposer and the response of the citizen receiving the proposal, neither citizens would
raise a proposal, thus the above tax policies could be sustained in all the periods.
Similar to the analysis in Subsection 1.2.1, it is easy to show if β 6 12 , the MPE tax
policy is: (T e1 = T
e
2 = 1); while if
1
2 < β 6
2
3 , the MPE tax policy is (T
e
1 = T
e
2 =
1−β
β );
while if 23 < β < 1, the MPE tax policy is: (T
e
1 = 1,T
e
2 = 0) or (T
e
1 = 0,T
e
2 = 1).
PROPOSITION 2.1.
Without commitment assumption, in the model with two citizens having equal
endowments, given (T1,T2), where T1,T2 > 0, it is indeed an optimal strategy for the
ruler to always punish the citizen who is identified as the proposer, and the derived
analytical results are exactly the same to those in the basic model in Subsection 1.2.1,
in which it is assumed that the proposer will always be punished.
According to the above proposition, we can infer that if a kleptocratic society has
two citizen groups with similar endowments, it would be difficult to distinguish the
types of the rulers, based on the redistribution policies adopted by them. Because
both the strong ruler and the weak ruler will always punish the citizen initiating the
challenge, and opt for similar redistribution policies.
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1.3.2 Weak Ruler and Unequal Endowments
Now suppose that the two citizens have unequal endowments, and ω1 = 1 and
ω2 = µ > 1. We can derive the following lemma:
LEMMA 2.3: (Please refer to Appendix I.4 for the proof)
Given any initial tax policy (T1,T2), where T1,T2 > 0, in a period, if citizen 2 is
identified as the proposer, it is a dominant strategy for the ruler to punish him and
buy off citizen 1; while if citizen 1 is identified as the proposer, the best response by
the ruler is always to buy off him.
Hence anticipating the response from the ruler, citizen 2 would never raise a pro-
posal to remove the ruler from power, while citizen 1 will always propose as long as
T1 > 0. Hence in order to prevent citizen 1 from raising a proposal, the ruler must set
T1 = 0. Since citizen 2 will never propose, even if T2 = µ , we may conclude that the
tax policy that is sustainable and maximizes the ruler’s payoff along the equilibrium
path is given by (T e1 = 0,T
e
2 = µ).
PROPOSITION 2.2:
Without the commitment assumption, in the model with two-citizen having un-
equal endowments, there is a unique MPE tax policy given by (T e1 = 0,T
e
2 = µ), i.e.,
the ruler will always choose to sustain the kleptocracy by allying with the citizen with
low endowment.
Given (T e1 = 0,T
e
2 = µ), citizen 1 has no incentive to raise a proposal and remove
the ruler from power, since his payoff will not be increased by removing the ruler;
while citizen 2 will not propose because it will never be successful in removing the
ruler and the ruler is not going to buy off him after he is identified as the proposer.
As a result, the kleptocracy will remain and this tax policy will be sustained in all the
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periods. This implies that in order to maximize the payoff and sustain the kleptocracy,
the ruler will always choose to ally with the citizen with low endowment by imposing
zero lump-sum tax on him, while at the same time, seizes all the surplus from the
citizen with high endowment.
As we can see, the above analytical results are different from those in the model in
Subsection 1.2.2, in which it is assumed that the proposer will always be punished. In
the model with the commitment assumption, it is not necessarily an optimal strategy
for the ruler to ally with the low endowment citizen and deprive the high endowment
one of all his surplus, and it is possible for the ruler to sustain the kleptocracy by
imposing positive tax on both of the citizens. While in this model without the com-
mitment assumption, along the equilibrium path, the ruler will always choose to ally
with the low endowment citizen and deprive the other one of all his endowment, and
it is impossible for the ruler to sustain a non-allying tax policy along the equilibrium
path. When the citizens have unequal endowments and are relatively impatient, com-
pared to the optimal allying tax policy, the sustainable optimal non-allying tax policy
extracting tax from both citizens, may bring higher payoff to the ruler. Therefore,
when the citizens have unequal endowments and are relatively impatient, compared
to the weak ruler, the strong ruler can extract more total surplus along the equilibrium
path. For example, when µ > 1+
√
5
2 , the relative payoffs between the strong ruler and
the weak one can be shown in the following graph:
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1.3.3 Weak Ruler and Anarchy
The environment in this subsection is the same to the one in Subsection 1.2.3
except that the strong ruler is now replaced by a weak one. Similar to the analysis
in Subsection 1.3.2, we may conclude that if both of the citizens could benefit from
removing the ruler from power, it is impossible for the ruler to sustain the kleptocracy.
Therefore, in order to sustain the kleptocracy, the initial tax policy (T1,T2) should
make at least one of the two citizens indifferent to whether the ruler is removed or
not. Based on the analysis in Subsection 1.2.3, we know that it is a dominant strategy
for the ruler to ally the citizen who is relatively weaker.
PROPOSITION 2.3:
If the kleptocracy by a weak ruler is followed by the state of anarchy, without the
commitment assumption, there is a unique MPE tax policy: (T e1 = 1,T
e
2 =
2q−β
β ).
As we can see, the above analytical result is exactly the same to those in the model
with commitment assumption in Subsection 1.2.3. This implies, if the kleptocracy is
followed by the state of anarchy, no matter the ruler is strong type or weak type, he
will always choose to allying the citizen who is relatively weaker along the equilib-
rium path. As a result, the citizen who is relatively strong is always marginalized in
the redistribution, because of the discriminatory tax policy.
Combining the analytical results derived in Section 1.2 and 1.3, we can infer when
the citizen groups are patient and heterogeneous, strong rulers may extract more tax
from the citizen groups along the equilibrium path of sustaining their power. Because
the former enjoy more flexibility in setting redistribution schemes that can sustain
their power; while the latter have to implement an allying tax policy. Thus the divide-
and-rule strategy could be more successfully implemented by a strong ruler, which
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explains why the dictators may try to set an example for the ruled citizens groups,
by punishing the one initiating the challenge. What is more, the results show that
if the collapse of a kleptocracy would be followed by a state of anarchy, the citizen
group with stronger capacity of fighting is more likely to suffer greater loss under
the kleptocracy. Because a relatively weaker citizen group has stronger incentive
to support the ruler to sustain the kleptocracy, thus the ruler will get higher payoff
through allying with the weaker one and discriminating against the stronger one in
the redistribution.
1.4 Larger Numbers of Citizen Groups
In the above basic model, we have shown that when there are only two citizens,
the ruler can always successfully implement the strategy of divide-and-rule to sustain
the kleptocracy. But what if there are more than two citizens? How will the increase
in the number of citizens affect the survivability of the kleptocracy, and payoffs for
the ruler and citizens? In order to answer the above questions, this section extends
the model of divide-and-rule by a strong ruler to a society with n citizens, where
n> 3. I assume that in order to remove the ruler, at least n2 citizens need to accept the
proposal if n is an even number; while at least n−12 citizens if n is an odd number. Two
different cases are going to be examined in this section: one is that these n citizens
have equal endowments, and the other one is that these n citizens could be divided
into two groups with unequal endowments.
In this section, if St−1 = K, they play the following game Γ(K˜) in period t:
1) The ruler announces (T1,T2, ...,Tn).
2) All citizens decide simultaneously whether to raise a proposal to remove the
ruler from power. If none of the citizens make the proposal, (T1,T2, ...,Tn) is imple-
mented and the political system remains at St = K. While if at least one citizen raises
the proposal, the game moves on to the following stages.
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3) If citizen j, where j = 1,2, ...,n, makes a proposal to remove the ruler, denoted
by p j = 1; if not, denoted by p j = 0. If at lease two citizens propose simultaneously,
then randomly set p j = 1 for one of them, and pi = 0 for all the other ones. Observing
the action taken by citizen j, the ruler makes a new offer (T r1 ,T
r
2 , ...,T
r
n ). Then all
the other citizens, except citizen j, respond to the proposal raised by citizen j and the
new tax policy (T r1 ,T
r
2 , ...,T
r
n ).
4) Given (T1,T2, ...,Tn) and (T r1 ,T
r
2 , ...,T
r
n ), If citizen i, where i 6= j, chooses to
accept the proposal, denote this by di = 1. If ∑ni=1 di > n2 when n is an even number,
or ∑ni=1 di > n−12 when n is an odd number, the ruler is removed from power and the
society switches to a democracy, i.e., St =D. Otherwise, the political system remains
at St = K and (T r1 ,T
r
2 , ...,T
r
n ) is implemented, and the stage game Γ(K˜) remains in
the following period.
1.4.1 Equal Endowments
Firstly, let’s look at the case in which these n citizens have equal endowments. It
is clear that in this extended model the GBC is given by:
CR,t 6
n
∑
i=1
Ti,t and 06
n
∑
i=1
Ti,t 6 n
Let’s start with the subgame in which citizen j, where j = 1,2, ...,n, has made
a proposal to remove the ruler. Then given the initial tax policy, the ruler responds
with a new tax policy (T r1 ,T
r
2 , ...,T
r
n ). In order to sustain the kleptocracy, the ruler
must ensure that ∑ni=1 di <
n
2 when n is an even number, or ∑
n
i=1 di <
n−1
2 when n is
an odd number, otherwise he will be removed. Given the assumption that if the ruler
announces a tax policy different from the initial tax policy in the previous period, this
will induce a small cost ε > 0 for the ruler, we can infer that if the kleptocracy could
be successfully sustained, the initial tax policy announced and implemented in period
t, will also be implemented in all the periods along the equilibrium path.
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Here, we can divide the analysis into two different cases, regarding whether n is
an even number or an odd number. Firstly, let’s examine the case that n is an odd
number. In this case, as long as the ruler can buy off n+12 citizens, the kleptocracy
can be sustained. Similar to the analysis in the previous section, now define:
V Ki (Ti) = Max
(T r1 ,T
r
2 ,...,T
r
n )
V Ki (T
r
i |Ti) (3.1)
s.t. CR,t 6
n
∑
i=1
Ti,t and 06
n
∑
i=1
Ti,t 6 n
It is obvious that if the ruler will never try to prevent a citizen from supporting the
proposal, he will impose the maximum tax on this citizen. Since the ruler only needs
to prevent n+12 citizens from supporting the proposal, solving the above maximization
problem, he will set a revised tax 1 on the citizen who raises the proposal and the
other (n−12 − 1) citizens whom are chosen by the ruler not to buy off. The revised
tax will be equal or smaller than one for the rest n+12 citizens, whom the ruler will
try to prevent from supporting the proposal. Thus if the ruler tries to prevent citizen
i, where i 6= j, from supporting the proposal, the maximum off-the-equilibrium path
continuation value for this citizen can be presented as a function of the tax policy
(T1,T2, ...,Tn):
V Ki (T
e
i ) = 1−T ri +
β (1−Ti)
1−β . (3.2)
If citizen i accepts the proposal of removing the ruler in period t, i.e., di = 1, his
expected total discounted payoff is given by V Di . It is clear that V
K
i (Ti) > V Di if and
only if:
Ti 6
1−β
β
(−T ri ). (3.3)
Based on inequality (3.3), we can infer that if Ti > 0, given any value of T ri < 0,
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by adjusting the value of Ti, we can always ensure the above inequality holds. This
means if the initial tax imposed on a citizen is positive, in order to prevent him from
supporting the proposal, the ruler needs to provide a positive amount of transfer to
this citizen after he is challenged. This is in sharp contrast to the model in ARV, in
which
It is important to note that given Ti6 0, inequality (3.3) holds as long as T ri 6
−βTi
1−β
and T ri 6 1. This implies that if the initial tax on a citizen is zero, the ruler can prevent
this citizen from supporting the proposal with zero amount of transfer after he is
challenged; While if the initial tax on a citizen is negative, i.e., the ruler provides a
positive amount of transfer to this citizen, he can prevent this citizen from supporting
the proposal even if he imposes a positive tax on this citizen after he is challenged.
This is in sharp contrast to the model in ARV, in which the ruler will never provide
any transfer to any citizen group along the equilibrium path.
The intuition is that as long as the ruler can prevent n+12 citizens from supporting
the proposal, the initial tax policy that maximizes the ruler’s payoff will be sustained
along the equilibrium path in all the following periods starting from period t + 1.
Hence, the tax extracted by the ruler after he is challenged in period t, will be com-
pensated by the transfer in all the following periods. The transfer provided by the
ruler to a citizen could be regarded as a kind of ‘insurance’ against the risk of being
challenged. The more total amount of transfer to some citizens, the more surplus
could be mobilized by the ruler to fight off the challenge. The surplus that could
be extracted from a citizen once the ruler is challenged, could serve as a universal
deterrence on the rest citizens.
As long as the ruler can prevent n+12 citizens from supporting the proposal, along
the equilibrium path, anticipating the response from the ruler and the action taken
by the citizens who receive the proposal, no citizens raises the proposal. As a re-
sult, the kleptocracy will be successfully sustained by the strategy of divide-and-rule.
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Subject to the constraint that V Ki (Ti) > V Di for n+12 citizens, the initial tax policy
(T ∗1 ,T
∗
2 , ...,T
∗
n ) that maximizes the ruler’s payoff will be sustained as the MPE tax
policy along the equilibrium path.
Since the ruler does not need to prevent all the citizens receiving the proposal
from supporting it, we can infer that he can divide the citizens into two different
groups. One consists of the potential citizens to be prevented from supporting the
proposal after it is raised. The other one consists of the citizens whose decision on
whether to support the proposal will not affect the survivability of the kleptocracy.
Those citizens in the second group will be completely marginalized in the redistri-
bution, no matter the ruler is challenged or not. Here, the first group is named as
the NON-MARGINALIZED GROUP (henceforth NG), and the second group is named
as the MARGINALIZED GROUP (henceforth MG). The problem of maximizing the
ruler’s payoff is given by:
Max
T1,...,Tn
CR =
n
∑
i=1
Ti,
subject to the constraint: given the initial tax policy (T1,T2, ...,Tn), once a pro-
posal is raised by a citizen, the ruler can always raise a new tax policy (T r1 ,T
r
2 , ...,T
r
n )
such that V Ki (Ti)>V Di for n+12 citizens.
It is clear that in order to maximize the payoff along the equilibrium path, the
ruler will set the maximum tax on all the citizens in the MG. In order to maximize
the payoff, he needs to decide the minimum number of citizens to be put in NG.
To answer this question, let’s examine two different cases. In the first case that a
proposal is raised by a citizen in the MG, to ensure V Ki (Ti)>V Di for n+12 citizens, the
NG should at least consists of n+12 citizens. While in the second case that a proposal
is raised by a citizen in the NG, to ensure V Ki (Ti) > V Di for n+12 citizens, the NG
should at least consist of n+32 citizens, because the member of the NG who proposes,
35
will be penalized by the ruler. Therefore, to ensure that along the equilibrium path,
the ruler will not be challenged by any citizen, the minimum number of citizens to be
put in the NG is given by n+32 .
After a proposal is raised by a citizen, if it is raised by a citizen in the NG, he will
set the maximum revised tax 1 on this citizen; while if it is raised by a citizen in the
MG, he will set the revised tax 1 on one citizen in the NG. It is clear that if the ruler
imposes a zero or negative tax on a citizen in the NG, this citizen will never raise
the proposal. Now suppose that in order to maximize the payoff, the ruler chooses to
ally with m citizens in the NG, where 0 6 m 6 n+12 , by imposing a zero or negative
tax on each of them. Hence, we could further divide the citizens in the NG into two
sub-groups: ALLY GROUP and NON-ALLY GROUP. Now rearrange all those citizens
in the NG as the first n+32 ones, and those in the ally group as the first m ones.
It is obvious that to maximize the ruler’s payoff along the equilibrium path, he
will set tax 1 on n−32 citizens in the MG, and maximize the total tax revenue from
those citizens in the NG. Given m citizens in the ally group, where 0 6 m 6 n+12 , if
a proposal is raised, the ruler can prevent all these m citizens from supporting the
proposal with a revised tax policy T ri 6 0, where j = 1,2, ...,m, and the total amount
of the tax that could be collected from these m citizens is given by∑mi=1 T ri . Here, let’s
use W to denote the total amount of surplus available to prevent (n+12 −m) citizens
from supporting the proposal. We can derive that:
W =
m
∑
i=1
T ri +
n−1
2
(3.4)
It is clear that the ruler can prevent citizens j, where j = 1,2, ...,m, from support-
ing the proposal if and only if::
T ri 6−
β
1−β Ti. (3.5)
Since T ri 6 1, we can infer that:
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Ti >−1−ββ ≡ T˜A, (3.6)
where i = 1,2, ...,m. Inequality (3.6) implies that because the maximum tax that
could be extracted from a citizen is one, given the initial tax policy, the transfer
provided by the ruler should be equal or less than 1−ββ ; otherwise, it would be a
‘waste’ for the ruler.
Let’s use TA to denote the average amount of transfer to the citizens in the ally
group. We must have TA > T˜A, and the maximum total amount of surplus, available
to prevent (n+12 −m) citizens from supporting the proposal, could be presented by:
W = m(− β
1−β TA)+
n−1
2
≡ Wˆ (3.7)
LEMMA 3.1: (Please refer to Appendix I.5 for the proof)
Given any value of W, the tax policy maximizing the total tax revenue from the
non-ally group is given by a uniform tax policy:
Tm+1 = Tm+2 = ...= Tn+3
2
= TB,
where TB = min{1, TˆB} and TˆB = 1−ββ ( Wn+1
2 −m
)
When W = Wˆ , we have:
TB = min{1, Tˆ ′B}. (3.8)
where Tˆ ′B =
−mTA+ n−12 ( 1−ββ )
n+1
2 −m
. We can infer that Tˆ ′B 6 1 if and only if:
TA >−[2βn− (n−1)2βm −1]≡ TˆA (3.9)
Where TˆA 6 0 if and only if:
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m6 2βn− (n−1)
2β
≡ mˆ (3.10)
It is clear that given m6 mˆ, we have: (please refer to Appendix I.6 for the proof)
∂ Tˆ ′B
∂TA
=
m
m− n+12
< 0,
which shows that when m 6 mˆ, Tˆ ′B is monotonically decreasing on TA, i.e., in-
creasing the average transfer to the citizens in the ally group will raise the uniform
tax imposed on the citizens in the non-ally group. It is clear that when β 6 n−12n , we
have mˆ6 0, and let m = 0, we can derive TB = 1
PROPOSITION 3.1:
Given n is an odd number, when β 6 n−12n , there is a unique MPE tax policy:
(T e1 = T
e
2 = ...= T
e
n = 1).
Based on the above analysis, we can infer that when the citizens are impatient
enough, i.e., β 6 n−12n , the ruler will impose the maximum tax on each of them along
the equilibrium path. Now, let’s denote the total tax revenue from the NG in each
period by ΠN . When β > n−12n , we have mˆ > 0, and the problem for the ruler to
maximize ΠN is given by:
Max
m,TA
ΠN = TAm+TB(
n+3
2
−m)
= TAm+[
−mTA+ n−12 (1−ββ )
n+1
2 −m
](
n+3
2
−m)
s.t. TA > max{T˜A, TˆA} (3.11)
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and m6 mˆ (3.12)
Solving the above maximization problem, we can derive the following proposi-
tion (Please refer to Appendix I.7 for the proof).
PROPOSITION 3.2: (Please refer to Appendix I.8 for numerical examples)
Given n is an odd number, when β > n−12n ,
a) if M1 > Mˆ1, where M1 = int(
2βn−(n−1)
2 ) and Mˆ1 =
(2β−1)(n−1)
2β , the MPE tax
policy is given by any tax policy that satisfies the following condition: the tax on n−32
citizens is one; the tax on M1 citizens is T˜A and the tax on (n+32 −M1) citizens is T˜B,
where T˜A =−1−ββ and T˜B = 1−ββ [
n−1
2 +M1
n+1
2 −M1
];
b) if M1 6 Mˆ1, the MPE tax policy is given by any tax policy that satisfies the
following condition: the tax on (n−M1−1) citizens is one; rearrange the rest (M1+
1) citizens as the first (M1+1) citizens, then the tax on these (M1+1) citizens falls
in the policy vector: Φ1 = {(T1,T2, ...,TM1+1)|∑M1+1j=1 Tj = (M1+1)Tˆ
′
A and − 1−ββ 6
Tj 6 0}, where, Tˆ ′A = 1− 2βn−(n−1)2β (M1+1) .
Similarly, we can derive the MPE tax policies for the case that n is an even num-
ber. Please refer to Appendix I.9 for the analytical result for this case.
Base on the above analysis, we can infer that in a kleptocracy, when there are
large numbers of citizen groups, there is a tendency for the ruler to impose discrimi-
natory tax on them. The ruler will impose the maximum tax on a number of citizen
groups which are chosen by the ruler not to buy off, and among the other groups, the
ruler will ally with a proportion of them by setting zero tax on them or provides a
positive transfer to them along the equilibrium path, so as to extract as much surplus
as possible from each of the rest groups.
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The more total amount of transfer to some citizen groups, the more surplus could
be mobilized by the ruler to fight off the challenge off the equilibrium path, thus
higher tax could be imposed on other citizen groups along the equilibrium path. The
surplus that could be extracted from an ally citizen group once the ruler is challenged,
can serve as a universal deterrence on any of the non-ally citizen groups, thus raising
the equilibrium tax on each of them. Therefore, with the increase in the number of
non-ally citizen groups, the surplus that could be extracted from an ally citizen group
will become more effective on raising the total tax revenue from the non-ally citizen
groups.
Given the discriminatory tax policy, in all the periods along the equilibrium path,
anticipating the response from the ruler and the action taken by the citizen groups who
receive the proposal to remove the ruler, none of them raises the proposal. Hence,
the ruler can sustain the kleptocracy by the divide-and-rule strategy successfully. As
a result, a small number of citizen groups may benefit from the discriminatory re-
distribution policies under the kleptocracy, while the vast majority will become the
victims of the kleptocracy. Sharp economic and political inequality between the citi-
zen groups may arise purely because of the discriminatory policies resulting from the
divide-and-rule strategy.
1.4.2 Unequal Endowments
Now let’s look at the case in which these n citizens could be divided into two
groups with unequal endowments. In order to simplify the analysis without affecting
the main analytical results, it is further assumed that these n citizens, where n > 5
and it is an odd number, are classified into two groups with unequal endowments:
n1 citizens in the low endowment group and n2 ones in the high endowment group,
where n1+n2 = n and n1 > n+32 , which captures the notion that the citizens with low
endowment are more than those with high endowment in this society. Each citizen i
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is endowed with ωi unites of cake in a period. It is assumed that each citizen in the
low endowment group is endowed with one unit of surplus; while each one in the
high endowment group is endowed with µ units, where µ > 1.
To maximize the payoff, the ruler will divide the citizens into the MG and the NG,
and then further divide the citizens in the NG into ally group and non-ally group. To
maximize the payoff, the ruler need to maximize the aggregate tax revenue from
the MG and the NG. It is clear that the tax revenue from MG will be maximized by
putting all the citizens with high endowment in this group; while in order to maximize
the tax revenue from the NG, the ruler should be able to mobilize as much surplus as
possible to buy off n+12 citizens in the NG when he is challenged. Hence, the ruler
will put all the n2 high endowment citizens and (n−32 − n2) low endowment citizens
in the MG, and put the rest n+32 low endowment citizens in the NG. Similar to the
analysis in the Subsection 1.4.1, we can solve the MPE in this subsection.
PROPOSITION 3.3:
a) When β 6 n2(2µ−1)+n1−12(n1+n2µ) , there is a unique MPE tax policy given by: T
e
1 =
T e2 = ...= T
e
n = 1.
b) When β > n2(2µ−1)+n1−12(n1+n2µ) , i) if M3 > Mˆ3, where M3 = int(m
#), m# = β (n+12 )−
(1−β )[n2(µ − 1)+ n−12 ] and Mˆ3 = n−12 − 1−ββ [n2(µ − 1)+ n−12 ], the MPE tax pol-
icy is given by any tax policy that satisfies the following condition: the tax on n2
high endowment citizens is µ and the tax on (n−32 − n2) low endowment citizens is
one; the tax on M3 low endowment citizens is (−1−ββ ) and the tax on (n+32 −M3) is:
1−β
β [
n2(µ−1)+ n−12 +M3
n+1
2 −M3
];
ii) while if M3 6 Mˆ3, the MPE tax policy is given by any tax policy that satisfies
the following condition: the tax on n2 high endowment citizens is µ , and the tax
on (n1−M3− 1) low endowment citizens is one; and rearrange the rest (M3 + 1)
citizens as the first (M3 + 1) citizens, then the tax on these (M3 + 1) citizens falls
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in the policy vector: Φ3 = {(T1,T2, ...,TM3+1)|∑M3+1j=1 Tj = (M3+1)T #A and − 1−ββ 6
Tj 6 0}. Here, T #A = 1−
n+1
2 − 1−ββ [n2(µ−1)+ n−12 ]
M3+1
.
It is clear that ∂m
#
∂µ = −n2(1− β ) < 0, which implies that with the increase in
the endowment inequality will decrease the number of low endowment citizens in
the ally group. The intuition is that when the ruler can extract more tax from the
high endowment citizens, he needs to ally with less low endowment citizens, in order
to extract as much tax as possible from the rest low endowment citizens. Based
on the above analysis, we can infer that in a kleptocracy society, the citizens with
high endowment are more likely to be marginalized because of the divide-and-rule
strategy.
1.5 The Failure of Divide-and-Rule
All the above parts of the paper illustrate how the strategy of divide-and-rule
can be successfully implemented in different environments. Although this strategy
is powerful, it does not mean it would be always successful. In this section, we are
going to illustrate two cases in which the strategy of divide-and-rule may fail, thus
leading to the breakdown of the kleptocracy. In the first case, it is assumed that the
citizens believe that they would receive an extra amount of surplus by removing the
ruler from power. In the second case, I assume that the citizens believe in altruism,
thus a citizen’s utility function is not only affected by his own payoff, but also affected
by the other one’s.
1.5.1 A Bonus for Removing the Kleptocrat
In the previous sections, the surplus endowed to the citizens is not affected by
the change in the political state. While in this subsection, I assume that the citizens
expect that there would be some additional surplus endowed to them after removing
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the ruler. The additional surplus may come from the foreign aid to reward the removal
of the kleptocrat and the democratization in this society. This subsection is going
to examine how this expectation may affect the interaction between the ruler and
the citizens, and the survivability of a kleptocracy. This subsection introduces an
extended model by making the following variations to the basic framework in Section
1.2:
i) The citizens believe that following the removal of the kleptocrat, each of them
will receive an extra amount of surplus θ , where θ > 0.
ii) A tax policy is sustainable if and only if CR > 0, otherwise the kleptocracy
would break down and the society would switch to a democracy.
iii) If the society is a kleptocracy, i.e., St−1 =K, they play the stage game specified
in Section 1.2, except for that given (T1,T2) or (T r1 ,T
r
2 ), the game will move on to the
next stages if and only if CR > 0; otherwise, if CR < 0, the kleptocracy would break
down and the society switches to a democracy.
All the rest settings in this subsection are the same as those in Section 1.2, except
those mentioned above. It is clear that if the kleptocracy breaks down and the society
switches to a democracy, the continuation value for citizen i, where i = 1,2, is given
by: V Di =
1+θ
1−β .
PROPOSITION 4.1: (Please refer to Appendix I.10 for the proof)
a) When θ > 1, no tax policy could be sustainable along the equilibrium path,
thus the kleptocracy will break down;
b) When 1− β < θ 6 1, the MPE tax policy is given by either of the two tax
policies in the policy vector: {(T e1 = 1,T e2 = 1−β−θβ ),(T e1 = 1−β−θβ ,T e2 = 1)};
c) When θ 6 1−β and β > 23 , or 2−3β2 6 θ 6 1−β and β < 23 , the MPE tax policy
is given by either of the tax policies in the policy vector: {(T1 = 1,T2 = 0),(T1 =
0,T2 = 1)};
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d) When θ < 2−3β2 and β <
2
3 , there is a unique MPE tax policy given by:
(T e1 = T
e
2 =
1−β−θ
β ).
Based on the above analytical result, we can find that if the citizens expect that
there would be a bonus for removing the kleptocrat, the kleptocracy would be sus-
tainable if and only if the bonus is less than or equal to one, i.e., θ 6 1, otherwise it
would break down. An allying tax policy is sustainable as long as θ 6 1, while a non-
allying tax policy is sustainable if and only if θ 6 1−β . This means that when there
is a bonus for removing the ruler, the allying tax policy increases the survivability of
a kleptocracy.
What is more, we can find that the ruler will opt for the optimal non-allying tax
policy if and only if the citizens are rather impatient and the bonus is rather small,
i.e., β < 23 and θ <
2−3β
2 ; Otherwise, the ruler will always opt for the allying tax
policy when both types of tax policies are sustainable, or the ruler will have to adopt
the allying tax policy because only the allying tax policy is sustainable. When θ 6 1,
the increase in the expected bonus will either increase the cost to ally with one of the
citizens, or decrease the tax imposed on both citizens, thus raising the payoff to the
citizens and reducing the payoff to the ruler along the equilibrium path.
1.5.2 Divide-and-Rule and Altruism
This subsection is going to introduce an extended model, based on the basic
framework in Section 1.2, to illustrate how the belief in altruism may affect the cit-
izens’ payoff and the sustainability of kleptocracy. A person may care about the
welfare of the other ones if they are connected to each other by kin, love or friend-
ship. Similarly, a citizen group may care about the payoff to the other citizen groups
if they are connected to each other through marriage or religious institutions. Accord-
ing to Bruni (2008), altruism between individuals or citizen groups is more likely to
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prevail in a civil society (such as Thailand and Burma) than a tribal society (such as
Libya and Kenya). To examine the impact of altruism on the kleptocracy, I assume
that the utility of citizen i, where i = 1,2, in period t is given by: Ui,t =Ci,t +λC j,t ,
where 0 < λ < 1, which measures the degree of altruism. What is more, I assume
that sustaining the kleptocracy induces a cost for the ruler in every period, which is
denoted by Z, where 0 < Z < 1. Thus: CR,t = T1,t +T2,t −Z, and the GBC is given
by: CR,t 6 T1,t +T2,t−Z and 06 T1,t +T2,t−Z 6 2−Z.
If the society is a kleptocracy, i.e., St−1 = K, they play the same stage game
specified in Subsection 1.5.1. Except for those mentioned above, all the rest settings
in this subsection are the same as those in Section 1.2. In the state of a democracy,
the total discounted utilities for the citizens are given by: V D1 = V
D
2 =
1+λ
1−β . If a tax
policy (T1,T2) is implemented in a period, the payoff in this period for citizen i ,
where i = 1,2, is given by: Ui = (1−Ti)+λ (1−Tj).
PROPOSITION 4.2: (Please refer to Appendix I.11 for the proof)
a) When λ > λ h, where λ h = 1−Z, no tax policy could be sustainable along the
equilibrium path, thus the kleptocracy will break down;
b) When λm < λ 6 λ h, where λm = (1−β )(1−Z), the MPE tax policy is given
by either of the tax policies in the following policy vector: {(T e1 = Tˆ A,T2 = 1),(T e1 =
1,T e2 = Tˆ A)}, where Tˆ A = (1−β )(1−Z)−λβ ;
c) When λ 6 λm , if and only if: i) β < 23 , ii) Z < Z˜, and iii) λ < λ l , where
Z˜ = 1−
3
2β
1−β and λ
l = (1−β )(1−Z)− β2 , there is a unique MPE tax policy given by:
(T e1 = T
e
2 = Tˆ A); Otherwise, the MPE tax policy is given by either of the tax policies
in the following policy vector: {(T1 = 0,T2 = 1),(T1 = 1,T2 = 0)}.
The above analytical result shows that the kleptocracy would break down when
the degree of altruism is sufficiently high, i.e., λ > λ˜ . Since ∂ λ˜∂Z = −1, this shows
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the increase in the cost of sustaining the kleptocracy will decrease its survivability.
Since ∂ Tˆ
A
∂λ =− 1β < 0, and it is clear:
∂CˆAR
∂λ =− 1β < 0 and
∂C˜AR
∂λ =− 2β < 0. Hence, we
can infer that when the degree of altruism is not high enough to remove the ruler,
i.e., λ 6 λ˜ , the increase in it may constrain the divide-and-rule strategy and decrease
the ruler’s payoff, through reducing the equilibrium tax imposed on the citizens or
increasing the transfer to a citizen. The intuition is that the ruler uses the divide-and-
rule strategy to exploit the fragility of the citizens’ cooperation in challenging his
rule, while the altruism between the citizens strengthen their incentive to cooperate,
thus making the divide-and-rule strategy less effective and even incapacitated.
Since ∂ Tˆ
A
∂λ =− 1β < 0, if we allow the value of λ to be negative, thus parameteriz-
ing the degree of hostility between the citizen groups, we can infer that lower value
of λ may lead to higher equilibrium tax imposed on the citizen groups. This implies
if the citizen groups are hostile to each other, this will enable the ruler to extract more
surplus from each of them, thus enhancing the sustainability of the kleptocracy.
1.6 Applications of Main Analytical Results
In this section, the main analytical results in this paper will be applied in the illus-
tration of some real world cases. First of all, the analytical results in Section 1.2 and
1.3 suggest that when the citizen groups are patient and heterogeneous, strong rulers
may extract more tax from the citizen groups along the equilibrium path, because the
former enjoy more flexibility in setting redistribution schemes that can sustain their
power; while the latter have to implement a policy that may enable they to ally with
one of the citizen groups. Thus the divide-and-rule strategy could be more effectively
implemented by a strong ruler, who can manage to sustain the regime without relying
on the alliance with any specific social group.
Brumberg (2003) points out that the kings in Arabic countries, such as Muham-
mad VI in Morocco and Abdullah II in Jordan, have an advantage on sustaining their
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power through the strategy of divide-and-rule, because ‘they act as referees of the
political field, rather than captains of any one team, they have more freedom of ma-
neuver to divide, manipulate, and thus control society’s competing groups’. While by
contrast, the Presidents in Arabic countries are tied to ruling parties, hence they of-
ten have less room to sustain their power by maneuvering and manipulating different
social groups.
As noted by Wiarda (1968), Rafael Trujillo was a highly personalistic dictator,
who concentrated power in his own hands and refused to share power with any other
individuals or groups, and he managed to put the whole governmental machinery
under his absolute control by constant shuffling and reshuffling of political office-
holders, and frequently changing commands of armed forces and police. Ruthless
oppression of actual or perceived member of any opposition was the key feature of
Trujillo’s regime, right from his assuming of dictatorship in 1930 (See Crassweller
1966).
Through his absolute monopoly over governmental machinery during his regime,
Trujillo was able to implement the strategy of divide-and-rule without relying on an
alliance with any specific individuals or citizen groups, which greatly facilitated his
massive accumulation over the economy. By the end of his regime, the Trujillo fam-
ily seized a fortune equal to about 100 percent of GDP at current prices, and they
controlled almost 80 percent of the country’s industrial production and 60 percent
of the country’s labor force depended on his economic empire directly or indirectly
(See Moya Pons 1995). As a strong ruler, Trujillo managed to put the whole Do-
minican society under his absolute control, and there was few effective opposition
movements during his rule from 1930 to 1961. Trujillo was characterized as one of
the most successful rulers because of his absolute dominance on the political stage
and overwhelming control of the economy
In Section 1.4, the model of the divide-and-rule strategy is generalized to a so-
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ciety with any number of citizen groups, and examine the impacts of the increase in
the number of citizen groups on the implementation of this strategy. The analytical
results indicate that due to the divide-and-rule strategy, a small number of citizen
groups may benefit from the discriminatory redistribution policies under the kleptoc-
racy, while the vast majority of them will become the victims of the kleptocracy. As a
result, sharp economic and political inequality between the citizen groups may arise,
due to the discriminatory policies resulting from the divide-and-rule strategy.
The above analytical result may help explain the discriminatory policies imple-
mented by Daniel arap Moi in Kenya, who was the President of Kenya from 1978 to
2002. Many reports and investigations indicated that there were sever human rights
abuses11 and stunning corruption under the Moi’s regime.12 After Moi assumed the
presidency in 1978, he promoted disproportional political privileges to his Kalenjin
community, while at the same time gradually marginalized the other ethnic groups,
such as Kikuyu, Luo and Luhya, in the redistribution of political power. By 1990,
most senior positions, in government, the military and security agencies, and state-
owned corporations, were seized by Kalenjins (Africa Watch 1993).
In 1991, right after Moi was forced to repeal the party ban, his regime connived
and supported the attacks launched by Kalenjin community against Kikuyus, Luhyas
and Luo in Rift Valley, and later allowed the members of Kalenjin community to oc-
cupy land previously held by other ethnic groups in Rift Valley Province. Nowrojee
and Manby (1993) reveals that the violence was manipulated by the Moi’s govern-
ment to reward and empower the Kalenjin community, and punish ethnic groups
that have supported the political opposition, so as to secure continued support from
Kalenjin, and consolidate the Kalenjin’s hegemony in Rift Valley.
11See ‘Civil and political rights, including questions of torture and detention
: report of the Special Rapporteur, Nigel Rodley, submitted pursuant to Com-
mission on Human Rights resolution 1999/32’, available on http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G00/115/09/PDF/G0011509.pdf?OpenElement.
12On 31 August 2007, the Guardian published a report by the international risk consultancy Kroll,
which alleges that relatives and associates of Moi seized more than £1bn of government money
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In Subsection 1.5.1, the analytical results show that if the citizen groups expect
that they would receive some bonus from removing a kleptocratic ruler and intro-
ducing an alternative regime, the ruler may be forced to reduce the equilibrium tax
imposed on them or even concede power, even if the expected bonus might not be
actually realized after removing the ruler.
Brown (2005) notes that ‘The 1990s saw the rapid growth of democracy promo-
tion as bilateral and multilateral donors reformulated their priorities for assistance.
With the disappearance of communism and Soviet expansionism as credible threats
to the USA and its allies, security considerations lost much of their relevance, es-
pecially in Africa’. In 1990s, the U.S. government began to concentrate resources
in those African countries that not only undertook market reform but also promised
to respect civil and political liberties. While the European governments introduced
modest political conditions promoting open economy and political liberalization, in
the process of providing development aids to African countries.
Political conditionality cannot guarantee the initialization of liberalization re-
forms, while it cannot be denied that many authoritarian regimes in Africa imple-
mented liberalizations reforms, under the pressure of political conditionality or in
anticipation of donor actions(see Bratton and van de Walle 1997). Examples include
Moi’s regime in Kenya, Kamuzu Banda’s in Malawi, and France-Albert René’s in
Seychelles. These cases indicate that the threat of political conditionality may help
constrain the kleptocratic policies and exact political liberalization.
From 1986 onwards, Moi’s government in Kenya faced continuous criticism and
the urge for political liberalization from the church leaders and lawyers. In July 1990,
a series of riots and mass disturbances broke out in Nairobi and regional towns. In
1991, two opposition parties13 were formed by some prominent politicians in Kenya.
Facing the increasing domestic pressure for political liberalization, Moi’s govern-
ment still insisted that Kenya would remain a one-party state before the international
13They are National Democratic Party and Forum for the Restoration of Democracy
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donor’s final push for political liberalization in November 1991. At the November
1991 meeting in Paris of the Consultative Group for Kenya, the donors explicitly told
Kenyan representatives that future aid levels would depend on the implementation
of political reform including ‘greater pluralism, the importance of the rule of law
and respect for human rights, notably basic freedoms of expression and assembly,
and...firm action to deal with issues of corruption.’ The donors made no further com-
mitments of aid, and announced that they would ‘review progress in these areas’ in
six months time.14
Two weeks after the Consultative Group meeting, Moi announced the immediate
repeal of the ban on parties, and promised that the next parliamentary elections would
be a multiparty affair. In December 1992, the first multiparty general elections were
held in Kenya since its independence in 1963. Although there are many problems
involved in the general elections (see Barkan 1993), this was a key step taken by
Kenya in the process of political liberalization. The domestic opposition movements
imposed great pressure on the Moi’s government to during the liberalization in 1991
and 1992, while it is undeniable that the final and critical push came from the Western
countries. The Consultative Groups introduced the political conditionality to reward
the liberalization in Kenya, which significantly jeopardized Moi’s capacity to fight off
the opposition forces by the divide-and-rule strategy. As a result, Moi’s government
was forced to make political concession to the opposition groups.
In Subsection 1.5.2, the results indicate that if the citizen groups are closely con-
nected to each other and mutually cares about each other’s interests, this may serve
to improve the payoff for each of them, and even remove the ruler from power; While
if the citizen groups are hostile to each other, this will facilitate the survival of the
kleptocracy and enable the ruler to seize more economic and political interests. This
result can partially explain why Moi’s government instigated and manipulated the
14See World Bank, "Press Release of the Meeting of the Consultative Group for Kenya," (Paris, 26
November 1991), p3-4.
50
violent conflicts between different ethnic groups in Kenya during 1990s.
In late 1991, Moi was forced to legalize a multi-party system, while the return to
multi-partyism was accompanied by the eruption of ethnic violence in Kenya’s Rift
Valley, among Kikuyus, Luhyas, Luo and Kalenjin. The attacks launched by Moi’s
Kalenjin community were followed by the retaliatory attacks against the Kalenjin by
the other three ethnic groups, which created an escalating cycle of violence15 and
fostered the growing atmosphere of hatred and suspicion between these communities
that had lived together peacefully for many years. Nowrojee and Manby (1993) points
out that: ‘...However, far from being the spontaneous result of a return to political
pluralism, there is clear evidence that the government was involved in provoking this
ethnic violence for political purposes and has taken no adequate steps to prevent it
from spiraling out of control....The conflict has been deliberately manipulated and
instigated by President Moi and his inner circle...’.
Nowrojee and Manby (1993) point out that Moi and his Kalenjin community ben-
efited economically and politically from the violence. By allowing the members of
Kalenjin community to occupy land previously held by other groups in Rift Valley
Province, the violence was manipulated by Moi’s government to reward and em-
power the Kalenjin community, and punish ethnic groups that have supported the
political opposition. What is more, the resulting growing ethnic hatred prevented the
Kalenjin from cooperating with Kikuyus, Luhyas and Luo in the political opposition
movement.
In the early 1990s, the ethnic violence was limited to the Rift Valley, and the
Western and Nyanza provinces, while it had expanded to include the Coastal Province
during the 1997 elections. Mainly by skillfully exploiting the ethnic tensions in these
contests, Moi won the presidential elections in 1992 and 1997. Mulli (1999) notes
that ‘by instigating ethnic violence, Moi fanned the fires of ethnic distrust which un-
15According to the estimation by Nowrojee and Manby (1993), the clashes had left at least 1,500
people dead and 300,000 displaced by late 1993.
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derlie relations among ethnic groups. By stimulating this distrust, the voting pattern,
especially for the presidential vote, was split and Moi was able to win despite failing
to gain an outright majority’.
Levitsky and Way (2003) state: ‘Divided oppositions may contribute to the sur-
vival of autocratic incumbents in at least two ways. First, in the electoral arena,
opposition division often enables unpopular incumbents to win with a mere plural-
ity of the vote... Polarized oppositions also enable autocratic incumbents to employ
divide and rule strategies. In cases of severe internal division, one opposition party
may work with the incumbent to prevent the victory of a rival party’.
1.7 Conclusion
How do these regimes, especially those kleptocracies, manage to sustain their
rule over long periods? As pointed out by many researches, such as Brumberg (2003)
and ARV, divide-and-rule is a key strategy for the survival of these regimes. Inspired
by the observation of real world cases and the research in ARV, this paper develops
a theory of divide-and-rule, explaining how kleptocracies can be sustained in equi-
librium by implementing the divide-and-rule strategy in various environments. This
paper develops two strands of divide-and-rule models: the models of divide-and-rule
by strong rulers and the models of divide-and-rule by weak rulers. What is more,
this paper generalizes the model of divide-and-rule to a society with any number of
citizen groups.
The following are four main analytical results derived in the above models. Firstly,
when the citizen groups are patient and heterogeneous, strong rulers may extract more
surplus from the citizen groups along the equilibrium path of sustaining their rule,
because the former enjoy more flexibility in setting redistribution schemes that can
sustain their power. Secondly, the increase in the number of citizen groups may inten-
sify the collective action problem and facilitate the implementation of this strategy,
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thus increasing the ruler’s payoff. Thirdly, because of the divide-and-rule strategy
implemented by the ruler, a numbers of citizen groups may benefit from the discrim-
inatory redistribution policies, while the vast majority of them will be marginalized
in the redistribution of political and economic interests, thus economic or political
inequality between them may purely result from discriminatory redistribution poli-
cies. Lastly, given the implicit assumption that each citizen group has the same voting
power in removing the ruler from power, those citizen groups with high endowment
or fighting capacity are more likely to suffer greater loss, compared to those with low
endowment or fighting capacity, because of the divide-and-rule strategy.
What is more, this paper introduces two cases to show how the divide-and-rule
strategy may fail, thus leading to the breakdown of the kleptocracy. The results
derived in the first case show that under certain conditions, the increase in the ex-
pected bonus from removing the kleptocrat may help improve the payoff of the citi-
zen groups under a kleptocracy, and when it is large enough the ruler may be forced
to give up his power. The results derived in the second case indicate that if the citi-
zen groups are closely connected to each other and mutually care about each other’s
interests, this may serve to improve the payoff for each of them, and even remove
the ruler from power. While if the citizen groups are hostile to each other, this will
facilitate the survival of a kleptocracy and enable the ruler to seize more economic
and political interests.
Furthermore, the main analytical results in this paper are applied in illustration
of some real world cases. This paper not only may help illustrate some economic
and political consequences resulting from kleptocratic ruler in a society, but also may
shed light on the questions about how to improve the economic and political rights of
those citizens living under a kleptocracy, and how to remove a kleptocratic ruler and
promote political liberalization in such a society.
The focus of this paper has been put on how the strategy of divide-and-rule could
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be successfully implemented by the rulers to exploit the citizen groups and sustain
their power. I introduce only two simple extended models to illustrate how this strat-
egy may fail and the kleptocracy may breakdown. In order to provide more com-
prehensive answers to this question, further researches could be carried out in the
following potential directions. The first one is to introduce into the model a player
with strategic options that could jeopardize the effectiveness of divide-and-rule pol-
icy, examining how the interaction between this player and the ruler may affect the
welfare of the civilians and the survivability of kleptocracy. The second one is to
introduce incomplete or asymmetric information into the model, thus examining how
this may affect the interaction between the players. The third one is to introduce a
production function which may incorporate economic shocks, studying their impact
on the survival of a kleptocracy. The last one is to introduce into the model a com-
mitment mechanism between the ruled citizen groups, exploring how this may help
bring down the kleptocrats.
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2 Chapter II: Kleptocracy and the Benevolent Oppo-
sition Organizations
Abstract
A kleptocrat implements the strategy of divide-and-rule to prevent the co-
operation between the ruled citizen groups, in order to maximize his economic
and political interests, and sustain his personal rule. By punishing those citizen
groups supporting the kleptocrats, the benevolent opposition organizations, like
trade unions and religious institutions, may help strengthen the cooperation be-
tween them. This paper develops a theoretical framework, examining how these
organizations may constrain the strategy of divide-and-rule, thus improving the
welfare of the civilians and even removing the kleptocrats. What is more, this
paper suggests that compared to punishing the citizen group supporting the
ruler, the benevolent opposition organizations could more effectively constrain
the kleptocracy through using available surplus to reward the citizen group who
challenges the ruler or supports another citizen group in challenging the ruler.
2.1 Introduction
The strategy of divide-and-rule breaks up large group into small ones that indi-
vidually is weaker than the one implementing the strategy, and exploits the interest
conflicts and fragility of cooperation between the ruled citizen groups, so as to pre-
vent the formation of an opposition coalition. This strategy has been implemented by
various authoritarian rulers, including kleptocrats, in order to sustain their rule and
maximize their political and economic interests. This strategy has been contributing
to the survival of a number of notorious kleptocracies in long periods, including Kim
Jong Il’s rule in North Korea (1994-2011), Moi’s Rule in Kenya (1978-2002), and
Mugabe’s in Zimbabwe (1980-present).
Although the strategy of divide-and-rule is powerful, it is not invincible. This
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paper focuses on how the ‘benevolent opposition organizations’ may serve to counter
the strategy of divide-and-rule. In this paper, the benevolent opposition organizations
refer to those institutions with the follow two key features: i) these institutions have
rather wide coverage among the population; and ii) they may help improve the eco-
nomic welfare and/or political rights of their members. In most countries, there are
two major forms of benevolent opposition organizations: the trade(/labour) unions
and religious institutions (especially the Catholic Churches).
Based on the model developed in Chapter I, This paper introduces a theoretical
framework to examine the impact of those benevolent opposition organizations on
the strategy of divide-and-rule, the survivability of kleptocracies and the welfare of
their members. What is more, this paper explores the following questions: i) how
the ruler’s ability to control the endowment to the ruled citizens or citizen groups
may affect the survivability of the kleptocracy, his the payoff and the welfare of
the citizens?; ii) how the benevolent opposition organizations could more effectively
constrain the kleptocracy? The following are the main analytical results derived in
this paper.
Firstly, the existence of the benevolent opposition organizations may help con-
strain the divide-and-rule strategy and even help remove the kleptocrats, through in-
creasing the cost of supporting the rulers. They may contribute to increasing the
payoffs to their members from two aspects. On one hand, the members are entitled
to the benefits provided by them, which is the direct benefit. On the other had, the
punishment threat imposed on their members by these groups, may help increase the
transfer to a citizen or decrease the tax imposed on a citizen along the equilibrium
path, which is the indirect benefit.
Secondly, if the rulers have more control over the allocation of the surplus en-
dowed to the citizens, the effectiveness of the divide-and-rule strategy will be in-
creased, thus increasing the survivability of kleptocracies. If a ruler has different
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extents of control over the citizens’ endowments, whether or not a kleptocracy is sus-
tainable, is mainly determined by the maximum surplus that could be extracted from
the citizen group whose endowments the ruler has more control over. When the ruler
decides to ally with one of the citizen groups, he would always opt for allying with
the citizen group whose endowment the ruler has less control over.
Lastly, compared to punishing the citizen supporting the ruler, the benevolent
opposition organizations could more effectively constrain the kleptocracy through
rewarding the citizen group who challenges the ruler or supports the other citizen
group in challenging the ruler. Firstly, rewarding the citizen groups, compared to
punishing the citizen groups, can significantly decrease the survivability of the klep-
tocracy. Secondly, when the opposition organization is not strong enough to help
remove the ruler, it can reduce the ruler’s payoff along the equilibrium path. Lastly,
if the benevolent opposition organizations choose to reward the citizen initiates the
challenge, this may prevent the ruler from adopting a discriminatory redistribution
policy.
There has been a large number of literature studying the impact of trade unions
and religious institutions on the welfare of their members and the democratization
process in a state. Yao and Zhong (2010) argue labour unions in China contribute
to the enhancing workers’ welfare in the aspects of hourly wages, monthly working
hours and pension coverage, based on a survey of 1,268 firms in 12 Chinese cities.
Donado and Wälde (2012) point out that trade unions have played a crucial role in
making workplaces safer and increasing the average health of workers.
Ellis and Haar (2006) argue that religious institutions play a major role in main-
taining educational and health services in many African countries, including the
Democratic Republic of Congo. According to Salih (2002), Islamic NGOs not only
provide relief and humanitarian assistance to poor communities in African countries
during emergencies and natural disasters, but also engage in long-term development
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activities, including community development, agriculture, water, health and educa-
tion.
Besides the important role as providers of services and assistance to their mem-
bers, trade unions and religious institutions may become active and powerful political
opposition forces against the authoritarian regimes. In several East/South European
countries, including Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, trade unions were
crucial in the opposition to the dictatorships and the democratic transitions between
1970s and 1990s (Maarten 2008). For instance, Solidarity spearheaded the peace-
ful democratization in Poland in the 1980s (Cirtautas 1997), and the trade unions
(MSZOSZ and LIGA) promoted the negotiated transition in Hungary (Bozóki 2002).
In many African countries, trade unions played a crucial role in ousting dictator-
ships and bringing democracy to these countries in the 1990s. For example, in Niger,
South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, political liberalization was directly prompted
by union movements. In Ghana, Senegal, and Namibia, democratization was not ini-
tiated until the trade unions created a favorable political space for the other opposition
organizations (Kraus 2007).
On the 100th Anniversary of Rerum Novarum in 1991, Pope John Paul II stated:
‘‘The Church values the democratic system inasmuch as it ensures the participa-
tion of citizens in making political choices, guarantees to the governed the possi-
bility of electing and holding accountable those who govern them, and of replacing
them through peaceful means when appropriate.” According to Huntington (1992),
Catholic Church’s emphasis on individual rights and opposition to authoritarian rule,
was one of the major driving forces leading to the third wave of democratization in
Latin America, East Asia, southern Europe and Eastern Europe in the later twentieth
century. Gifford (1995) points out that in several African countries, the Christian
Church has played a critical role in the democratization movements since the late
1980s.
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This paper mainly contributes to the literature on the impacts of trade unions and
religious institutions on the democratization process in a state, by introducing a the-
oretical framework to examine how these institutions may constrain the divide-and-
rule strategy. What is more, this paper is related to the study on the political econ-
omy of a weakly institutionalized society, such as Acemoglu, Robinson and Verdier
(2004), Jackson and Rosberg (1982), and La Ferrara and Bates (2001).
This paper will proceed in the following way. Section 2.2 develops the base
framework to illustrate how the benevolent opposition organizations could help con-
strain the kleptocracy by punishing the citizen group supporting the ruler. Section
2.3 introduces an extended model to examine the best strategy for the benevolent
opposition organizations to constrain the kleptocracy. Section 2.4 concludes.
2.2 The Basic Model
The society consists of two citizen groups: citizen group 1 and citizen group 2,
and it is assumed that there is no collective action problem within a citizen group.
For the sake of simplicity, ‘citizen’ and ‘citizen group’ are interchangeable in this
paper. In every period, each citizen is endowed with one unit of surplus. Without
affecting the main analytical results, we normalize the amount of the ruler’s endow-
ment to zero. There is a benevolent opposition organization in this society, such as
the Catholic church or a trade union, and both citizens are its members. In each pe-
riod, as a member, citizen i, where i = 1,2, is entitled to λi > 0 units of additional
surplus as long as he does not choose to support the ruler after his power is chal-
lenged. Otherwise, he would be punished by the opposition organization, losing the
additional surplus forever. Here, λi measures the influence of the opposition organi-
zation on citizen i. The consumption of citizen i, where i = 1,2, in period t is given
by: Ci,t = 1+λi−Ti,t , where Ti,t is a lump-sum transfer or tax imposed on citizen i
at time t.
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In this paper, the ruler’s degree of control over the endowment of citizen i is
measured by τi, where 0 < τi 6 1, which represents the maximum lump-sum tax that
can be imposed on citizen i. The higher the value of τi, the stronger the degree of
control. The total discounted utility of the citizens and the ruler is given by: Vi,t =
∑∞s=t βCis, where i = 1,2,R and β is the discount factor and 0 < β < 1. Here, it is
assumed that there is no deadweight loss resulting from taxation. Thus, we have:
−τ j 6 Tit 6 τi, where i 6= j, and the government budget constraint (GBC) is given
by: CR,t 6 T1,t +T2,t and 06 T1,t +T2,t 6 τ1+ τ2, where CR,t is the consumption of
the ruler in a period.
The political state is denoted by St , where St = D if it is a democracy, and St = K
if it is a kleptocracy. I assume that a tax policy is sustainable if and only if CR,t > 0,
otherwise, if CR,t < 0, it is not sustainable. In a period, if no tax policy is sustainable,
the kleptocracy will break down and the society will switch to a democracy. In a
democracy, the two citizens set T1 = T2 = 0, thus CR = 0. Therefore, the lifetime
utility of citizen i, where i = 1,2, in a democracy is given by: V Di =
1+λi
1−β .
Here, I assume that the ruler is the strong type, thus he will always punish the
citizen who proposes to remove him from power. Timing of the events in the political
game are as follows. In each period, t, the society inherits a political state, either
St−1 = D or St−1 = K. If St−1 = D, the society remains so forever, and the two
citizens play the game denoted by Γ(D). If St−1 = K, they play the following game,
denoted by Γ(K), in period t:
1) The ruler announces a tax policy (T1,T2). If CR < 0, the kleptocracy breaks
down and the society switches to a democracy; while if CR > 0, the game moves on
to the following stages.
2) Given (T1,T2), the citizens decide simultaneously whether to make a proposal
to remove the ruler from power. If neither of the citizens make the proposal, (T1,T2)
is implemented and the political system remains at St = K. While if at least one
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citizen makes the proposal, the game moves on to the following stage.
3) If citizen j, where j = 1,2, makes a proposal to remove the ruler, denoted by
p j = 1. If not, denoted by p j = 0. If both citizens propose, each of them would be
identified as the proposer with probability 12 , and there must be one and only one
identified as the proposer. Observing the action taken by the citizens, the ruler makes
a new offer (T r1 ,T
r
2 ). If CR < 0, the kleptocracy breaks down and the society switches
to a democracy; while if CR > 0, the game moves on to the following stages.
4) Given (T1,T2) and (T r1 ,T
r
2 ), citizen i, where i 6= j, responds to the proposal
raised by citizen j and the new tax policy (T r1 ,T
r
2 ). If citizen i chooses to accept the
proposal, denoted by di = 1, the ruler is removed from power and the society switches
to a democracy. While if di = 0, citizen i loses λi unit of additional surplus forever,
and the political system remains at St =K and (T r1 ,T
r
2 ) is implemented, and the stage
game remains Γ(K) in the following period.
Here, I introduce a tie-break assumption that if the expected payoff from changing
the status quo is equal to that from sustaining it, a player will always opt for the
actions sustaining the status quo. It is assumed that at the period t, there is no cost
to set a tax policy, however in the following periods under a kleptocracy, if the ruler
announces a tax policy different from the initial policy announced at the beginning of
the previous period, this will induce a small cost ε > 0 for the ruler, where ε → 0. In
this basic model and all the following extended models, the focus is put on Markov
Perfect Equilibrium (MPE).
2.2.1 Equal Additional Surpluses
In this subsection, it is assumed that τ1 = τ2 = τ and λ1 = λ2 = λ , where τ,λ > 0.
Given the tie-break assumption, if the ruler provides a positive lump-sum transfer to
citizen i, i = 1,2, or impose zero lump-sum tax on him, i.e., when Ti 6 0, there
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would be no incentive for citizen i to raise a proposal to remove him from power.
While to ensure that such an allying tax policy could be implemented to sustained
the kleptocracy, the ruler must guarantee that once citizen j, where j 6= i, raises the
proposal, he can raise a new tax policy that could prevent citizen i from supporting
the proposal.
Suppose that following the tax policy (T1,T2) announced by the ruler, citizen j,
where j = 1,2, raises the proposal to remove the ruler from power and he is identified
as the proposer. It is clear that observing the action taken by citizen j, the best
response by the ruler is given by: (T ri = −τ,T rj = τ), where i 6= j. This means that
the ruler will impose the maximum lump-sum tax τ on citizen j, and provide τ unit
of transfer to citizen i, in order to prevent the latter from supporting the proposal.
Given the new tax policy, if citizen i chooses to decline the proposal, thus supporting
the ruler, he will lose the additional surplus λ forever. Then expected continuation
value for him is given by:
V Ki = 1+ τ+
β (1−Ti)
1−β (1.1)
It is obvious that citizen i will choose to accept the new tax policy if and only if
V Ki >V Di , which gives:
Ti 6
(1−β )τ−λ
β
≡ Tˆ (1.2)
where Tˆ > 0 if and only if:
λ 6 (1−β )τ ≡ λ h; (1.3)
and Tˆ >−τ if and only if:
λ 6 1. (1.4)
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Inequality (1.4) implies that when λ > 1, no allying tax policy is applicable.
When λ h < λ 6 1, we have: −τ 6 Tˆ < 0. Inequality (1.1) could be expressed as:
τ > βTi
1−β +
λ
1−β (1.5)
Left hand side of inequality (1.4) represents the benefit for citizen i to accept the
new tax policy, thus declining the proposal to remove the ruler, while the right hand
sight represents the opportunity cost to accept the new tax policy. The benefit is given
by τ , which is the maximum amount of transfer that could be provided by the ruler
to prevent a citizen from accepting the proposal in a period.
The opportunist cost consists of two parts. If citizen i accepts the new tax policy,
the kleptocracy would be sustained and the initial tax policy (T1,T2) would be im-
plemented from the next period onwards. As a result, citizen i will pay the amount
of tax equal to Ti when Ti > 0, and he will receive the amount of transfer equal to
(−Ti) when Ti 6 0 from the next period onwards, This is represented by the first part
βTi
1−β . What is more, if citizen i accepts the new tax policy, he would be punished
by the opposition organization, thus losing the additional surplus from the current
period onwards, which is represented by the second part λ1−β . It is obvious that the
increase in the value of β raises the value of λ1−β , which means that the increase in
the citizens’ patience will raise the opportunity cost of accepting the new tax policy.
When λ h < λ 6 1, the second part alone will outweigh the benefit. Hence, in
order to ally with citizen i and prevent him from supporting the proposal, the ruler
should provide at least (−Tˆ ) unit of transfer to citizen j in each period; While if
λ 6 λ h, the second part alone is not enough to outweigh the benefit, thus the ruler
can ally with citizen i and prevent him from supporting the proposal by imposing zero
tax on him. Therefore, it is clear the when λ h < λ 6 1, the optimal allying tax policy
for the ruler is given by either one in the following policy vector: {(T1 = Tˆ ,T2 =
τ),(T1 = τ,T2 = Tˆ )}, Given either of the optimal allying tax policies, we have:
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CR =
τ−λ
β
= C˜R (1.6)
where C˜R > 0 if and only if:
λ 6 τ. (1.7)
Inequality (1.7) means that when λ > λ h, either of the above two optimal allying
tax policies is sustainable if and only if: λ h < λ 6 τ . When λ 6 λ h, the optimal
allying tax policy is given by either one in the following policy vector: {(T1 = 0,T2 =
τ),(T1 = τ,T2 = 0)}. Given either of the above two allying tax policies,
CR = τ > 0,
Therefore, when λ 6 λ h, either of the optimal allying tax policy is always sus-
tainable. Now, let’s examine the optimal non-allying tax policy for the ruler. Suppose
that observing a tax policy (T1,T2), where T1,T2 > 0, announced by the ruler, citizen
j, where j = 1,2, chooses to raise the proposal, it is clear that citizen i, where i 6= j,
will choose to accept the new tax policy if and only if:
i.e. Ti 6 Tˆ (1.8)
Hence, it is clear that the optimal non-allying tax policy for the ruler is given by:
(T1 = T2 = T ∗), where T ∗ = min{τ, Tˆ}, given which:
CR = 2T ∗ (1.9)
It is easy to show Tˆ 6 τ if and only if:
β > τ−λ
2τ
≡ β ∗, (1.10)
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where β ∗ < 12 , and it is clear that β
∗ > 0 if and only if λ < τ . We have shown
that Tˆ > 0 if and only if λ 6 λ h. Therefore, the above non-allying tax policy is
sustainable if and only if λ 6 λ h. Since: ∂ λˆ∂β = −τ < 0, i.e., λ h is monotonically
decreasing on β , we can infer that the more patient are the citizens, the more difficult
for the ruler to sustain the kleptocracy by the non-allying tax policy. Given λ 6 λ h,
we have β ∗ > 0. When β > β ∗, we have Tˆ 6 τ , thus T ∗ = Tˆ , given which:
CR =
2[(1−β )τ−λ ]
β
≡ CˆR (1.11)
When β < β ∗, we have Tˆ > τ , thus T ∗ = τ , given which:
CR = 2τ > 0 (1.12).
It is obvious when λ 6 λ h and β < β ∗, the following optimal non-allying tax
policy brings the ruler the highest payoff: (T1 = T2 = τ). When λ 6 λˆ , it is easy to
show: CˆR > τ if and only if:
λ <
(2−3β )τ
2
≡ λ l (1.13),
where λ l < λ h, and it is easy to show λ l > 0 if and only if:
β <
2
3
(1.14)
It is clear that when β > 23 , we always have λ l 6 0< λ , hence, the optimal allying
tax policy strictly dominates the optimal non-allying tax policy (T1 = T2 = Tˆ ). When
β ∗ 6 β < 23 , if λ l 6 λ 6 λ h, the ruler will choose the optimal allying tax policy;
while if λ < λ l , the ruler will opt for the optimal non-allying tax policy.
PROPOSITION 1.1:
a) When λ > τ , no tax policy is sustainable, thus the kleptocracy will break down;
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b) When λ h < λ 6 τ , where λ h = (1−β )τ , the MPE tax policy is given by either
one in the policy vector: {(T e1 = Tˆ ,T e2 = τ),(T e1 = τ,T e2 = Tˆ )}, where Tˆ = (1−β )τ−λβ ;
c) When λ 6 λ h and β < β ∗, where β ∗ = τ−λ2τ , there is a unique MPE tax policy
given by: (T e1 = T
e
2 = τ);
d) When λ 6 λ h and β > 23 , or λ l 6 λ 6 λ h and β ∗ 6 β <
2
3 , where λ
l =
(2−3β )τ
2 , the MPE tax policy is given by either one in the following policy vector:
{(T e1 = 0,T e2 = τ),(T e1 = τ,T e2 = 0)};
e) When λ < λ l and β ∗ 6 β < 23 , there is a unique MPE policy given by: (T e1 =
T e2 = Tˆ ).
It is obvious that: ∂C˜R∂λ =− 1β < 0, and given λ 6 λ h, we have: ∂CˆR∂λ =−2(τ−λ )β 2 < 0.
Therefore, we can infer that the rulers’ payoff is non-monotonically decreasing on the
influence of the opposition. It is is easy to show: ∂ Tˆ∂λ = − 1β < 0, which implies that
if the opposition is relatively strong, i.e., λ h < λ 6 τ , the increase in the influence of
the opposition will raise the ruler’s cost to ally with a citizen; while if the opposition
is relatively weak and the citizens are relatively patient, i.e., λ < λ l and β ∗ 6 β < 23 ,
the increase in the influence will decrease the tax imposed on both citizens along
the equilibrium path. However, if the opposition is relatively weak and the citizens
are rather impatient, i.e., λ < λ l and β < β ∗, the opposition organization will have
no effect on improving the payoffs for the citizens, and the ruler will impose the
maximum tax on both citizens along the equilibrium path.
In summary, the existence of the opposition may contribute to the increase in
the payoff to the citizens from two aspects. On one hand, the members are entitled
to the benefits provided by them, which is the direct benefit. On the other had, the
punishment threat imposed on their members by them, may help increase the transfer
to a citizen or decrease the tax imposed on a citizen along the equilibrium path, which
is the indirect benefit.
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As we can see, the kleptocracy can be sustained by either the allying tax policy
or the non-allying one, if and only if the maximum applicable tax is larger than the
additional surplus that could be derived from the opposition. When the additional
surplus is relatively high, i.e., λˆ < λ 6 τ , the ruler will always seek to ally with one
of the citizens, so as to maximize his payoff. Under certain conditions, the decrease
in the extent of control over a citizen’s endowment will reduce the ruler’s payoff
along the equilibrium path.
2.2.2 Unequal Additional Surpluses
In this subsection, it is assumed that these two citizens derive unequal additional
surpluses from the benevolent opposition organization, and without loss of general-
ity, let λ1 > λ2. It is clear that the allying allying tax policy is given by either one
the following policy vector: {(T1 = τ,T2 = min{0, Tˆ2}),(T1 = min{0, Tˆ1},T2 = τ)},
where Tˆ1 =
(1−β )τ−λ1
β and Tˆ2 =
(1−β )τ−λ2
β .
Given λ1 > λ2, we have Tˆ1 < Tˆ2. It is easy to show it is a weakly dominant
strategy for the ruler to ally with the citizen with lower additional surplus, compared
to allying with the citizen with higher additional surplus. Hence, the optimal allying
tax policy is given by: (T1 = τ,T2 = min{0, Tˆ2}).
PROPOSITION 1.2: (Please refer to Appendix II.1 for the proof)
a) When λ2 > τ , it is impossible for the ruler to sustain the regime by any tax
policy, thus the kleptocracy will break down;
b) When λ2 6 τ and λ1 > λ h, where λ h = (1−β )τ , there is a unique MPE tax
policy: (T e1 = τ,T
e
2 = Tˆ2), where Tˆ2 =
(1−β )τ−λ2
β ;
c) When λ1 6 λ h, and β l 6 β < β h, where β h = τ−λ22τ and β l =
τ−λ1
2τ , there is a
unique MPE tax policy: (T e1 = Tˆ1,T
e
2 = τ), where Tˆ1 =
(1−β )τ−λ1
β ;
d) When λ1 6 λ h and β > β h, if λ1+λ2 > τ(2−3β ), there is a unique MPE tax
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policy: (T e1 = τ,T
e
2 = 0); while if λ1 +λ2 < τ(2− 3β ), there is a unique MPE tax
policy: (T e1 = Tˆ1,T
e
2 = Tˆ2);
e) When λ1 6 λ h and β < β l , there is a unique MPE tax policy: (T e1 = τ,T e2 = τ),
Based on the above analysis, we can see that whether or not the kleptocracy is
sustainable, is completely determined by the value of λ2, i.e., the additional surplus
for citizen 2. The ruler can sustain the kleptocracy if and only if λ2 6 τ . This im-
plies that the impact of the opposition organization on the survival of the kleptocracy
and the welfare of his members is mainly affected by the ‘weaker link’ within the
organization and the extent of the ruler’s control over a citizen’s endowment.
2.2.3 Different Extents of Control
In this subsection, it is assumed that the citizens derive the same amount of addi-
tional surplus from the opposition organization, while the ruler has different extents
of control over the citizens’ endowments. Without loss of generality, it is assumed
that τ1 > τ2, i.e., the ruler can impose higher lump-sum tax on citizen one. To sim-
plify the analysis without affecting the main analytical results, I assume 12 6 β < 1
and τ2 > (1−β )τ1.
PROPOSITION 1.3: (Please refer to Appendix II.2 for the proof)
a) When λ > τ1, it is impossible for the ruler to sustain the kleptocracy by any
tax policy, thus the kleptocracy will break down;
b) When λˆ h < λ 6 τ1, where λˆ h = (1−β )τ1, there is a unique MPE tax policy:
(T e1 = τ1,T
e
2 =
(1−β )τ1−λ
β );
c) When λˆm < λ 6 λˆ , where λˆm = (1−β )τ2, there is a unique MPE tax policy:
(T e1 = τ1,T
e
2 = 0);
d) When λ 6 λˆm, i) if τ1 6 τˆ1 and τ2 6 τˆ2, where τˆ1 = βτ21−β and τˆ2 =
(2β−1)τ1+λ
1−β ,
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or τ1 > τˆ1, τ2 6 τˆ2 and λ > λˆ l , where λˆ l = (1−β )τ1−βτ2, there is a unique MPE
tax policy: (T e1 = τ1,T
e
2 = 0);
ii) if τ1 6 τˆ1 and τ2 > τˆ2, or τ1 > τˆ1, τ2 > τˆ2 and λ > λˆ l , there is a unique MPE:
(T e1 =
(1−β )τ2−λ
β ,T
e
2 =
(1−β )τ1−λ
β );
iii) if τ1 > τˆ1, τ2 6 βτ21−β and λ < λˆ l , there is a unique MPE tax policy: (T e1 =
τ1,T e2 = 0);
iv) if τ1 > τˆ1, τ2 > λ1−β and λ < λˆ
l , there is a unique MPE tax policy: (T e1 =
(1−β )τ2−λ
β ,T
e
2 = τ2).
Base on the above analytical result, we can infer that if the ruler has different
extents of control over the citizens’ endowments, whether or the kleptocracy is sus-
tainable, is determined by the maximum amount of surplus that could be extracted
from the citizen with higher applicable tax. It is a dominant strategy for the ruler to
ally with the citizen with lower maximum applicable tax, compared to allying with
the one with higher maximum applicable tax.
2.3 Punishing vs Rewarding
In Section 2.2, the additional surplus from the opposition organization could only
be used as a punishing scheme on its members. However, is this the most effec-
tive way to constrain the kleptocracy? To answer this question, this section allows
the opposition organization to choose whether to adopt the punishing scheme or the
rewarding scheme, so as to minimize its lost function:
L =−(T1+T2) =−CR
I assume that the opposition organization is endowed with 2λ units of surplus in
each period, and the ruler is not able to impose a tax on the opposition organization.
The punishing scheme means that the opposition organization will punish a citizen
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by retrieving the additional surplus λ if the citizen chooses to decline the proposal
to remove the ruler, otherwise he will receive an additional surplus λ at the end of
each period. While the rewarding scheme means that the opposition organization will
either reward the citizen who is identified as the proposer or reward the citizen who
accepts the proposal, by providing him with 2λ units of additional surplus in each
period; Otherwise no citizen will receive any additional surplus at the end of each
period. If the ruler chooses the rewarding scheme, he will then decide whether to
reward the proposer or the one supporting the proposal.
In each period t, the society inherits a political state, either St−1 =D or St−1 = K.
If St−1 = K, they play the following game, denoted by Γ(Kˆ), in period t.
At the beginning of period t, the benevolent opposition organization decides
whether to adopt the punishing scheme or the rewarding scheme. If it chooses the
punishing scheme, denote this B = 0; If it chooses the rewarding scheme, denote this
by B = 1. If the opposition organization decides to reward the proposer, denote this
by W = 0; while if it chooses to reward the one supporting the proposal, denote this
by W = 1. Then the game moves on to the next stages specified in stage game Γ(K)
in Section 2.2. To simplify the analysis without affecting the main analytical results,
it is assumed that β > 12 in this section.
In this section, the problem for the opposition organization is given by the fol-
lowing minimization problem:
Min
B∈{0,1},W∈{0,1}
L(B,D) = (1−B)L(B = 0)
+B[(1−D)L(B = 1,D = 0)+DL(B = 1,D = 1)
In order to find out the optimal solution for the above minimization problem, we
need to examine the loss functions for the opposition organization corresponding to
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different strategies. If the opposition organization chooses the punishing scheme,
denoted by B = 0, then based on the analysis in Subsection 2.2.1, we can infer that:
1) When λ > τ , no tax policy is sustainable. As a result, the kleptocracy will
break down and the society will switch to a democracy, where the citizens set T1 =
T2 = 0, hence: L(B = 0, .) = 0.
2) When λ h < λ 6 τ , given the optimal tax policy: either of (T1 = Tˆ ,T2 = τ) and
(T1 = τ,T2 = Tˆ ), we have: L(B = 0, .) =− τ−λβ ;
3) When λ 6 λ h and β > 23 , or λ ∗ 6 λ 6 λ h and
1
2 < β <
2
3 , where λ
∗ = (2−3β )τ2 ,
given the optimal tax policy: either of (T1 = 0,T2 = τ) and (T1 = τ,T2 = 0), we have:
L(B = 0, .) =−τ;
4) When λ < λ ∗ and 12 < β <
2
3 , given the optimal tax policy (T1 = T2 = Tˆ ), we
have: L(B = 0, .) =−2[(1−β )τ−λ ]β .
If the opposition organization chooses to reward the citizen supporting the pro-
posal, denoted by B= 1 and W = 1. Suppose given (T1,T2), citizen j, where j = 1,2,
raises the proposal and he is identified as the proposer. Following the action taken by
citizen j, the ruler announces a new tax policy (T ri =−τ,T rj = τ). Given (T1,T2) and
(T ri =−τ,T rj = τ), if citizen i, where i 6= j, accepts the proposal, thus removing the
ruler from power, his discounted total payoff is given by:
Vi(di = 1|p j = 1,B = 1,W = 1) = 1+2λ1−β . (2.5)
While if he declines the proposal, his discounted total payoff is given by equation
(1.2). Similar to the analysis in Subsection 2.2.1, we can derive the following results:
1) When λ > τ2 , no tax policy is sustainable, thus the kleptocracy will break down,
hence:
L(B = 1,W = 1) = 0; (2.6)
2) When λ
h
2 < λ 6
τ
2 , given the optimal tax policy: either of (T1 = T˜ ,T2 = τ) and
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(T1 = τ,T2 = T˜ ), where T˜ =
(1−β )τ−2λ
β , we have:
L(B = 1,W = 1) =−τ−2λ
β
; (2.7)
3) When λ 6 λ h2 and β >
2
3 , or
(2−3β )τ
4 6 λ 6
λ h
2 and
1
2 < β <
2
3 , given the
optimal tax policy: either of (T1 = 0,T2 = τ) and (T1 = τ,T2 = 0), we have:
L(B = 1,W = 1) =−τ; (2.8)
5) When λ < (2−3β )τ4 and
1
2 < β <
2
3 , given the optimal tax policy (T1 = T2 = T˜ ),
we have:
L(B = 1,W = 1) =−2[(1−β )τ−2λ ]
β
. (2.9)
The above analysis shows that if the opposition organization chooses to reward
the citizen supporting the proposal, instead of punishing the citizens, the kleptocracy
would be sustainable if and only if λ 6 τ2 , thus there is a significant decrease in the
survivability of the kleptocracy. What is more, it is easy to show given any value of
λ and β , we always have:
L(B = 1,W = 1)> L(B = 0, .), (2.10)
Inequality (2.10) means it is a dominant strategy for the opposition organization
to reward the citizen supporting the proposal, compared to adopting the punishing
scheme.
Now, let’s examine the loss functions if the opposition organization chooses to
reward the proposer, denoted by B = 1 and W = 0. Suppose given (T1,T2), citizen
j, where j = 1,2, raises the proposal and he is identified as the proposer, follow-
ing which the ruler announces a new tax policy (T ri = −τ,T rj = τ). Given (T1,T2)
and (T ri = −τ,T rj = τ), if citizen i, where i 6= j, accepts the proposal, the expected
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continuation values for the citizens are given by:
Vi(di = 1|p j = 1,B = 1,W = 0) = 11−β , (2.11)
Vj(p j = 1|di = 1,B = 1,W = 0) = 1+2λ1−β . (2.12)
While if citizen i declines the proposal, the continuation values for the citizens
are given by:
Vi(di = 0|p j = 1,B = 1,W = 0) = 1+ τ+ β (1−Ti)1−β , (2.13);
Vj(p j = 1|di = 0,B = 1,W = 0) = 1− τ+ β (1−Tj)1−β +
2λ
1−β . (2.14)
If neither of the citizens raise the proposal, the continuation values for the citizens
are given by:
Vi(di = d j = 0|B = 1,W = 0) = 1−Ti1−β , (2.15)
Vj(di = d j = 0|B = 1,W = 0) = 1−Tj1−β . (2.16)
In order to sustain (T1,T2), the ruler must ensure that given (T1,T2) and (T ri =
−τ,T rj = τ), neither of the citizens would raise the proposal or support it, which
means that (T1,T2) is sustainable if and only if:
1+ τ+
β (1−Ti)
1−β >
1
1−β , (2.17)
and
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1−Ti
1−β > 1− τ+
β (1−Ti)
1−β +
2λ
1−β , (2.18)
where i = 1,2. Inequalities (2.17) gives :
Ti 6
(1−β )τ
β
; (2.19)
while inequalities (2.18) gives:
Ti 6 τ− 2λ1−β , (2.20)
where τ − 2λ1−β > 0 if and only if λ 6 λ
h
2 . This means that if the opposition
organization chooses to reward the proposer, the kleptocracy is sustainable if and
only if λ 6 λ h2 ; otherwise when λ >
λ h
2 , the kleptocracy will break down. Given
λ 6 λ h2 , (T1,T2) is sustainable if and only if:
Ti 6 min{(1−β )τβ ,τ−
2λ
1−β }. (2.21)
It is easy to show (1−β )τβ > τ− 2λ1−β if and only if
λ > (2β −1
β
)[
(1−β )τ
2
]≡ λB, (2.22)
where 0 < λB 6 λ h2 . Hence, if λB 6 λ 6
λ h
2 , we have: Ti = τ − 2λ1−β ; while if
λ < λB, we have: Ti = (1−β )τβ . Therefore, when λ
B6 λ 6 λ h2 , the optimal sustainable
tax policy is given by:
(T1 = T2 = τ− 2λ1−β ),
given which:
L(B = 1,W = 0) =−2(τ− 2λ
1−β ). (2.23)
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When λ < λB, the optimal sustainable tax policy is given by:
(T1 = T2 =
(1−β )τ
β
),
given which:
L(B = 1,W = 0) =−2(1−β )τ
β
. (2.24)
Based on the above analysis, we can find that if the opposition organization
chooses to reward the proposer, the kleptocracy is sustainable if and only if λ 6 λ h2 ,
which is exactly the same to the case that it chooses to reward the citizen supporting
the proposal. Therefore, if the opposition organization opts for the rewarding scheme,
disregard whom is rewarded, the kleptocracy would be sustainable when λ 6 λ h2 , and
it will break down when λ > λ
h
2 . What is more, if the opposition organization chooses
to reward the proposers, no discriminatory tax policy would be sustained along the
equilibrium path.
When λB 6 λ 6 λ h2 , if the opposition organization chooses to reward the citi-
zen supporting the proposal, denoted by L(B = 1,W = 1), the minimum loss for the
opposition organization is given by equation (2.7); while if it decides to reward the
proposer, denoted by L(B = 1,W = 0), the loss is given by equation (2.23). We can
derive that given λB 6 λ 6 λ h2 , we have: (2.23) > (2.7) (please refer to Appendix
II.3 for the proof). Therefore, when λ > λB, rewarding the proposer is the optimal
strategy to minimize the loss function.
It is easy to show given β > 12 , we have: λ
B < (2−3β )τ4 . Hence, when λ < λ
B,
if the opposition organization chooses to reward the citizen supporting the proposal,
its loss is given by equation (2.9); while if it chooses to reward the proposer, its loss
is given by equation (2.24). It is obvious (2.9)> (2.24), which means rewarding the
citizen supporting the proposal, denoted by L(B = 1,W = 1), is the optimal solution
to the loss minimization problem.
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PROPOSITION 2.1:
a) When λ > λ
h
2 , the MPE is given by: {(B= 1,W = 1), .} or {(B= 1,W = 0), .},
given either of the above two, no tax policy is sustainable and the kleptocracy will
break down;
b) When λB 6 λ 6 λ h2 , where λB = (
2β−1
β )[
(1−β )τ
2 ], there is a unique MPE given
by: {(B = 1,W = 0),(T e1 = T e2 = τ− 2λ1−β ), p1 = p2 = 0}
c) When λ < λB, there is a unique MPE given by: {(B = 1,W = 1),(T e1 = T e2 =
(1−β )τ−2λ
β ), p1 = p2 = 0}
Based on the above analysis, we can infer that rewarding the citizens is more
effective on constraining the kleptocracy, compared to punishing the citizens. If the
opposition organization chooses the punishing scheme, the kleptocracy would be sus-
tainable as long as λ > (1−β )τ; while if it chooses the rewarding scheme, no matter
rewarding the proposer or the one supporting the proposal, the kleptocracy would
be sustainable if and only if λ > λ
h
2 . This shows that the rewarding scheme can
significantly decrease the survivability of the kleptocracy.
When λ 6 λ h2 , the rewarding scheme could not help remove the ruler, however it
would reduce the ruler’s payoff along the equilibrium path. If the endowment of the
opposition organization is relatively high, i.e., λB 6 λ 6 λ h2 , the most effective strat-
egy to reduce the rulers’s payoff along the equilibrium path is to reward the proposer.
While if the endowment of the opposition organization is relatively low, i.e., λ < λB,
the most effective strategy is to reward the citizen supporting the proposal. What is
more, rewarding the proposer will prevent the ruler from adopting a discriminatory
tax policy.
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2.4 Conclusion
This paper introduces a theoretical framework to examine the impact of the benev-
olent opposition organizations, like trade unions and religious institutions, on the
strategy of divide-and-rule and the survivability of kleptocracies. This paper mainly
contributes to the literature on the impact of trade unions and religious institutions
on the democratization process in a state. By punishing the members supporting the
kleptocrats, the benevolent opposition organizations may constrain the divide-and-
rule policy and even help remove the kleptocrats. They may contribute to improving
the welfare of their members both directly and indirectly.
What is more, the paper shows that compared to punishing the citizen group sup-
porting the ruler, the benevolent opposition organizations more effectively constrain
the kleptocracy through rewarding the citizen group proposing to remove the ruler or
the citizen group supporting the proposal. Firstly, rewarding the citizens, compared to
punishing the citizens, can significantly decrease the survivability of the kleptocracy.
Secondly, when the opposition organization is not strong enough to help remove the
ruler, it can reduce the ruler’s payoff along the equilibrium path. Lastly, if the benev-
olent opposition organization chooses to reward the citizen group who initiates the
challenge, this may prevent the ruler from adopting a discriminatory redistribution
policy.
Furthermore, this paper suggests that a kleptocracy or dictatorship is more likely
to prevail and persist in those states in which the regimes have more control over
the allocation of various economic and social resources. This may help explain why
North Korea, Burma, China, Cuba, Laos and Saudi Arabia are among the nineteen
countries that boasts the lowest levels of political rights and civil liberties (see Table
1 in Appendix II.4).
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3 Chapter III: Democratization, Revolution and In-
ternational Interventions
Abstract
In a dictatorial society or a weakly institutionalized society, the ruler and
the opposition vie for social surplus, while the international community decides
whether or not to carry out military interventions in the case of a civil war, or
whether or not to impose economic sanctions to promote the democratization
process in this society. This paper develops a theoretical model for military
interventions and economic sanctions respectively, formalizing the interaction
between the international community, the opposition and the ruler. This pa-
per shows that both military interventions and economic sanctions may help
promote democratization process, while they may also induce the opposition to
resort to a revolution to overthrow the regime, thus increasing the likelihood of
a civil war and raising the uncertainties in the democratization process. Several
analytical results in this paper may shed light on the questions about the effi-
cacy and impacts of international interventions on the democratization process
in a state. What is more, this paper introduces the military interventions in 2011
Libyan revolution and the economic sanctions against Burma as case studies.
3.1 Introduction
Following the end of World War II, promoting democratic governance around
the world has been put in the agenda of the international community. In 1948, the
United Nations adopted the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, and Article 21
of the Declaration states that: “ The will of the people shall be the basis of the au-
thority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections...
”.16 International interventions could be classified into three main types: diplomatic
16See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml#a23
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sanctions, economic sanctions and military interventions. Even though economic
sanctions and military interventions are applied by the international community as
the main apparatuses for democracy promotion, their effectiveness has long been dis-
puted (see Peceny 1999a & 1999b, Meernik 1996 and Collins 2009). By introducing
two theoretical models, this paper is going to examine the impacts of economic sanc-
tions and military interventions on the process of democratization in a society.
Since the end of World War II, many military interventions have been taken by
hegemonic actors, including the U.S. and other great powers, such as NATO and
the United Nations (henceforth UN), in responding to grave violations of human
rights in internal armed conflicts.17 Examples include Yugoslavia in early 1990s
(see Mayall 1996), Haiti in 1994, Liberia from 1991 to 1996 (see Huband 1998),
Somalia in 1993 (see Mayall 1996) and Libya in 2011. While in many occasions,
the grave violations of human rights, such as famine and carnage, result from dif-
ferent military/political factions’ competition for political power, or the suppression
on protests/demonstrations demanding more political or economic rights. Through
changing the relative strength of different political forces, military interventions may
have significant impact on the democratization process in a nation. For instance, in
July 1994, in response to deteriorating human rights in Haiti following the military
coup in September 1991,18 the UNSC Resolution 94019 authorized a US-led multina-
tional military interventions, which successfully restored President Aristide to office
and upheld democracy in Haiti (see Dinstein 2005).
Besides military interventions, economics sanctions are another major apparatus
17Conteh-Morgan (2001) states ‘...experience of the post-Cold War era, in particular, is character-
ized by centrifugal forces of violent ethnonationalism related to normative concerns of human rights
and democratization that in turn spawn responses (for example peacekeeping interventions) from the
international system. These interventions reflect a shift away from a strict adherence to the doctrine
of state sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention’.
18The coup ousted President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, who was legitimately elected the Haitian gen-
eral election eight month earlier. According to the ‘Report on the situation regarding human rights in
Haiti’, following the coup, human rights situation in Haiti was extremely dangerous and vast majority
of the Haitian people lived in desperately poor living conditions.
19U.N. Resolution for Invasion of Haiti". The New York Times. August 1, 1994.
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for the international community. According to Hufbauer, Schott, Elliott and Oegg
(2007) (Henceforth HSEO), there have been 187 episodes of economic sanctions
since 1914, and 66 of which started after the end of Cold War. Vast majority of these
sanctions are levied either by the USA or the international community led by the
USA, such as the sanctions on Haiti (1991), Cambodia (1992), Guatemala (1993),
Nigeria (1993) and Pakistan (1999) etc.. In 1993, after Guatemalan President Jorge
Serrano dissolved Congress and announced he would rule by decree, the U.S. and the
European Economic Community terminated all non-humanitarian aid and threatened
sharp economic sanctions if democracy was not immediately restored. Under the
threat of comprehensive sanctions, Serrano was ousted by the military supported by
a wide range of sectors in Guatemalan society, and the democracy was restored within
days following the coup (see Nelson and Eglinton 1996). Other successful episodes
include the sanctions against Peru in 1992, Malawi in 1992 (see Posner 1995) and
Serbia in 1998 (see De Krnjevic-Miskovic 2001) etc.. Nonetheless, on a large number
of other occasions, international sanctions have failed to achieve their intended goals,
examples including Ethiopia (1977), Argentina (1977), Paraguay (1977) and Sierra
Leone (1977) (see HSEO). According to HSEO, economic sanctions are found to be
effective in only 36 percent of all cases in the twentieth century.
International interventions by the hegemonic actors are usually carried out in the
name of ‘humanitarian intervention’ or promoting democracy, and legalized and jus-
tified by various humanitarian or pro-democracy purposes. However behind the veil
of these purposes, national interests of those sender countries play an important role
in the decision on whether and when to intervene (see Conlon 2004). For example,
Chomsky (1993) argues that the 1993 military intervention in Somalia was utilized
by the U.S. government as a new pretext to justify continuing massive military bud-
gets and government subsidies to the U.S. defense industry. Justin (2004) states: “...a
pushover for the U.S. that would bring it prestige at little cost. That the U.S. pulled
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out as soon as it began to lose domestic support for the action in Somalia confirms
Chomsky’s contention that humanitarian motives were not the real agenda. ...Once it
became clear that the costs of intervening would be greater than the benefits, the U.S.
pulled out”.
For the sender states, there are two major categories of benefits that could be de-
rived from engaging in international interventions. One is the instrumental value of
international interventions, which refers to the benefits for the sender states by induc-
ing the regime shift or policies changes in the target states through interventions, such
as strengthening their political/military influence in the target states and improving
diplomatic and business relationship with them. The other one is the symbolic value
of interventions, which refers to the benefits for the sender states to declare their po-
litical standpoint regarding democratization issues and their resolution to defend their
political values, through carrying out the interventions.
In the case of military interventions, the symbolic value plays a relatively trivial
role in the utility function of the sender states, given the huge cost involved in military
interventions.20 While in the case of economic sanctions, their symbolic value could
be a crucial part of their utility function. Galtung (1967) points out that even though
economic sanctions may not make a receiving nation comply, they may still serve
functions that are useful in the eyes of the sender nation(s). Eland (1995) claims
that symbolic goals of economic sanctions are important and may even be vital, and
‘Nations watch the behavior of other countries carefully for subtle clues about their
intentions and resolve’. Whang (2011) argues that sanctions could be imposed by the
policymakers to increase domestic support.
“There are no eternal friends or eternal enemies,...only eternal interests” (—
Winston Churchill). International relations are subject to changes over the time:
20For example, the military intervention in Somalia between 1992 and 1993 costs the U.S. Govern-
ment more than 7 billion USD (see Valentino 2011), and the cost of U.S. military operation in Libya
in 2011 could be as high as 2 billion USD per day (see ‘The Real Cost Of U.S. In Libya? Two Billion
Dollars Per Day’, Forbes, August 3, 2011.
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friends today could turn into enemies tomorrow, while enemies today could become
friends tomorrow. After Gaddafi came to power through the 1969 coup, US-Libyan
relations became increasingly strained, because of Libya’s support to international
terrorism21 and a series of international conflicts between them in the following three
decades (see Davis 1990). In 1970s, the USA terminated official diplomatic relation-
ship with Libya and designated Libya a ‘state sponsor of terrorism’(see Haley 1984),
and imposed or promoted a series of unilateral or the UN sanctions on Libya in 1980s
and 1990s.22 However because of Gaddafi government policy reversals on terrorism
and weapons of mass destruction,23 most of these sanctions were lifted in 2003 and
2004, and the USA normalized the relationship with Libya between 2004 and 2006.24
In a dictatorial society or other weakly institutionalized societies, the ruler and
the opposition vie for social surplus, economic interests and political powers etc..
The international community decides whether or not to carry out military interven-
tions in the case of a civil war, or whether or not to impose economic sanctions to
promote the democratization process in this society. This paper develops a theoreti-
cal model for military interventions and economic sanctions respectively, formalizing
the interaction between the international community, the opposition and the ruler.
This paper mainly explores the following four questions. Firstly, what is the im-
pact of military interventions on the ways of democratization chosen by a nation,
21’’Libya terrorism: the case against Gaddafi’s (Ronald Bruce St John),
http://www.recalibration.com/Libyan+terrorism%3A+the+case+against+Gaddafi.-a014151801
22In 1986, the U.S. imposed economic sanctions on Libya, due to the latter’s continuous support
to international terrorism, and launched an air strike against targets near Tripoli and Benghazi fol-
lowing the death of two Americans in the 1986 Berlin discotheque bombing (see http://www.global
security.org/military/ops/e_Eldorado_canyon.ht). In 1992 and 1993, a series of UN resolutions
(Resolution 731, 748 and 883) were passed to impose international pressure and sanctions on
Libya, after two Libyan intelligence agents were indicted in 1991 by the U.S. and Scotland for the
1988 bombing of Pan Am flight 103 (see http://www.UN.org/documents/SC/res/1992/scres92.ht and
http://www.UN.org/Docs/acres/1993/scres93.ht).
23On December 19, 2003, Gaddafi’s regime announced its intention to stop the weapons of mass
destruction and MTCR-class missile programs. From then on, it started to cooperate with the interna-
tional community for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons toward these objectives.
24From 2004, the U.S. began the process of normalizing bilateral relations with Libya, including
terminating the applicability of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act in 2004, re-establishing business
connections, rebuilding diplomatic relations in 2004 and finally upgrading to a full embassy in 2006.
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peaceful negotiation or revolution? Secondly, why does a civil war break out, despite
that it could be costly to both the opposition and the authoritarian regime? Thirdly,
what factors may affect the efficacy of economic sanctions on promoting democrati-
zation? Lastly, how do the policy changes demanded by the international community
affect the ways of democratization in a society? The following are the main findings
in this paper.
Firstly, the volatility of international relations may induce/encourage the oppo-
sition groups, who are relatively weak in the aspect of military strength, to resort
to a revolution to remove the ruler from power. In the next period, if there would
be significant improvements in the relation between the authoritarian regime and the
international community, the cost of the military interventions would outweigh the
gains from removing the ruler from power if the opposition is rather weak. As a
result, the international community would not provide military support to the oppo-
sition, which would encourage the ruler to purge the opposition in the next period,
instead of abiding by the surplus-sharing agreement between them. Given the expec-
tation that the ruler would purge the opposition if they are weak, in the future period,
it becomes the best strategy for the weak opposition to engage in a revolution to re-
move the ruler from power in the period when they could receive the support from
military interventions.
Secondly, when the opposition is sufficiently strong, the democratization process
in a nation would be less subject to the volatility of international relations, and it is
more likely for this country to resort to peaceful negotiation to embark on democrati-
zation. The reason is that when the opposition are sufficient strong, the international
community may still opt for engaging in military interventions, even though there
would be improvements in the relation between the authoritarian regime and the in-
ternational community. As a result, the authoritarian regime will have to face the
consistent military pressures from both the domestic opposition groups and the in-
83
ternational community. This will force the regime to abide by the surplus-sharing
agreement in the long run, thus facilitating the peaceful political transition to democ-
racy.
Thirdly, economic sanctions could be levied to induce certain policy changes in
favor of democratization or even a revolution against the ruler, if and only if the target
state is sufficiently vulnerable to economic sanctions. What extent of policy changes
could be induced depends on two key factors: the potential damage resulting from
the sanctions and the strength of the opposition. Nonetheless, even if the target state
is rather invulnerable to economic sanctions, in order to extract symbolic value of
sanctions, the international community may still choose to impose the sanctions, at
the cost of the welfare of ordinary citizens in the target states.
Lastly, both military interventions and economic sanctions may increase the like-
lihood of a revolution in a state. Base on the results derived in the model of military
interventions, we can infer that the presence and inconsistency of military interven-
tions could aggravate the commitment problems between an authoritarian regime and
the opposition, thus leading to a civil war. If the international community demand
policy changes that are not acceptable by the regime, this will intensify the conflict
between the regime and the opposition, because of the ‘collateral damage’ on the
opposition resulting from economic sanctions. Hence, if a country is sufficiently vul-
nerable to the sanctions, the international community may induce the opposition to
engage in a revolution to overthrow the authoritarian regime through imposing eco-
nomic sanctions.
This paper contributes to the literature examining the impacts of military interven-
tions on the process of democratization in the target nations. Some researchers argue
that military interventions increase liberalization in these states, examples includ-
ing Peceny (1999a and 1999b), Hermann and Kegley (1996) and Meernik (1996).25
25Mark Peceny (1999a and 1999b) state that the U.S. military interventions, promoting "free and fair
elections", have frequently resulted in remarkably resilient new democracies; Meernik (1996) suggests
that probit analysis of the effects of military interventions on democratization generally support the
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While the others state that military interventions may not necessarily promote the
democratic process in these countries, examples including Pearson, Walker and Stern
(2006) and Dimitrov (2005).26 This paper contributes to the literature by introduc-
ing a theoretical framework to the study on the impacts of military interventions on
the process of democratization. This paper suggests that the presence and inconsis-
tency of military interventions could induce/encourage the relative weak opposition
groups to engage in a risky revolution to overthrow an authoritarian regime. On one
hand, this may facilitate the democratization process in a nation if the revolution suc-
cessfully overthrows the dictatorial regime; While on the other hand, it reduces the
likelihood of peaceful political transition to democracy in a nation.
What is more, this paper contributes to the literature examining the effectiveness
of economic sanctions on democracy promotion or the welfare of the population in
the target states, and help explain the recurrence of half-hearted and seemingly in-
effective sanctions since World War II. Empirical researches present significant dif-
ferences in the efficacy of economic sanctions between the Cold War period and the
post Cold War era.27 The researches carried out in the Cold War period usually indi-
cate that economic sanctions in the Cold War period are largely futile in promoting
democratization in target countries. Examples includes Losman (1979), Schreiber
(1973) and Galtung (1967). While many researches, examining the efficacy of sanc-
tions in the post Cold War era, present more positive assessments, such as Cortright
and Lopez (2000), Rogers (1996) and Elliott (1992). This paper shows that economic
sanctions could be levied to induce certain policy changes in favor of democratization
notion that the U.S. military interventions do lead to increased democratization.
26Pearson, Walker and Stern (2006) state that when factors, such as human, political, and civil
rights, are used as measures of democratic success, military interventions do not clearly emerge as an
agent for democratic transformation; Dimitrov (2005) argues that international interventions tend to
sidestep and marginalize the local institutions and political process, thus undermining the sustainabil-
ity of the achieved improvements on the process of democratization.
27Collins (2009) argues that the increase in the efficacy of economic sanctions in the post Cold War
era is mainly due to the change in the shift from bipolar international system to the Unipolar one,
because ‘the structural attributes of the (unipolar) system presented a more benign environment for
the sanctions efforts of the United States’.
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or even a revolution, if and only if this country is sufficiently vulnerable to the sanc-
tions, and the more vulnerable to the sanctions, the more significant policy changes
could be induced. However, even if the target state is invulnerable to economic sanc-
tions, the international community may still impose the sanctions in order to extract
symbolic value of sanctions, and some of the seemingly failed episodes of sanctions
might actually be a strategic success for the sender states.
Furthermore, this paper contributes to the literature studying the “inefficiency
puzzle”: why does the bargaining over the terms of peaceful settlement break down,
despite that the fighting is costly? This question has framed many researches on
inter-state and civil war, and the explanations fall into two main streams: one is in-
complete/asymmetric information, and the other one is commitment problem. The
first stream argues that the breakout of a war is mainly due to the incomplete infor-
mation or the asymmetric information between the players, such as Fearon (1995)
and Powell (2004a).28 The second stream points out that a war may result from the
commitment problems between the parties involved, such as Acemoglu and Robin-
son (2001), Fearon (2007) and Powell (2006).29 This paper suggests that economic
sanctions or military interventions may contribute to a revolution in a state through
aggravating the conflicts between the opposition and the regime.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 develops the model of military inter-
ventions; Section 3.3 develops the model of economic sanctions; Section 3.4 intro-
duces the case study; Section 3.5 Concludes.
28Fearon (1995) argues that a war may result from the private information about resolve or capabil-
ity and the incentives to misrepresent these; Powell (2004a) suggests a way to empirically distinguish
wars arising from these the asymmetric information the about the cost of fighting or the distribution
of power, and shows that the equilibrium dynamics of informational accounts of war may be sensitive
to the bargaining environment through which information is conveyed.
29Powell (2006) points out two major limitations inherent to the first stream literature: i ) a poor
account of prolonged conflict; and ii) a bizarre reading of the history of some cases, and argues that
the war may result from large and rapid shifts in the distribution of powers, because of first-strike or
offensive advantages; Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) state that the poor may resort to a revolution
and the rich may launch a coup, in order to ensure higher payoff in the next periods, because neither
party could make a credible commitment on the redistribution in the next periods; Fearon (2007)
asserts that fighting may be used by the government to screen out the weak type of rebel groups, when
the latter’s types are unknown to the former.
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3.2 A Model of Military Interventions
In an authoritarian society, time runs in infinite discrete periods. In each period,
the society is endowed with one unit of surplus, such as political power and economic
resources. There are two agents, the ruler and the opposition, contesting for the sur-
plus. They may bargain over the allocation of the surplus between them, or resort
to a war to take possession of the surplus. If a war breaks out in a period, the inter-
national community will choose whether or not to carry out military interventions.
It is assumed that if the international community chooses not to carry out military
interventions in the case of a war, denoted by M = 0, no matter who wins the war,
there is neither cost nor surplus for the international community.
However, if the international community chooses to engage in military interven-
tions in period t, denoted by M = 1, supporting the opposition to remove the ruler
from power, the surplus for the international community in each period is zero if the
ruler wins the war. While if the opposition win, the international community may
receive µt units of surplus in each of the following periods from period t onwards.
Here, µt is stochastic before the society switches to a democracy, denoted by St = D.
This captures the notion that the international relations are volatile, and the inter-
national community’s attitude towards an authoritarian regime may change over the
time. In particular, it is assumed that µt takes two values,
µt =
 µ
h with probability pi
µ l with probability 1−pi
where µh > µ l > 0 and 0 < pi < 1. When µ = µh, there is relatively strong hos-
tility between the authoritarian regime and the international community, and the later
may derive relatively more benefits from removing the ruler. When µ = µ l , there
is relatively weak hostility between them, and the international community may de-
rive less benefits. The value of pi reflects the level of consistency in the international
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community’s attitude towards the ruler, and the larger the value of pi , the more the
consistency.
Without military interventions, Pr and Pg represent the winning probability of
the ruler and that of the opposition in a war respectively. Let Pg = p, then Pr =
1− p. It is assumed that p 6 12 , which captures the notion that in an authoritarian
society, the ruler usually has military advantages over the opposition without the
presence of military interventions. In a period with µt = µh, following the breakout
of a war, if the international community intervenes and provides military support
to the opposition, this will increase the winning probability of the opposition by φ ,
where 0 < φ 6 1− p, which represents the strength of military interventions. In this
base model, it is assumed that φ is exogenously determined, and given p, the cost of
intervention corresponding to φ is given by f (p,φ)= (1− p)C(φ), which implies that
given a certain value of φ , the weaker the opposition, the higher the cost of military
interventions. It is assumed that C
′
(φ)> 0 and C′′(φ)> 0 for any φ ∈ (0,1− p), and
C(0) = 0 and C(1− p) = 1.
If a war breaks out in a period, (1−ζ ) fraction of the surplus, where ζ > 0, will
be destroyed in this period. The loser in the war will lose everything forever, while
the winner will seize all the surplus in the following periods. The discounted total
amount of surplus for the winner could be denoted by: m1−β , where m= (1−β )ζ+β .
Here, m represents the average surplus entitled to the winner in each period following
a war, which is a weighted average between ζ and 1 by the discount factor β . If the
winner is the opposition, the society switches from an authoritarian regime, denoted
by St = (K,µt), to a democracy; while if the ruler wins, the society switches to an
autocracy, denoted by St = A, in which there is no opposition group challenging the
ruler. It is assumed that once the society switches to a democracy or an autocracy, it
will remain so forever.
In a period with µt = µh, the opposition chooses to engage in a revolution or
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raise a proposal for the allocation of the surplus. If the opposition chooses to raise
a proposal θ , i.e., θ fraction of surplus allocated to themselves, and it is accepted,
then a coalition government will be established, and the society enters the state of
political transition to democracy, denoted by St = (T,µt). A war will break out if the
opposition chooses to engage in a revolution, denoted by R = 1, or the ruler decides
to purge, denoted by G = 1.
In a period with µt = µ l , the ruler decides whether to abide by the agreement θ ,
or to purge the opposition. If the ruler chooses to abide by the agreement, denoted by
G= 0, the players will divide the surplus according to the agreement, and the society
will switch to a democracy, denoted by St = D, from the status of political transition.
While if the ruler decides to purge the opposition, denoted by G = 1, this will lead
to a war. If the opposition wins the war, the society will switch to a democracy and
they will receive all the remaining follow of the surplus; while if the ruler wins, he
will seize all the remaining follow of surplus.
All the agents have identical preferences represented by Et [∑∞j=0β jCit+ j], for
i = r,g,s. where r, g and s represent the ruler, the opposition and the international
community respectively. Here, Cit is the amount of surplus taken by agent i at time
t and Et is the expectations operator conditional on all information available at time
t. The following is the timing of events in a period with St−1 = (K,µt) or (T,µt):
(please refer to Appendix III.1 for the Game Tree)
(1) The state µt is revealed.
(2) If µt = µh, at the beginning of the period, the opposition decides whether or
not to engage in a revolution. If they choose to do so, i.e., R = 1, then a war breaks
out. If R = 0, then the opposition raises a proposal θ . Observing the proposal, the
ruler decides whether to accept the proposal or to purge the opposition. If no purge
is carried out, i.e., G = 0, then the proposal is implemented in the current period, and
the society switches to the status of political transition, denoted by St = (T,µt);
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(3) If µt = µ l , at the beginning of the period, the ruler decides whether to abide
by the agreement or to purge the opposition. If he chooses to purge, i.e., G = 1, then
a war breaks out. If the ruler chooses to abide by the agreement, i.e., G = 0, the
agreement sustains in this period, and the society switches to a democracy, denoted
by St = D. .
(4) If a war breaks out in a period, the international community decides whether
or not to carry out military interventions. If there are military interventions, denoted
by M = 1, the opposition will win the war with probability (p+φ), and the ruler will
win the war with probability (1− p−φ). While if there is no intervention, denoted
by M = 0, the winning probabilities are given by p and (1− p) for the opposition
and the ruler respectively. If the opposition wins the war, the society switches to a
democracy, denoted by St = D; while if the ruler wins, the society switches to an
autocracy, denoted by St = A.
In this section, the state S is one of D, A, (K,µt) or (T,µt), where µt = µh or
µt = µ l . We can simplify (K,µh) as Kh, (K,µ l) as Kl , (T,µh) as T h and (T,µ l) as
T l . The strategy of the ruler is denoted by σ r(S | θ), which depends on the state S and
the actions taken by the opposition when S = (K,µh) or S = (T,µh). This strategy
determines the actions of the ruler G when S= (K,µt), The strategy of the opposition
is denoted by σg(S), which is a function of the state S. This strategy determines the
actions of the opposition {R,θ} when S = (K,µh) or S = (T,µh). The strategy of
the international community denoted by σ s(S | R,G), which depends on the state S
and the action taken by the opposition and the ruler. A pure strategy Markov Perfect
Equilibrium (MPE) is a strategy combination denoted by {σˆg(S), σˆ r(S | θ}, σˆ s(S |
R,G)}, such that σˆg, σˆ r and σˆ s are the best response to each other for all possible
states.
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Analysis
Suppose a war breaks out in a period with µt = µh, if the international community
chooses to carry out military interventions following a war, the expected continuation
value for them is given by:
V s(M = 1|Kh) = (p+φ) µ
h
1−β − (1− p)C(φ). (1.1)
It is clear that in period t, the international community will carry out military
interventions if and only if (p+φ) µ
h
1−β > (1− p)C(φ), which gives:
µh > (1−β )(1− p)C(φ)
p+φ
≡ µ∗, (1.2)
where µ∗ is the threshold value determining whether or not the international com-
munity is going to carry out military interventions. It is clear that:
∂µ∗
∂ p
=−[(1−β )C(φ)(p+φ)+(1−β )(1− p)C(φ)
(p+φ)2
]< 0,
which shows that µ∗ is monotonically decreasing on p, i.e the increase in the
strength of the opposition will decrease this threshold value. When p = 0, we have
µ∗ = (1−β )C(φ)φ , and when p =
1
2 , we have µ
∗ = (1−β )C(φ)1+2φ . To simplify the analysis
without affecting the main analytical results, I introduce the following assumption:
ASSUMPTION 1: µh > (1−β )C(φ)φ > µ
l
Given the above assumption, we have µh > µ∗, thus it is a dominant strategy
for the international community to carry out military interventions in a period with
µt = µh, given any value of p. Hence, in a period with µt = µh, if the opposition
chooses to engage in a revolution, or the ruler declines a proposal θ raised by the
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opposition, the following are the expected continuation values from the war for the
opposition and the ruler respectively:
V g(R = 1 | Kh) =V g(θ | Kh,G = 1)
=
(p+φ)m
1−β ; (1.3)
V r(.|R = 1,Kh) =V r(G = 1 | Kh,θ)
=
(1− p−φ)m
1−β . (1.4)
While if a proposal θ is raised by the opposition and accepted by the ruler, thus a
coalition, government and the society switches to the state of transition. The follow-
ing would be the Bellman equations for the opposition and the ruler respectively:
V g(θ | Kh,G = 0) = θ +β [piV g(T h)+(1−pi)V g(T l | θ)]; (1.5)
V r(G = 0 | Kh,θ) = 1−θ +β [piV r(T h)+(1−pi)V r(T l | θ)]. (1.6)
In a period with µt = µ l , the international community will carry out military in-
terventions if and only if µ l > µ∗. It is obvious that if the µ l < (1−β )C(φ)1+2φ , i.e., when
the benefit from removing the ruler from power is rather small, the international com-
munity will not carry out military interventions, no matter how strong the opposition
is. To simplify the analysis without affecting the main analytical results, I introduce
the following assumption:
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ASSUMPTION 2:µ l > (1−β )C(φ)1+2φ .
Since µ∗ is monotonically decreasing on p, and (1−β )C(φ)1+2φ 6 µ l <
(1−β )C(φ)
φ , it is
clear that there must exist a unique p∗ 6 12 such that:
µ∗(p∗) =
(1−β )(1− p∗)C(φ)
p∗+φ
= µ l (1.7)
where p∗ is the threshold value determined whether the international community
is going to intervene. If p > p∗, i.e., when the opposition is strong enough, the
international community will intervene; while if p < p∗, i.e., when the opposition is
relatively weak, the international community will not. Therefore in a period µt = µ l ,
when p> p∗, if the ruler chooses to purge the opposition, the expected continuation
values for the ruler and the opposition are exactly the same to their counterparts in
the period with µt = µh. Hence, when p> p∗, if a proposal θ is accepted by the ruler
in a period with µt = µh, the ruler will abide by it in a period with µt = µ l , leading
to a peaceful transition to democracy.
Therefore, when p> p∗, if the opposition chooses to raise a proposal θ in a period
with µt = µh and it is accepted by the ruler, then the expected continuation values for
the opposition and the ruler are given by the following equations respectively:
V g(θ | Kh,G = 0, p> p∗) = θ
1−β ; (1.8)
V r(G = 0 | Kh,θ , p> p∗) = 1−θ
1−β . (1.9)
Therefore in a period with µt = µh, when p > p∗, if the opposition chooses to
raise a proposal θ , the problem for the ruler is given by:
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Max
G∈{0,1}
V r(G | Kh, p> p∗) = GV r(G = 1 | Kh,θ)+(1−G)V r(G = 0 | Kh,θ , p> p∗)
It is clear that V r(G = 0 | Kh,θ , p> p∗)>V r(G = 1 | Kh,θ) if and only if:
θ 6 1− (1− p−φ)m≡ θ¯ , (1.10)
where 0 < θ¯ < 1. Inequality (1.10) means when p > p∗, the ruler will choose
to accept a proposal if θ 6 θ¯ in a period with µt = µh; otherwise, he will opt for
purging the opposition. Therefore, it is obvious when p> p∗, the optimal θ is given
by: θ ∗ = θ¯ . Substitute θ ∗ into (1.8) and (1.9), we have:
V g(θ¯ | Kh,G = 0, p> p∗) = 1− (1− p−φ)m
1−β ; (1.11)
V r(G = 0 | Kh, θ¯ , p> p∗) = (1− p−φ)m
1−β . (1.12)
Hence, in a period with µt = µh, when p > p∗, the problem for the opposition
regarding whether or not to engage in a revolution is given by:
Max
R∈{0,1}
V g(R | Kh) = RV g(R = 1 | Kh)+(1−R)V g(θ¯ | Kh,G = 0, p> p∗)
It is easy to show: V g(θ¯ | Kh,G = 0, p > p∗) > V g(R = 1 | Kh), which means
that when p> p∗, it is a dominant strategy for the opposition to raise the proposal θ¯
instead of engaging in a revolution, and the ruler will accept and abide by the proposal
in all the periods.
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PROPOSITION 1.1:
When the opposition is strong enough, i.e., when p> p∗, a coalition government
will be established according to θ¯ in a period with µt = µh, thus the society enters the
state of political transition, and will switch to a democracy in a period with µt = µ l .
When p> p∗, given any values of pi and φ , there is a unique MPE given by:
{(R = 0,θ = θ¯ ,G = 0 | Kh);(G = 0;M = 1 | T l)}
where θ¯ = 1− (1− p−φ)m.
The above proposition shows that when the opposition is sufficiently strong, the
society will embark on peaceful and successful political transition to democracy. We
have examined in the above the case that p > p∗. Now let’s turn to the case that
p < p∗, i.e., when the opposition is relatively weak. When p < p∗, the international
community will not carry out military interventions in a period with µt = µ l . There-
fore, if the ruler chooses to purge the opposition in period µt = µ l , the following are
the expected continuation values for the opposition and the ruler respectively:
V g(T l,G = 1,M = 0,) =
pm
1−β ≡W
l
g ; (1.13)
V r(G = 1 | T l,M = 0,) = (1− p)m
1−β ≡W
l
r . (1.14)
It is clear that when p < p∗, the ruler will choose to purge if and only if (1.14)>
(1.9), which gives:
θ > 1− (1− p)m≡ θ , (1.15)
where 0 < θ < 1. When p < p∗, conditional on the expectation that the ruler
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will choose to purge in a period with µt = µ l , if the opposition opts for raising a
proposal θ in a period with µt = µh, and it is accepted by the ruler, the following are
the continuation values for the opposition and the ruler respectively:
V g(θ | Kh,G = 0, p < p∗) = (1−β )θ +β (1−pi)pm
(1−βpi)(1−β ) ; (1.16);
V r(G = 0 | Kh,θ , p < p∗) = (1−β )(1−θ)+β (1−pi)(1− p)m
(1−βpi)(1−β ) . (1.17).
It is clear that in a period with µt = µ l , if the optimal strategy for the ruler is to
purge the opposition, he would choose to accept a proposal in a period with µt = µh,
as long as (1.17)> (1.4), which gives:
θ 6 1− m[(1− p)(1−β )−φ(1−βpi)]
1−β ≡ θˆ , (1.18)
where θˆ > θ . It is clear that ∂ θˆ∂ p = m > 0, which means that θˆ is monotonically
increasing on p, i.e., the stronger the opposition, the more surplus the ruler is willing
to concede to them, in order to prevent a revolution. It is obvious that if the opposition
chooses to raise a proposal when p < p∗, the optimal proposal is given by:
θ ∗ = max{1, θˆ}.
This implies that given the proposal θ ∗, the ruler will opt for a purge in a period
with µt = µ l . It is clear that θˆ > 1 if and only if:
φ >
(1−β )(1− p)
1−βpi = φˆ , (1.19)
where 0 < φˆ < 1− p. Thus if φ > φˆ , i.e., the strength of military interventions
is relatively strong, we have θˆ > 1, thus θ ∗ = 1; while if φ 6 φˆ , i.e., the strength of
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military interventions is relatively weak, we must have θˆ 6 1, thus θ ∗ = θˆ . Given
φ > φˆ , substituting θ ∗ = 1 into equation (1.16), we have:
V g(θ ∗ = 1 | Kh,G = 0,S = T, p < p∗) = (1−β )+β (1−pi)pm
(1−βpi)(1−β ) . (1.20)
It is clear that when p < p∗, the opposition will choose to raise a proposal θ = 1
if and only if (1.20)> (1.3), which gives:
pi > φm− (1−β )(1− pm)
βφm
≡ pi∗, (1.21)
where pi∗ < 1. We can derive that pi∗ 6 0 if and only if: i) ζ 6 ζ ∗, ii) p < pˆ,
and iii) β < βˆ , where ζ ∗ = (1−β )(1−pβ )−φβ[φ+(1−β )p](1−β ) , pˆ =
(1−β )−φβ
β (1−β ) and βˆ =
1
1+φ . Thus when
φ > φˆ , if ζ 6 ζ ∗, p < pˆ and β < βˆ , we have pi∗ 6 0 and (1.20) > (1.3), which
implies that it is a dominant strategy for the opposition to raise the proposal θ ∗ = 1.
PROPOSITION 1.2:
When φ > φˆ , if ζ 6 ζ ∗, p< pˆ and β < βˆ , or ζ < ζ ∗, p> pˆ or β > βˆ , but pi > pi∗,
there is a unique MPE given by:
{(R = 0,θ = 1,G = 0, . | Kh);(G = 1,M = 0 | T l)};
While if ζ < ζ ∗, p> pˆ or β > βˆ , but pi < pi∗, there is a unique MPE given by:
{(R = 1,M = 1 | Kh);(G = 1,M = 0 | T l)}.
Conditional on the expectation that the optimal strategy for the ruler is to purge
the opposition in a period with µt = µ l , if ζ 6 ζ ∗, p < pˆ and β < βˆ , the opposi-
tion would opt for raising the proposal θ ∗ = 1 in a period with µt = µh along the
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equilibrium path; While if ζ < ζ ∗, p> pˆ or β > βˆ , when the consistency of military
interventions is relatively high, i.e., pi > pi∗, the best strategy is to raise the proposal
θ ∗ = 1; when the consistency is relatively low, i.e., pi < pi∗, the optimal strategy is to
launch a revolution.
The above analysis shows that when the strength of military interventions is rela-
tively strong, i.e., φ > φˆ , conditional on the expectation that the optimal strategy for
the ruler is to purge the opposition in a period with µt = µ l , the opposition would opt
for raising the proposal θ ∗ = 1 in a period with µt = µh along the equilibrium path,
if all of the following three constraints are satisfied: i) the cost of a war is relatively
high, i.e., (1− ζ ) > (1− ζ ∗); ii) the strength of the opposition is sufficiently weak,
i.e., p < pˆ; iii) the opposition is relatively impatient, i.e., β < βˆ . While if any one
of these three constraints is violated, whether or not the opposition would opt for the
proposal θ ∗ = 1, depends on the level of consistency of military interventions.
In this society, the ruler is not able to make a credible commitment of redistri-
bution in the following periods, thus the maximum amount of surplus that could be
conceded by the ruler, is the total surplus in the current period. When p < p∗, the
opposition is not strong enough to ensure that in the following periods, the ruler will
abide by the agreement made in the current period, as a result, the ruler will carry out
a purge in the period with µt = µ l .
If the consistency of military interventions is relatively low, i.e., pi < pi∗, thus
the probability of a purge in the following periods is high, the opposition will opt
for a revolution even if the ruler agree to concede all the surplus in the period with
µt = µh. While if the consistency of military interventions is relatively high, i.e.,
pi > pi∗, thus the probability of a purge is low, this would induce the opposition to
refrain from engaging in a revolution, given the high payoff in a period with µt = µh.
This implies that when the strength of military interventions is relatively strong, i.e.,
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when φ > φˆ , while the consistency of military interventions is relatively high, this
may induce the opposition to adopt the ‘opportunist strategy’: establishing a coalition
government with the ruler, despite the expectation that they would be purged by the
ruler in a period with µt = µ l .
In the above part, we have discussed the case that φ > φˆ . Now let’s turn to the
case that φ 6 φˆ , i.e., the strength of military interventions is relatively weak. When
φ 6 φˆ and p < p∗, the optimal proposal for the opposition is given by θ ∗ = θˆ . It is
clear:
∂ θˆ
∂pi
=−mφβ
1−β < 0,
which shows that θˆ is monotonically decreasing on pi . This implies that in order
to prevent the opposition from engaging in a revolution, the ruler is willing to con-
cede more surplus to them when the consistency of military interventions is lower.
Substituting θ ∗ = θˆ into equation (1.16), we have:
V g(θ ∗ = θˆ | Kh,G = 0, p < p∗)
=
(1−β )−m[(1− p)(1−β )−φ(1−βpi)]+β (1−pi)pm
(1−βpi)(1−β ) . (1.22);
We can derive: (1.22) > (1.3) (please refer to Appendix III.3 for the proof),
which implies that when p< p∗ and φ 6 φˆ , it is a dominant strategy for the opposition
to raise the proposal θ ∗ = θˆ .
PROPOSITION 1.3:
When both the strength of the opposition and that of military interventions are
sufficiently weak, i.e., p < p∗ and φ 6 φˆ , given whatever level of consistency in mil-
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itary interventions, the ruler can always concede sufficient surplus to the opposition
to prevent them from engaging in a revolution, when there is the threat of military
interventions; while he will opt for purging the opposition when the threat vanishes.
When p < p∗ and φ 6 φˆ , There is a unique MPE given by:
{(R = 0,θ ∗ = θˆ ,G = 0,M = 1 | Kh);(G = 1,M = 0 | T l)},
where θˆ = 1− m[(1−p)(1−β )−φ(1−βpi)]1−β .
According the above analysis, when the opposition is relatively weak, i.e., p< p∗,
the ruler will purge the opposition in a period with µt = µ l . However, if the strength
of military interventions is relatively weak, i.e., φ 6 φˆ , along the equilibrium path,
the opposition always chooses to raise the proposal θ ∗ = θˆ in a period with µt = µh,
disregard the level of consistency in military interventions. The higher the level of
consistency, the more will be conceded by the ruler. Based on the above analysis, we
may infer that a revolution is less likely to break out when both the strength of the
opposition and that of military interventions are relatively weak.
3.3 A Model of Economic Sanctions
‘‘When military action is impossible for one reason or another, and when doing
nothing is seen as tantamount to complicity, then something has to be done to express
morality, something that at least serves as a clear signal to everyone that what the
receiving nation has done is disapproved of. If the sanctions do not serve instrumental
purposes, they can at least have expressive functions.’’—Galtung (1967)
As an alternative apparatus of international interventions, economic sanctions
usually aim to induce and secure pro-democracy policy changes that are specified
by the international community.30 Comparing economic sanctions with military in-
30For example, the sanctions on South Africa in 1962 intended to compel the abolition of the
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terventions, their differences mainly lie in the following four aspects. Firstly, unlike
military interventions, economic sanctions may serve as an active apparatus to in-
duce policy changes in favor of democratization in a society, disregard whether the
sanctions are welcome by any individuals or groups within this society. Secondly,
compared to military interventions, it is much more difficult for economic sanctions
to avoid ‘collateral damage’ on the opposition and the ordinary civilians, even though
economic sanctions may intend to target at some individuals or political groups.31
Thirdly, compared to military interventions, economic sanctions are more frequently
introduced by the sender states to exert long-term pressure on the target countries, in
order to induce some pro-democracy policy changes.32 Lastly, unlike military inter-
ventions, economic sanctions could be suspended or reimposed in a period under the
discretion of the sender countries.
Considering the above significant differences between economic sanctions and
military interventions, this section is going to introduce a new framework to examine
the impact of economic sanctions on the interaction between the opposition and the
ruler. This society is endowed with one unit of surplus in each period: λ unit of the
surplus is allocated to the opposition, while the rest 1−λ is seized by the ruler. In
each period, the international community may decide whether or not to urge the ruler
to embarking on democratization, by threatening to impose economic sanctions on
this society. If they choose not to, denote this by H = 0; while if they choose to do
so, denoted by H = 1, they will request the ruler to concede δ unit surplus to the
opposition, where 0 < δ 6 1−λ . If the ruler accepts the proposal δ in a period, the
apartheid system; while the sanctions against Peru in 1992 aims to force Peruvian President Alberto
Fujimori to restore and protect the legislative and judicial branches in the country.
31For example, in response to the military coup in Haiti in 1991, the OAS employed a wide array
of economic sanctions, intending to force the Haitian military to restore President Aristide. But the
sanctions turned out to be devastating to many ordinary Haitian citizens and the poorest population,
while many of them are among Aristide’s strongest supporters (see Acevedo 1993)
32The duration of sanctions varies dramatically in different episodes. Some sanctions are revoked
shortly after they are levied, such as those imposed on Peru in 1992, Guatemala in 1993 and Malawi
in 1992. However, in many other episodes, they last for long periods, examples including those on
Iraq (1990-2003), Cuba (1960-ongoing), Chile (1975-90) and Libya (1978-2004) (see HSEO).
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sanctions will not be enforced, and there would no cost for the international commu-
nity. The benefit to the international community is given by φδ in the corresponding
period, where 0 < φ 6 1. Here, φ parameterizes the relationship between the in-
ternational community and the opposition: the higher the value of φ , the closer the
relationship.
After the ruler declines the proposal δ , if he is removed from power in revolution,
the payoff to the international community in each period is given by φ(1−λ ). While
if he remains in power at the end of the period, the sanctions will be enforced at the
cost of ω , and will destroy (1−ηt) proportion of the surplus allocated to each of the
players, where 0 < ηt < 1. The symbolic value of enforcing the sanctions is denoted
by ϒ, where ϒ> 0. Here, I introduce a tie-break assumption that for the international
community, if the payoff from introducing the threat of sanctions is equal to that
from not introducing it, the ruler will always opt for the latter. In this section, ηt
measures how vulnerable this society is to the economic sanctions, and in particular,
it is assumed that ηt takes two values,
ηt =
 η
l with probability pi
ηh with probability 1−pi
where 0 < η l < ηh < 1. If ηt = η l , it implies that the economy is rather vulner-
able to the economic sanctions in this period. While if ηt = ηh, it means it is less
vulnerable to the economic sanctions. If a war breaks out, Pr and Pg represent the
winning probability of the ruler and that of the opposition respectively. It is assumed
Pg = p and Pr = 1− p, where 14 < p < 12 .
If a war breaks out in a period, (1− ζ ) proportion of the total surplus, where
1
2 6 ζ < 1, will be destroyed in this period. Following the war in a period, the loser
will lose everything for ever, while the winner will seize all the remaining surplus
in this period, and one unit of surplus in each of the following periods. Let m =
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(1− β )ζ + β , where β > 34 , which represents the average surplus entitled to the
winner in each period following a war. It is assumed that λ > pm and 1− λ >
(1− p)m, given which neither the opposition nor the ruler will initiate a war without
external interventions. What is more, to simplify the analysis without affecting the
main analytical results, I assume: η l < 1−λm < η
h, where 12 <
1−λ
m < 1.
In this section, the state S is one of D, A, (K,ηt) or (T,ηt), where ηt = ηh or
ηt = η l , and we can simplify (K,ηh) as Kh, (K,η l) as Kl , (T,µh) as T h and (T,µ l)
as T l . It is assumed that the games starts in a period with ηt = η l , and the follow
are the timing of the game in a period: (please refer to Appendix III.2 for the Game
Tree)
(1) The state ηt is revealed.
(2) If St = Kl , at the beginning of the period, the international community de-
cides whether or not to urge the ruler to concede δ unit surplus to the opposition, by
threatening to impose economic sanctions on this society. If not, denoted by H = 0,
the state St = (K,ηt) remains and the stage game ends. If they choose to, denoted by
H = 1, and raise the proposal δ , the game moves onto the next stage.
(3) Observing the proposal δ by the international community, the ruler decides
whether or not to accept the proposal. If the ruler accepts, denoted by F = 0, the
sanctions will not be enforced and the society switches to the status of political tran-
sition, denoted by St = (T,ηt); While if he declines the proposal, denoted by F = 1,
the game moves onto the next stage.
(4) Following the action taken by the international community and the response
by the ruler, the opposition decides whether or not to engage in a revolution to over-
throw the ruler. If they choose not to engage in a revolution, denoted by R = 0, the
authoritarian regimes remains, and the sanctions will be enforced in all the periods.
If they choose to, denoted by R = 1, then a war breaks out. If the opposition wins
the war, the society switches to a democracy; while if the ruler wins, the society
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switches to an autocracy, denoted by St = A, and the sanctions will be enforced in all
the periods and the stage game ends.
(5) If St = T h, the ruler decides whether or not to purge the opposition. If he
decides not to, denoted by G = 0, the society switches to a democracy, denoted by
St = D. While If he decides to purge, denoted by G = 1, a war breaks out. If the
opposition wins the war, the society switches to a democracy; while if the ruler wins,
the society switches to an autocracy and the sanctions will be enforced in all the
periods.
Analysis
I am going to use backward induction to derive the MPE in this game. It is
obvious that if a proposal δ is raised by the international community and accepted by
the ruler in a period with St−1 = Kl , the ruler will abide by the agreement in a period
with St−1 = T l . Now, let’s examine the best strategy taken by the ruler in a period
with St−1 = T h. If the ruler chooses to abide by the agreement, denoted by G = 0,
the society will switch to democracy, and the continuation value for him is given by:
V r(G = 0 | T h,δ ) = 1−λ −δ
1−β . (2.1)
While if the ruler chooses to purge, it is given by:
V r(G = 1 | T h,δ ) = η
hm(1− p)
1−β . (2.2)
Hence, given an agreement δ reached in a period with St−1 = Kl , then in a period
with St−1 = T h, the problem for the ruler regarding whether or not to purge, is given
by:
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Max
G∈{0,1}
V r(G | T h,δ ) = GV r(G = 1 | T h,δ )+(1−G)V r(G = 0 | T h,δ )
It is clear that the ruler will choose not to purge if and only if (2.1)> (2.2), which
gives:
δ 6 1−λ −ηhm(1− p)≡ δ˜ , (2.3)
where 0 < δ˜ < 1−λ . The above inequality implies that δ˜ is the threshold value
determining whether or not the ruler will choose to purge the opposition a period
with St−1 = T h. If δ 6 δ˜ , i.e., the amount of surplus conceded to the opposition is
relatively small, the best strategy for the ruler is to abide by the agreement; while if
θ > δ˜ , i.e., the amount of surplus conceded to the opposition is relatively large, the
best strategy for the ruler is to purge the opposition in a period with St−1 = T h.
Now, let’s examine the interaction between the players in a period with St−1 =Kl .
Firstly, Let’s check the best response by the opposition if the ruler declines a proposal
δ . If the opposition decides to engage in a revolution, the continuation value for them
is given by:
V g(R = 1 | Kl,δ ,F = 1) = pm
1−β . (2.4)
While if they refrain from engaging in a revolution, thus the ruler remains in
power, the sanctions will be imposed in all the periods. As a result, the continuation
value for the opposition is given by:
V g(R = 0 | Kl,δ ,F = 1) = η
lλ
1−β . (2.5)
It is easy to show the opposition will opt for revolution if and only if(2.4)> (2.5),
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i.e.:
η l 6 pm
λ
≡ ηˆ l, (2.6)
where 12 6 ηˆ l 6 1. The above inequality shows that in the case that the ruler de-
clines the proposal by the international community, economic sanctions may induce
the opposition to engage in a revolution if and only if the society is vulnerable enough
to the sanctions when St =Kl , i.e., η l 6 ηˆ l , otherwise they would rather bear the loss
resulting from the sanctions than taking the risk to overthrow the ruler through a
revolution. Therefore, it is clear that when η l > ηˆ l , if the international community
chooses to introduce the threat of sanctions and raise a proposal, the continuation
values for the players are given by:
V r(F = 1 | Kl,η l > ηˆ l,δ ) = η
l(1−λ )
1−β ; (2.7)
V g(R = 0 | Kl,η l > ηˆ l,δ ) = η
lλ
1−β ; (2.8)
V s(δ | Kl,η l > ηˆ l) = ϒ−ω
1−β . (2.9)
It is clear that (2.9)> 0 if and only if ϒ> ω . Therefore, when η l > ηˆ l , if ϒ> ω ,
the international community will opt for raising a proposal δ ; while if ϒ 6 ω , they
will not.
Proposition 2.1:
When the society is not vulnerable to sanctions, i.e.,η l > ηˆ l , if the symbolic value
of enforcing sanctions exceeds the cost of enforcing them, i.e., ϒ > ω , the interna-
tional society will raise a proposal δ ∗, where 0 < δ ∗ 6 1−λ , despite that the ruler
will decline the proposal and the opposition will not engage in a revolution. When
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η l > ηˆ l and ϒ> ω , there are infinite number of MPE defined by:
{δ = δ ∗,F = 1,R = 0|Kl; .|Kh},
Nonetheless, if the symbolic value of enforcing sanctions is outweighed by the
cost of enforcing them, i.e., ϒ6 ω , the international society will refrain from raising
any proposal. When η l > ηˆ l and ϒ6 ω , there is a unique MPE defined by:
{H = 0, .|Kl; .|Kh}.
Now let’s turn to the case that η l 6 ηˆ l . Given η l 6 ηˆ l , it is easy to show if the
ruler declines a proposal δ , this will lead to a revolution launched by the opposition.
Thus, the continuation values for him and the international community are given by:
V r(F = 1 | η l 6 ηˆ l,δ ) = η
l(1− p)m
1−β ; (2.10)
V s(δ | η l 6 ηˆ l,F = 1) = pφ(1−λ )+(1− p)(ϒ−ω)
1−β . (2.11)
While if the ruler accepts the proposal, the following would be the Bellman equa-
tions for him and the international community respectively:
V r(F = 0 | Kl,η l 6 ηˆ l,δ ) = 1−λ −δ +β [piV r(T l)+(1−pi)V r(T h)]; (2.12)
V s(δ | Kl,η l 6 ηˆ l,F = 0) = φδ +β [piV s(T l)+(1−pi)V s(T h)]. (2.13)
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We have shown that in a period with St−1 = T h, if δ 6 δ˜ , the best strategy for the
ruler is to abide by the agreement. Therefore, if the ruler accepts a proposal δ 6 δ˜ ,
the continuation values the ruler and the international community are given by:
V r(F = 0 | Kl,η l 6 ηˆ l,δ 6 δ˜ ) = 1−λ −δ
1−β ; (2.14)
V s(δ 6 δ˜ | Kl,η l 6 ηˆ l,F = 1) = φδ
1−β . (2.15)
Thus, given δ 6 δ˜ , the ruler will accept the proposal if and only if (2.14) >
(2.10), which gives:
δ 6 1−λ −η lm(1− p)≡ δˆ ,
where δ˜ < δˆ < 1−λ . The above inequality shows that in a period with St−1 =Kl ,
if δ 6 δˆ , the ruler will accept the proposal by the international community; while if
δ > δˆ , he will decline the proposal, despite that this will result in a revolution. Based
on the above analysis, we can infer that if δ 6 δ˜ , the best response for the ruler is
to accept and abide by the proposal in all the period, thus the society will embark on
a peaceful political transition to democracy under the threat of economic sanctions;
While If δ > δˆ , the proposal will be declined by the ruler, and the threat of economic
sanctions will induce the opposition to engage in a revolution. While if δ˜ < δ 6 δˆ ,
the proposal will be accepted by the ruler and the revolution will be avoided in a
period with St−1 = Kl, however in a period St = T h, the ruler will opt for purging the
opposition instead of abiding by the agreement.
It is obvious that if the international community chooses to raise a proposal δ 6 δ˜ ,
then the optimal proposal is given by δ = δ˜ , the continuation values for the interna-
tional community and the opposition are given by:
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V s(δ = δ˜ |Kl) = φ [1−λ −η
hm(1− p)]
1−β ; (2.16)
V g(δ = δ˜ |Kl) = 1−η
hm(1− p)
1−β . (2.17)
If the international community chooses to raise a proposal δ ∈ (δ˜ , δˆ ], then the
optimal proposal is given by δ = δˆ , thus the continuation values for the international
community and the opposition are given by:
V s(δ = δˆ |Kl)
=
φ [1−λ −η lm(1− p)]
1−βpi +
β (1−pi)
1−βpi {
pφ(1−λ )+(1− p)(ϒ−ω)
1−β }; (2.18)
V g(δ = δˆ |Kl) = 1−η
lm(1− p)
1−βpi +
β (1−pi)pm
(1−β )(1−βpi) . (2.19)
While if the international community decides to raise a proposal δ > δˆ , the con-
tinuation values for the international community and the opposition are given by:
V s(δ > δˆ |Kl) = pφ(1−λ )+(1− p)(ϒ−ω)
1−β ; (2.20)
V g(δ > δˆ |Kl) = pm
1−β . (2.21)
It is easy to show that the difference between V s(δ > δˆ |Kl) and V s(δ = δˆ |Kl) is
given by:
V s(δ > δˆ |Kl)−V s(δ = δˆ |Kl)
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=
1− p
1−βpi {ϒ−ω+φ [η
lm− (1−λ )]} ≡ ∆1; (2.22)
while the difference between V s(δ > δˆ |Kl) and V ss (δ = δ˜ |Kl) is given by:
V s(δ > δˆ |Kl)−V ss (δ = δ˜ |Kl)
=
1− p
1−β {ϒ−ω+φ [η
hm− (1−λ )]} ≡ ∆2, (2.23)
where, ∆1 > 0 if and only if:
ϒ> ω+φ [1−λ −η lm]≡ ϒˆ, (2.24)
and ∆2 > 0 if and only if:
ϒ> ω+φ [1−λ −ηhm]≡ ϒ˜. (2.25)
It is clear that ϒˆ > 0 and ϒˆ > ϒ˜. We can infer that ϒ˜ > 0 if and only if ω > ωˆ,
where ωˆ = φ [ηhm− (1− λ )] > 0. Hence, if ω 6 ωˆ, we always have ϒ˜ 6 0, thus
∆2 > 0. Base on the above analysis, it is easy to show the follow analytical results:
i) When ω 6 ωˆ , i.e., the cost of economic sanctions is relatively small, if ϒ> ϒˆ,
we have: ∆2 > ∆1 > 0, hence V ls (δ > δˆ ) > V ls (δ = δˆ ) > V ls (δ = δ˜ ). This means
that the optimal strategy for the international community is to raise a proposal that is
not acceptable for the ruler, such that the opposition would resort to a revolution to
remove him. If ϒ6 ϒˆ, we have: ∆1 6 0 and ∆2 > 0, hence V ls (δ = δˆ )>V ls (δ > δˆ )>
V ls (δ = δ˜ ). This means that the optimal strategy for the international community is to
raise the proposal δˆ , which would be accepted by the ruler only in the periods when
the society is vulnerable to economic sanctions.
ii) When ω > ωˆ , i.e., the cost of economic sanctions is relatively large, if ϒ> ϒˆ,
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we have ∆2 > ∆1 > 0, hence: V ls (δ > δˆ ) > V ls (δ = δˆ ) > V ls (δ = δ˜ ), which implies
the optimal strategy is to raise a proposal that is not acceptable for the ruler; while if
ϒˆ>ϒ> ϒ˜, we have: ∆16 0 and ∆2> 0, hence: V ls (δ = δˆ )>V ls (δ > δˆ )>V ls (δ = δ˜ ),
which means the optimal strategy is to raise the proposal δˆ .
iii) When ω > ωˆ , if ϒˆ > ϒ˜ > ϒ, we have: V ls (δ = δˆ ) > V ls (δ = δ˜ ) > V ls (δ > δˆ )
if pi > pˆi (Please refer to Appendix III.4 for the proof), where,
pˆi = 1− φm[η
h(1−βpi)−η l(1−β )]
β [ω+φ(1−λ )−ϒ] , (2.26)
We can derive: 0 < pˆi < 1 (please refer to Appendix III.5 for the proof); while if
pi 6 pˆi , we have: V ls (δ = δ˜ )>V ls (δ = δˆ )>V ls (δ > δˆ ), which implies that the optimal
strategy for the international community is to raise the proposal δ˜ , which would be
accepted and abided by the ruler in all the periods, hence the society will switch to a
democracy through a peaceful transition.
PROPOSITION 2.2:
When η l 6 ηˆ l , if ϒ > ϒˆ, the international society will raise a proposal that is
not acceptable to the ruler, thus inducing the opposition to engage in a revolution
through economic sanctions. There are infinite number of MPE, defined by:
{δ = δ ∗,F = 1,R = 1|Kl; .|Kh},
where δˆ < δ ∗ 6 1−λ .
If: i) ω 6 ωˆ and ϒ6 ϒˆ; ii) ω > ωˆ and ϒˆ> ϒ> ϒ˜; or iii) ω > ωˆ , ϒˆ> ϒ˜> ϒ and
pi > pˆi , the international society will raise a proposal that is only acceptable to the
ruler when the society is vulnerable to the sanctions; while in a the transition period
when the society is not vulnerable to the sanctions, the ruler will opt for purging the
opposition. There is a unique MPE given by:
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{δ = δˆ ,F = 0, .|Kl; G = 1|T h}.
If ω > ωˆ , ϒˆ > ϒ˜ > ϒ and pi 6 pˆi , the international society will raise a proposal
that is acceptable to the ruler in all the period, hence the society will switch to a
democracy through a peaceful transition. There is a unique MPE given by:
{δ = δ˜ ,F = 0, .|Kl; G = 0|T h,}.
It is clear ∂ δ˜∂ p = η
hm > 0, i.e., δ˜ is monotonically increasing on p, which means
that the stronger the opposition, the more surplus the ruler is willing to concede to
them in the process of peaceful transition. Since ∂ δ˜∂ηh = −(1− p)m < 0, i.e., δ˜ is
monotonically decreasing on ηh, this means that the more vulnerable the society to
the sanctions in a period with ηt =ηh, the more surplus the ruler is willing to concede
to them during the peaceful transition.
It is easy to show: V s(δ = δ˜ |Kl)>V s(δ > δˆ |Kl), which implies that the opposi-
tion always prefers the proposal δ˜ , such that the society will switch to a democracy
through a peaceful transition, compared to a proposal that would be declined by the
ruler, thus inducing them to engage in a revolution under the threat of economic sanc-
tions. However, based on the above analysis, we can find it is not always to the best
interest of the international community to raise the proposal δ˜ . When the symbolic
value of sanctions is high enough, i.e., ϒ > ϒˆ, the best strategy for them is to in-
duce the opposition to engaging in a revolution to remove the ruler under the threat
of economic sanctions, instead of raise a proposal, such that the society would be
peacefully transformed to a democracy.
Since ∂ ϒˆ∂φ = 1−λ−η lm> 0, i.e., ϒˆ is monotonically increasing on φ , this implies
that the closer the relation between the opposition and the international community,
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the less likely for the latter to induce the former to engage in a revolution through
economic sanctions. Therefore, the improvement in the relationship between the
opposition and the international community, may increase the chance of a peaceful
transition to democracy in a society.
3.4 Case Studies
This section contains two subsections. The first one is the case of military in-
terventions in the 2011 Libyan Revolution, and the second one is the case study of
economic sanctions against Burma between 1988 and 2012.
3.4.1 Military Interventions in the 2011 Libyan Revolution
On 15 February 2011, between 500 and 600 Libyan people protested in front of
Benghazi’s police headquarters following the arrest of human rights lawyer Fathi
Terbil.33 The protests, which began by demanding Fethi Tarbel’s release, rapidly
dissolved into an anti-Gaddafi protest, spreading south and westwards across the
country, including Bayda, Derna and Zintan. Libyan security forces responded to
the unrest with lethal force, leading to violent clashes between the protesters and
them. On 18 February, the protesters started active resistance to the government in
Benghazi, and the protest/unrest escalated into a national-wide revolution against the
Gaddafi government. By the end of February, the rebel forces had taken control of
a significant part of Libya, including the major cities of Misrata and Benghazi, and
other cities including Tobruk, Bayda, Zawiya, Zuwara, Sabratha and Sorman, and the
important harbors at Ra’s Lanuf and Brega.34
On 22 February, Gaddafi expressed his defiance towards the rebels and his de-
33Fethi Tarbel is known for his work with families of the victims of the 1996 Abu Salim prison
massacre, in which around 1,000 prisoners were believed to have been executed.
34‘Gaddafi loses more Libyan cities’,
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/02/2011223125256699145.html
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termination to purge the rebels, in his long speech on state television.35 Gaddafi
referred to the rebels as ‘cockroaches’ and ‘rats’ in the speech, and asserted that they
did not represent anyone, and they were nothing. He vowed that he would not give
up his power, and would cleanse Libya house by house until the insurrection was
crushed. On 27 February, anti-Gaddafi forces established an interim governing body,
the National Transitional Council of Libya (Henceforth NTC), with the main aims of
co-coordinating resistance efforts and presenting a political face to the opposition to
present to the world.36 On 29 March, the political and international affairs commit-
tee of the Council announced its eight-point plan for Libya in The Guardian. 37 The
eight-point plan expresses the rebel’s desire to build a democratic society in Libya,
and at the same time, show their strong determination to resort to revolution to over-
throw Gaddafi’s dictatorship, leaving no space for any form of peaceful negotiation
between the Gaddafi regime and them.
While we have to note that despite the rebel’s victory in several cities at this
stage, the pro-Gaddafi forces still had obvious military advantages over the rebellious
forces.The rebellious forces were composed primarily of civilians severely lacking of
military training, such as the unemployed, students, teachers and oil workers. What
is more, the rebels were badly organized, and the communications between different
rebel groups were poor. Furthermore, the rebels are seriously outmatched by loyalist
forces in the aspect of weapons, due to their limited access to modern heavy military
equipment and air forces. The few armored units deployed by the rebels have been
obsolete T55 tanks, while the pro-Gaddafi forces were equipped with relatively mod-
ern T72 and T62 tanks, and well supported by air forces, including MiG23 Flogger
and Mi-25/35 Hind attack helicopters.38 The pro-Gaddafi forces’ ability to deploy
35‘Gaddafi: ‘I will not give up’, ‘we will chase the cockroaches’.’,
http://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20110222/local/
gaddafi-in-fighting-speech-i-will-not-give-up.351487
36‘Libya opposition launches council’,
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/02/2011227175955221853.html
37‘A vision of a democratic Libya’ (The Interim National Council), The Guardian, 29 March 2011
38‘Libya rebels’ weapons deficit’, http://www.iiss.org/whats-new/iiss-voices/?blogpost=146
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air power consisted a tremendous threat to the survival of the rebels, and this threat
could hardly be neutralized by the rebels without international military interventions.
In early March, the pro-Gaddafi forces launched a large-scale counteroffensives,
supported by their overwhelming relative modern weapons, including tanks and their
air forces.39 Between 9 and 17 March, despite the brave resistance from the rebels,
pro-Gaddafi force retook Zawiya, Ra’s Lanuf, Ajdabiya, Misrata, and Zuwara, with
the support of tanks, artillery, warplanes and warships. The counteroffensive launched
by the Gaddafi forces imposed tremendous military pressures on the rebellious forces.
Facing the regime’s relative superior heavy weapons and professional soldiers, it was
becoming more and more difficult for the rebels to stop the pushing forwards of the
pro-Gaddafi forces, without the support from intentional military interventions.
Why are the opposition forces so determined to remove Gaddafi through a vio-
lent revolution, despite that their military strength is much weaker than that of the
pro-Gaddafi forces? The reasons largely lie in the following two aspects: the ex-
pectation of international military interventions and the fear of purge by Gaddafi in
the near future. From the beginning of March 2011, the U.S. and the UK urged the
international community, with the UN or NATO, to approve to establish a no-fly zone
over Libya, in order to protect anti-Gaddafi protesters. In the European Union crisis
summit on Libya opened in Brussels on March 11, France and the UK urged their
partners to extend formal recognition to Libya’s opposition while working on contin-
gency planning for military action. These above actions taken by the U.S., the UK
and France signaled that these three great powers were ready to push forwards and
take military interventions in Libya in support of the rebel’s fighting against Gaddafi
regime, which provides a reliable expectation of the coming military interventions in
the near future to the rebels.
Because of the improvements in the relations between Gaddafi regime and the
39‘Gaddafi loyalists launch offensive’,
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/03/201131041228856242.html
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western countries, including the U.S. and the UK during the past decade, there is a
good reason for the opposition in Libya to worry that the international community
may refrain from engaging in the military interventions against the Gaddafi regime
in the near future, if their relations keep on improving. Thus even if Gaddafi regime
agreed to concede some economic interests and political power to them in the cur-
rent period, in the near future, without the pressure from potential military interven-
tions, Gaddafi may resort to forces to purge the opposition, whose military strength is
much weaker, compared to that of the pro-Gaddafi forces. Given the expectation that
Gaddafi would purge them in the near future, revolution becomes the best strategy
for the opposition in the period when they could get support from the international
military interventions.
Despite the tremendous military pressures imposed by the regime, their determi-
nation to topple Gaddafi’s rule by forces remained unshaken. “There is no return
for us. This nation will not bear both of us. It is us or his (Gaddafi’s) family,” Iman
Bugaigis, a media officer with the rebels told reporters in Benghazi.40 Neither did the
Gaddafi’s regime seek to negotiate with the rebels, when they are pushing forwards
in the count-attacks. On March 10, in an interview with the Reuters, Gaddafi’s son
Saif al-Islam,41 declared that the regime would launch a full scale military offensive
against the rebels, and announced: "There is no more chance for negotiations with
rebels fighting the Libyan government."
On 17 March, the UNSC passed Resolution 197342 to impose a no-fly zone in
Libyan airspace, and authorize the use of force in Libya to protect civilians from
40‘Gaddafi loyalists launch offensive’,
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/03/201131041228856242.html
41He was part of his father’s inner circle, in charge of public relations and diplomatic roles on behalf
of his father, and he was the second most-widely recognized official in Libya in Gaddafi’s regime (
McLean, Alan; Shane, Scott; Tse, Archie (November 28, 2010). ‘A Selection From the Cache of
Diplomatic Dispatches’. New York Times. ).
42Ten Security Council members voted in the affirmative: Colombia, Gabon, Lebanon, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Portugal, Nigeria, South Africa, and permanent members France, the United Kingdom,
and the United States; Five abstained: Germany, Brazil, India, and permanent members China and
Russia; None opposed.
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attack,43 which marked the beginning of military interventions led by USA, UK
and France. With the military and financial support from NATO countries, the rebel
forces launched an offensive against the pro-Gaddafi forces in the from later March
onwards, and by 23 August, they had taken control of the vast majority cities, in-
cluding Libya capital Tripoli, after the rebels seized Gaddafi’s own compound in Bab
al-Azizia. On 20 October 2011, Gaddafi was captured and killed, following which
NTC declared the liberation of Libya and the official end of the war on 23 October
2011.44 Even though there are still a number of uncertainties in the process of de-
mocratization in Libya, the fall of Gaddafi regime opens a window for the Libyan
people to introduce a fair and democratic system.
3.4.2 Economic Sanctions against Burma 1988-2012
Economic sanctions for the sake of democracy promotion have been imposed on
Burma since September 1988. It is not until April 2012, the international community,
including the USA, Australia and EU, decided to suspend their sanctions against
Burma, following the by-election. In this by-election on 1 April 2012, the opposition
party National League for Democracy (henceforth NLD), led by Aung San Suu Kyi
(henceforth Suu Kyi), won 43 of 45 open seats.45
Considering the level of synchronization between the sender countries and the
strength of the sanctions, we may roughly divide the 23 years of sanctions against
Burma, between 1988 and 2011, into three stages: i) the first stage, 1988-1996, is
featured by litter synchronization and weak measures; ii) the second stage, 1997-
2006, is characterized by improved synchronization but still weak measures; iii) and
the third stage, 2007-2012, is featured by high level of synchronization and strong
measures. By examining the sanctions measures taken by the sender countries and
43UNSC Resolution 1973,
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N11/268/39/PDF/N1126839.pdf?OpenElement
44“NTC declares ‘Liberation of Libya’ ”( 23 October 2011), Al Jazeera English.
45See ‘EU lifts Burma sanctions for one year’( by Kate Nodal), The Guardian, 23 April 2012,
http://www.guardian.co.UK/world/2012/APR/23/eu-lifts-burma-sanctions
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responses by the junta and the opposition in these different periods, we can find that
the effectiveness of the sanctions is closely related to the level of synchronization
between the sender countries and the strength of the sanctions.
In August and September 1988, a series of pro-democracy marches, demonstra-
tions and protests erupted into a mass uprising led by students, monks and politi-
cal activists, which was brutally suppressed by the military regime led by the State
Law and Order Restoration Council (Henceforth SLORC), leading to thousands of
deaths.46 In response to the bloody crackdown by the military regime, the USA sus-
pended its arms sales and assistance in September 1988. In the same year, Canada
banned arms export and non-humanitarian exports to Burma, and the EU imposed
an arms embargo against Burma, and the top two donors to Burma, Japan and West
Germany, suspended their aid.47 While in the following two years, only the USA
imposed further sanctions against Burma. In April 1989, the USA withdrew all Gen-
eralized System of Preferences (GSP) benefits, and in May 1990, the USA announced
that it would continue to suspend economic assistance ‘until a government broadly
acceptable to the Burmese people comes into being’.48
However, the above sanctions failed to reduce the pace of the regime’s suppres-
sion against dissidents, let alone facilitating the policy changes in favor of democ-
ratization. In July 1989, the military regime arrested the opposition leaders Aung
San Suu Kyi, U Tin and other senior members of NLD, a major opposition party in
Burma, and ‘mistreatment of political prisoners, including torture, beatings, is re-
portedly widespread’ (see HSEO). Although the military regime held relatively fair
multiparty election on 27 May 1990, they refused to turn over the power after NLD
won majority of seats in National Assembly.49 Nonetheless, between 1991 and 1996,
despite Burmese regime’s defiance to the sanctions and the pressure of the interna-
46This figure is according to ‘Human Rights Watch World Report 1989: BURMA’, while the au-
thorities claim that the deaths are around 350
47Source: Far Eastern Economic Review, 22 September 1988, 15
48Source: Far Eastern Economic Review, 7 June 1990, 11
49Source: Washington Post, 29 May 1990
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tional community, the USA is the only country imposed further economic sanctions
against Burma.50 What is more, the weak pressure on the military regime was further
diluted by a series of unilateral lifting of bans by Japanese government between 1990
and 1995.
From 1988 to 1996, due to the lack of synchronization, weak sanction measures
and self-reliance of Burma’s economy, the sanctions in this period failed to bring out
any significant progress towards democracy in Burma, except for some trivial and
temporary concessions made by the military regime. Furthermore, according to the
report by Amnesty International in February 1997, the political repression and human
rights violations in Burma had reached the peak since 1989.51
Between 1997 and 2006, there were significant improvements in the synchro-
nization of sanction measures taken by the international community. In 1997, all the
major sender countries, including USA, UK, EU and Canada, extended or imposed
further sanctions against Burma, intending to exert more pressure on the Burmese
regime for democratic progresses and human rights protection. However, between
1998 and 2001, the synchronization on the sanctions is undermined by the unilateral
actions taken by Japan.52
Between 1997 and 2006, although the coordination between the sender states has
been improved significantly, the sanctions are still far from being comprehensive and
strong, and the EU sanctions against Burma were still much weaker than those of
the USA. The investment ban imposed by the USA in 1997 exempted the USA firms
50In July 1991, the U.S. government refused to renew the bilateral textile agreement that expired on
31 December 1990. In April 1994, the USA listed Burma as an international "outlaw" state, prevent-
ing the funds available under the Foreign Assistance Act from financing U.S. share in international
organizations for Burmese programs. In December 1995, Senator Mitch McConnell introduced the
"Burma Freedom and Democracy Act," prohibiting U.S. investment, assistance, travel in Burma and
imports from Burma (See HSEO).
51Source: Washington Post, 12 February 1997
52In March 1998, Japan announced that it would provide a 2.5 billion yen loan to Burma for emer-
gency maintenance of Rangoon’s international airport. In November 1999, though Japan refused to
resume full-scale financial assistance to Burma, it decided to fund projects in Burma on a case-by-case
basis. In May 2001, Japan resumed development aid to Burma, and granted 28 million USD to Burma
for modernizing a power plant.
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that were already operating in the country. From Figure 1 (in Appendix III.6), we can
find following the sanctions in 1997, FDIs from the USA, the EU and the UK dropped
dramatically, leading to a sharp decrease in the total FDIs in Burma from 879 million
USD in 1997 to 191 million USD in 2002. While from Figure 2(in Appendix III.7),
we can see that the sanctions introduced in 1997 and 2003, have no significant impact
on the exports of Burma. Despite the sharp drop in FDIs, Burma’s annual real GDP
growth rate raised from 5.7 percent in 1997 to 13.7 percent in 2000, and the GDP
kept on growing fast throughout the following seven years.
Like the sanctions in the first period, those in the second period were still not
strong enough to bring out any major policies, expect for some minor adjustments in
the ways treating the political dissidents. In June 2003, the regime took Suu Kyi and
19 other members of NLD into "protective custody", and closed the party’s headquar-
ters in Rangoon and several NLD offices around the country. With the house arrest
of Suu Kyi, the NLD has become increasingly cautious and politically inactive, re-
fraining from political mobilization and action.
Although the damage resulting from the sanctions in this stage was still not se-
vere enough to force the Burmese regime to embark on democratization, it brought
out significant collateral damage on the ordinary Burmese civilians, which increased
the tension between them and the regime, and partially contributed to the national-
wide demonstrations in 2007. The investment bans resulted in a decline in average
salaries, benefits and working conditions for workers, because of the withdrawal of
the western investors.53 From Figure 3(in Appendix III.8) and Figure 4(in Appendix
III.9), we can find that following the sanctions introduced in 2003, the growth of
Burma’s economy slows down, and the purchasing power parity of GDP per capita
decreased from 1800 USD to 1700 USD in 2004 and 2005.
Due to the lack of foreign reserve resulting from the sanctions and the regime’s
mismanagement of the economy, the Burmese authorities removed the fuel subsidies
53see International Crisis Group Asia Report N°782.
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on 15 August 2007. As a result, the fuel prices rose by more than 60 percent, and price
of compressed natural gas hiked by 500 percent. The price increase soon spreads to
the prices of other basic necessities, including foods. These price increases triggered
a wave of national-wide protests between 19 August and 27 September 2007. Dur-
ing this period, more than 200 protests were witnessed in 66 cities across the country,
and the major demonstrations took place between 24 and 27 September. This wave of
demonstrations were finally crack down by the security force and the army, through
the use of brutal violence and a large number of arrests of the dissidents.54 By 1 Oc-
tober, the regime had succeeded in preventing any significant demonstrations around
the country.
In response to Burmese regime’s crackdown on the peaceful demonstrations, fur-
ther and strengthened sanctions against Burma were introduced by the major sender
states, including USA, EU, Japan, Canada and Australia. In October 2007, the USA
extended the ban authorized under the BFDA to cover high technology exports, and
introduced asset freeze and visa bans on leading Burmese officials and those who
with strong connections to Burma’s military regime. Furthermore, the USA imposed
a ban on importation of all the gems of Burmese origin,55 and prohibited Burmese fi-
nancial institutions from accessing the U.S. financial system. In the same month, the
EU imposed bans on exports, imports and investment with Burma’s logging, timber
and mining sectors,56 and Australia announced arms embargo and financial sanctions
on Burma.57 Also in the same month, Japan halted more than 4.7 million dollars of
funding for a human resources center based in Rangoon University.58
54Burmese junta raids monasteries, arrests over 200 monks Mizzima News, 27 Septem-
ber 2007; Myanmar: UN rights expert to probe allegations of abuses during crackdown,
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=24405&Cr=myanmar&Cr1=
55This ban was established under the ‘Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE Act’, which intended
to close a loophole through which Burmese gems, processed into jewelery outside Burma, could be
exported to the U.S..
56‘EU Imposes Fresh Sanctions on Myanmar’, http://www.dw.de/dw/article/0„2934373,00.html
57These sanctions denied access to any Australian financial institutions to those senior government
officials, military personnel and prominent business associates of the regime (‘Australia’s autonomous
sanctions: Burma’, http://www.dfat.gov.au/un/unsc_sanctions/burma.html)
58‘Japan adds to pressure on Burma (16 October 2007)’, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-
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In 2007, Burma economy had become much more susceptible to sanctions in the
following years, mainly because of the following two reasons. The first reason is the
slump in GDP growth since 1998. The annual GDP growth rate dropped dramatically
from 12.0 percent in 2007 to 3.6 percent in 2008, and in the following two years, the
growth rates were 5.1 percent and 5.3 percent respectively (see Figure 4 in Appendix
III.10). The slump in GDP growth rate was partially due to the sanctions, which
presented the Burmese regime the potential further damage on the economy resulting
from the sanctions. At the same time, with the sharp decrease in GDP growth rate,
the regime became more reliant on FDIs and international trade to boost the economy
growth. The regime embarked on a series of reforms in 2011, including currency
exchange rate, anti-corruption and foreign investment laws and taxation, and one of
the major goals of these reforms is to attract more FDIs.59
Another reason is the expansion of industry and service sectors. With the growth
in industry and service sectors, the development of Burmese economy becomes in-
creasingly reliant on the international business relations, because of the significant
decrease of the importance of agriculture in Burma’s economy.60 Consequently, the
Burma’s economy could not longer be self-reliant, instead, it becomes vulnerable to
the fluctuations in FDIs and international trade, thus becomes more susceptible to
economic sanctions.
Following the wave of sanctions in 2007, instead of showing defiance or giving
worthless promise of democratization, they started to put efforts on making some
‘pro-democracy’ institutional changes, in order to relieve the pressure from the sanc-
pacific/7046267.stm
59‘Burma’s Business Revolution’ (25 January 2012), http://the-
diplomat.com/2012/01/25/burma%E2%80%99s-business-revolution/
60In 1980s and 1990s, Burma’s economy relied primarily upon agriculture, which accounted for 57-
63 percent of Burma’s GDP and employed approximately 63-70 percent of the labor force. Because
of the dominate role of agriculture in the economy, the Burma’s economy was rather self-reliant in
the 1980s and 1990s. While in the 2000s, with the continuous and fast growth in the industry and
service sectors, the importance of agriculture sector declined steadily and it’s percentage dropped to
43 percent till 2007 (see Figure 5). The industry and service sectors replace the agriculture sector as
the major part of the economy and the dominant source of economic growth in Burma.
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tions and the domestic opposition. In February 2008, under the wave of economic
sanctions, the SPDC announced to hold a constitutional referendum in May 2008,
claiming that the new Constitution would ensure the creation of a "discipline-flourishing
democracy", and multiparty elections would be held in 2010. On 2 May, the regime
held the referendum on 10 May, and the new constitution was approved through ma-
nipulating the referendum.61
In accordance with the new constitution, the regime held a general election on
7 November 2010, which was the first general election since 1990. Despite that the
general election were widely alleged to have been manipulated by the regime and
won by Union Solidarity and Development Party, a party loyal to the military junta,
it marked the start of the political transition from the military rule to the civilian
government. What is more, on 13 November 2010, six day after the result of general
election was announced, Suu Kyi was released from house arrest, and a few days
later, the NLD announced that they would re-register as a political party in order to
contend 48 parliament seats in the by-elections.62
Since October 2011, the regime started to relax the press censorship,63 and in
the same month, Tint Swe, the head of press censorship department, said that cen-
sorship should be abolished in the near future, since it was incompatible with demo-
cratic practices.64 In October 2011, the regime passed new International Labour
Organization-approved legislation, which allows labour unions the right to strike.65
Furthermore, on 1 April 2012, the regime held a rather free and fair by-election that
was widely praised by the international community, in which NLD won 43 of 45 open
seats.66 This by-election marked a major progress towards democracy in Burma.
61‘Massive Cheating Reported from Referendum Polling Stations’, The Irrawaddy, 10 May 2008
62"Suu Kyi’s NLD democracy party to rejoin Burma politics". BBC News. 18 November 2011.
63For example, the regime started to allow the newspapers to publish photographs and reports about
Suu Kyi.
64Burma censor chief calls for more media freedom (by Rachel Harvey), BBC, 8 October 2011
65‘Burma law to allow labour unions and strikes’ (14 October 2011), BBC,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-15303968
66See ‘EU lifts Burma sanctions for one year’( by Kate Nodal), The Guardian, 23 April 2012,
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So far, there have been important policy and institutional changes in favor of
democracy in Burma, however without the support of sender states and the threat of
sanctions, the opposition in Burma still does not have enough leverages to ensure
the continuous progress towards democracy. Following the by-election, the Burmese
government has been eager to work with Suu Kyi, in order to convince the sender
states to remove the sanctions.67 While Suu Kyi insisted that the sanctions should
be suspended instead of lifted, as a way to acknowledge the progress to democracy,
while at the same time keep imposing the threat of sanctions on the regime68.
Soon after the by-election, the sender states announced to lift or suspend the
sanctions against Burma, in response to the democratic progress in Burma. In April
2012, in recognition of the changes taking place in the country, UK, EU, Australia
and Canada all suggest that their sanctions should be suspended, 69 On 17 May 2012,
The United States decided to suspend the investment bans in Myanmar, while at the
same time stressed that the laws underpinning U.S. sanctions on Myanmar would
remain, in order to maintain the leverage to push further progress on democratic
reforms in Burma.70
In summary, in the first stage, the sanctions had negligible impact on Burma’s
economy, because of the weakness of the sanctions and the self-reliance of Burmese
economy. Thus we can infer that given the extremely low cost of sanctions for the
sender states, the introductions of sanctions is mainly used as a symbolic instrument
to convey their stance to defend their democratic value and express their support to
the opposition in Burma. In the second stage, with the improvement in the syn-
http://www.guardian.co.UK/world/2012/APR/23/eu-lifts-burma-sanctions
67‘Sanctions Worked in Burma’,Wall Street Journal, 4 April 2012.
68‘Aung San Suu Kyi supports suspension of UK sanctions against Burma’,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/burmamyanmar/9202653/Aung-San-Suu-Kyi-
supports-suspension-of-UK-sanctions-against-Burma.html
69David Cameron calls for Burma sanctions to be suspended, BBC, 13 April 2012; EU lifts Burma
sanctions for one year, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/apr/23/eu-lifts-burma-sanctions;
anada suspending Burma sanctions, http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2012/04/24/burma-canada-
sanctions.html
70WRAPUP 1-US suspends sanctions on investment in Myanmar (May 17 2012),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/17/usa-myanmar-clinton-idUSL1E8GHHZQ20120517.
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chronization of sanctions and the increase in their strength, even though the damage
resulting from the sanctions is still not severe enough to force the Burmese regime
to embark on democratization, they result in heavy collateral damage on the ordi-
nary Burmese civilian. This increases the tension between them and the regime, and
partially contributes to the national-wide demonstrations in 2007. In the third stage,
after sanction measures have been significantly strengthened and Burma’s economy
becomes more vulnerable to the sanctions, the Burmese regime is finally forced to
carry out major policy changes towards democracy.
3.5 Conclusion
International community may intervene to help remove an authoritarian ruler in
a society, either through military interventions or through economic sanctions. Both
apparatuses may help promote peaceful democratization in a state. Military interven-
tions may force the ruler to embark on democratization by increasing the revolution
threat and reducing their expected payoff from a civil war. While economic sanctions
may force an authoritarian regime to implement policy changes towards democracy,
by reducing their payoff in status quo under sanctions, and raising the revolution
threat through intensifying the interest conflict between the opposition and them, due
to the ‘collateral damage’ of the sanctions.
While both military interventions and economic sanctions may induce the oppo-
sition to resort to a revolution to overthrow the authoritarian regimes, thus increasing
the likelihood of a civil war and raising the uncertainties in the democratization pro-
cess in the authoritarian states. The expectation of military interventions and low
consistency of them may induce the opposition to resort to a revolution by aggra-
vating the commitment problem between the ruler and them. The threat of military
interventions in a future period, would increase the ruler’s incentive to purge the op-
position in a period when there is no such a threat. As a result, a revolution become
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a more attractive strategical option for the opposition in a period when they could re-
ceive the support from military interventions. While economic sanctions reduces the
surplus for the opposition because of the ‘collateral damage’, thus may force the op-
position to revolt by aggravating the interest conflicts between the regime and them,
through demanding policy changes that are not acceptable by the regime.
The sender states of military interventions or economic sanctions have different
variables in their utility functions, compared to the opposition’s in the target states.
Hence, their interests are not always in line with the opposition’s. military interven-
tions may not be always carried out when the opposition needs them, while they are
rarely implemented against the interests of the opposition, because of their relative
trivial symbolic value, compared to the huge cost involved in military interventions,
and the relatively ‘passive’ feature of them. However, unlike military interventions,
economic sanctions could be introduced as an ‘active’ diplomatic apparatus and their
symbolic value could play an important role in the sender states’ utility function. Un-
der certain conditions, they may be carried out to maximize the sender states’ or the
policy makers’ interest, at the cost of interests of the opposition and the welfare of
the ordinary civilians in the target states.
Economic sanctions are usually considered by the public and researchers to be a
failure if they fail to bring our designated policy changes in the target states. However,
considering the active strategic use of sanctions in maximizing sender states’ interest,
some episodes of these sanctions might actually be a strategic success for the sender
states. As pointed out by Galtung (1967), ‘if economic sanctions do not make a
receiving nation comply, they may nevertheless serve functions that are useful in the
eyes of the sender nation(s)’. This may partially explain the much higher ‘failure’ rate
of economic sanctions, compared to that of military interventions, and the recurrence
of half-hearted and seemingly ineffective sanctions since World War II (see HSEO).
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General Conclusion
By exploiting the fragility of the cooperation between different citizen groups,
the strategy of divide-and-rule has been implemented by many kleptocrats and other
authoritarian rulers to sustain their ruler. This strategy could be applied not only in a
society with two major citizen groups, but also in a society with many citizen groups.
The increase in the number of citizen groups may create more space for the kleptocrat
to implement this strategy, thus increasing the survivability of the regime. When
there are more than two citizen groups, a small number of citizen groups may benefit
from the discriminatory redistribution policies implemented by the kleptocrat, while
the vast majority of them will become the victims of the kleptocracy. In a society
where the strategy of divide-and-rule prevails, sharp polarization between the citizen
groups may arise in the aspects of economic interests and political power, due to the
discriminatory redistribution policies,
Though the strategy of divide-and-rule is powerful, it is not invincible. A measure
or factor may help constrain the divide-and-rule strategy, it it could increase the cost
to support the ruler or the benefit to remove him. For example, the increase in the
expected bonus from removing the kleptocrat may help constrain the divide-and-rule
strategy, and when it is large enough, the ruler may be forced to give up his power.
What is more, if the citizen groups are closely connected to each other and mutually
care about each other’s interests, this may serve to improve the payoff for each of
them and even remove the ruler from power.
Furthermore, the existence of the benevolent opposition organizations, like trade
unions and religious institutions, may also help constrain the divide-and-rule strategy,
through punishing the members supporting the ruler. They may contribute to raising
the payoffs to their members from two aspects. On one hand, the members are en-
titled to the benefits provided by them. On the other had, the punishment threat im-
posed on their members by them, may help increase the transfer to the citizen groups
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or decrease the tax imposed on the citizen groups along the equilibrium path. How-
ever, compared to punishing the citizen group supporting the ruler, the opposition
organizations could more effectively constrain the kleptocracy through rewarding the
citizen group challenging the ruler or the one supporting the challenge.
In many countries, the democratization process is largely determined by the in-
teractions between the ‘internal players’, such as the kleptocrat, the opposition and
some other citizen groups; While in some other ones, it could be significantly affected
by the actions taken by the ‘external players’, such as the UN and the great powers.
International community may intervene to help remove an authoritarian ruler in a
society, either through military interventions or through economic sanctions. Both
apparatuses may help promote peaceful democratization in a state. While they may
also induce the opposition to resort to a revolution to overthrow the regime, thus
increasing the likelihood of a civil war and raising the uncertainties in the democra-
tization process in an authoritarian state.
The sender states of military interventions or economic sanctions have different
variables in their utility functions, compared to the opposition’s in the target states.
Military interventions may not be always carried out when the opposition needs them,
while they are rarely carried out against the interest of the opposition. However,
unlike military interventions, economic sanctions could be introduced as an ‘active’
diplomatic apparatus, because their symbolic value could play an important role in
the sender states’ utility function. As a result, they may be implemented to maximize
the sender states’ utility, at the cost of the interest of the opposition and the welfare
of the ordinary civilians in the target states.
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1)
  Figure A1:  World Freedom Trend: 1973-2012       
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[APPENDIX I:]
1) Proof: Suppose that citizen 2 raises the proposal, it is clear that the ruler will
respond with (T r1 = −µ,T r2 = µ). If citizen 1 chooses to accept the above tax new
policy, then his expected continuation value is given by:
V K1 (T1) = 1+µ+
β [(1−T2)]
1−β . (1.1
∗)
Hence, citizen 1 will accept the new tax policy if and only if (1.1∗) > 11−β , i.e.,
T1 6 µ(1−β )β . Since T1 6 1 and T2 6 µ , we can infer that if the ruler imposes positive
tax on both of the citizens, the optimal sustainable tax policy for the ruler is given by:
(T1 = min{1, µ(1−β )β },T2 = min{µ,
1−β
β
})
2) Prove Proposition 1.3.
Proof: It is clear that µ(1−β )β > 1 if and only if β <
µ
1+µ , and
1−β
β > µ if and only
if β < 11+µ . Therefore, if the ruler imposes T > 0 on both citizens, then:
i) when β < 11+µ , the optimal non-allying tax policy is: (T1 = 1,T2 = µ), and the
payoff for the ruler in one period is given by:
T1+T2 = 1+µ (1.2∗)
ii) when 11+µ 6 β <
µ
1+µ , the optimal non-allying tax policy is: (T1 = 1,T2 =
1−β
β ), and the payoff for the ruler in one period is given by:
T1+T2 =
1
β
(1.3∗)
iii) when β > µ1+µ , the optimal non-allying tax policy is: (T1 =
µ(1−β )
β ,T2 =
1−β
β ),
and the payoff for the ruler in one period is given by:
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T1+T2 =
(1+µ)(1−β )
β
(1.4∗)
Firstly, it is clear that (1.2∗) > µ for any values of β and µ , therefore when
β < 11+µ , the MPE tax policy is given by: (T
e
1 = 1,T
e
2 = µ).
Secondly, it is easy to show: (1.3∗)> µ if and only if β 6 1µ , and
1
µ >
µ
1+µ if and
only if µ 6 1+
√
5
2 . Thus if µ 6
1+
√
5
2 , when
1
1+µ 6 β <
µ
1+µ , we have β 6
1
µ , thus
the MPE tax policy is given by (T e1 = 1,T
e
2 =
1−β
β ); While if µ >
1+
√
5
2 , when
1
1+µ 6
β 6 1µ , the MPE tax policy is given by (T e1 = 1,T e2 =
1−β
β ), and when
1
µ < β <
µ
1+µ ,
the MPE tax policy is given by (T e1 = 0,T
e
2 = µ).
Lastly, it is clear that (1.4∗) > µ if and only if β 6 1+µ1+2µ , where
µ
1+µ >
1+µ
1+2µ if
and only if µ > 1+
√
5
2 . Therefore if µ 6
1+
√
5
2 , when
µ
1+µ 6 β 6
1+µ
1+2µ , the MPE
tax policy is given by (T e1 =
µ(1−β )
β ,T
e
2 =
1−β
β ); and when β >
1+µ
1+2µ , the MPE tax
policy is given by: (T e1 = 0,T
e
2 = µ). While if µ >
1+
√
5
2 , when β >
µ
1+µ , the MPE
tax policy is given by: (T e1 = 0,T
e
2 = µ).
3) Prove Proposition 1.4
Proof: Suppose that following the tax policy (T1,T2) announced by the ruler,
citizen j raises the proposal and he is identified as the proposer. Observing the action
taken by citizen j, the best response by the ruler is given by (T ri =−1,T rj = 1). It is
easy to show citizen i will choose to accept the new tax policy if and only if:
Ti 6
2(1−Qi)−β
β
, (1.5∗)
Given Q1 = q and Q2 = 1−q, we can derive:
T1 6
2(1−q)−β
β
≡ Tˆ1, (1.6∗)
and
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T2 6
2q−β
β
≡ Tˆ2, (1.7∗)
It is obvious that given 12 < q < 1, we have Tˆ2 > 0, which means if the ruler
chooses to ally with citizen 2, he can impose a positive tax Tˆ2 on him. In the previous
subsections, if the ruler chooses to ally with a citizen, he imposes zero tax on this
citizen, which means that there is no cost for a citizen to ally with the ruler. While in
this subsection, in order to ally with the ruler, citizen 2 needs to pay some surplus to
the ruler.
In the previous subsections, since a democracy will follow the collapse of the
kleptocracy and the citizen will keep their own endowments, thus the expected loss
to remove the ruler is zero for either of the citizens. Therefore, given a positive tax
on citizen j, where j = 1,2, and conditional on that the proposal to remove the ruler
would be accepted by citizen i, where i 6= j, citizen j will always opt for raising the
proposal. While in this subsection, the collapse of the kleptocracy is followed by the
state of anarchy, in which the expected loss for citizen 2, who is relatively weaker, is
given by:
(1.6)− (1.1) = 2q−1
1−β . (1.8
∗)
Therefore, citizen 2 will opt for supporting the ruler to sustain the kleptocracy, as
long as the cost to ally with the ruler is relatively small, i.e., T2 6 Tˆ2. It is easy to
show Tˆ1 > 0 if and only if:
q6 1− β
2
≡ qˆ, (1.9∗)
where 12 < qˆ < 1. Thus Tˆ1 > 0 when q 6 qˆ; while Tˆ1 < 0 when q > qˆ. Hence,
when q > qˆ, if the ruler chooses to ally with citizen 1, he needs to provide at least
(−Tˆ1) unit of transfer to him. When q 6 qˆ, he can ally with citizen 1 by imposing
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zero tax on him. It is easy to show given any value of q, the ruler can get higher
payoff through allying with citizen 2, compared to allying with citizen 1. Hence, the
optimal allying tax policies is given by:
(T1 = 1,T2 = Tˆ2),
given which,
CR =
2q
β
. (1.10∗)
When q > qˆ, we have Tˆ1 < 0, which implies that it is impossible for the ruler
to sustainable the kleptocracy by imposing positive tax on citizen 1, hence, no non-
allying tax policy would be sustainable along the equilibrium path. When q6 qˆ, we
have Tˆ1 > 0, the kleptocracy can be sustained by implementing the following optimal
non-allying tax policy:
(T1 = Tˆ1,T2 = T ∗2 ),
where T ∗2 = min{1, Tˆ2}. It is easy to show when β > q, we have Tˆ2 6 1, thus
T ∗2 = Tˆ2. Hence, when q 6 qˆ and β > q, given the optimal non-allying tax policy
(T1 = Tˆ1,T2 = Tˆ2), we have:
CR =
2(1−β )
β
. (1.11∗)
When β 6 q, we have Tˆ2 > 1, thus T ∗2 = 1. Hence, when q6 qˆ and β 6 q, given
the optimal non-allying tax policy (T1 = Tˆ1,T2 = 1), we have:
CR =
2(1−q)
β
. (1.12∗)
Given 12 < q < 1, we can derive: (1.11
∗)< (1.10∗) and (1.12∗)< 1.10∗). There-
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fore, If the collapse of the kleptocracy is followed by the state of anarchy, there is a
unique MPE tax policy given by:
(T e1 = 1,T
e
2 =
2q−β
β
).
4) Prove Lemma 2.3.
Proof: Let’s start with the subgame in which given the initial tax policy (T1,T2),
citizen j, where j = 1,2, has made a proposal to remove the ruler from power and
been identified by the ruler as the proposer.
Firstly, let’s check what is the best response by the ruler after citizen 2 is identified
as the proposer, i.e., p2,t = 1. Suppose that in period t, citizen 2 has been identified
by the ruler as the proposer. After observing this, the ruler will respond by one of the
following two revised tax policy: (T r1,t =−1,T r2,t 6 0) or (T r1,t 6 0,T r2,t =−µ). If the
first one is the best response by the ruler, it means that the ruler chooses to buy off
citizen 2, given p2,t = 1. Then condition on that the new tax policy in period t could
be accepted by citizen 2, the payoffs for the ruler and him are given by the following
two equations respectively:
VR,t(T r2,t 6 0|p2,t = 1,d2,t = 0, .)
= (1+T r2,t)+βE[VR,t+1(T
r
2,t 6 0|p2,t = 1,d2,t = 0)] (2.1∗)
V2,t(d2,t = 0|p2,t = 1,T r2,t 6 0)
= µ−T r2,t +βE[V2,t+1(d2,t = 0|p2,t = 1,T r2,t = 0)] (2.2∗)
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Given the new tax policy (T r1,t =−1,T r2,t 6 0) , it is clear that citizen 2 can benefit
from raising a proposal and being identified as the proposal, thus he will propose
in all the following periods. Now suppose that in all the following periods, citizen
1 would never propose or be identified as the proposer after he proposes, and it is
always citizen 2 who is identified as the proposer, or any period, after citizen 1 is
identified as the proposer, the response by the ruler is still to buy off citizen 2. Then
conditional on the new tax policy in each period could be accepted by citizen 2, the
resulting expected continuation value for the ruler is given by :
VR,t(T r2,t 6 0|p2,t = 1,d2,t = 0)
= (1+T r2,t)+β [(1+T
r
2,t+1)+β
2[(1+T r2,t+2)]+ ...
=
1
1−β +T
r
2,t +βT
r
2,t+1+β
2T r2,t+1+ ... (2.3
∗)
In period t+ x, where x> 1, if citizen 1 is identified as the proposer, and the best
response by the ruler is given by (T r1,t+x 6 0,T r2,t+x = µ), it shows that for the ruler, no
matter who is identified as the proposer, the best response by the ruler is always to buy
off him. Thus in the stage game denoted by Γ(Kˆ) at any period following period t,
both citizens would propose and each of them has probability 12 to be identified as the
proposer. In period t + y, where y > x, if citizen 1 is identified as the proposer, then:
CR,t+y = µ + T r1,t+y; while if citizen 2 is identified as the proposal, then: CR,t+y =
1+T r2,t+y. Now, suppose that in each period following period t, the best response by
the ruler is always to buy off the citizen who is identified as the proposer. Conditional
on the new tax policy could be accepted by the one identified as the proposer in each
period, then in period t, if the ruler chooses to buy off citizen 2 after he is identified
as the proposer, the expected payoff for the ruler is given by:
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VR,t(T r2,t 6 0|p2,t = 1,d2,t = 0) = (1+T r2,t)+β [
1
2
(1+T r2,t+1)+
1
2
(µ+T r1,t+1)]
+β 2[
1
2
(1+T r2,t+2)+
1
2
(µ+T r1,t+2)]+ ...
= [1+
β
1−β (
1+µ
2
)]+T r2,t +
β
2
(T r1,t+1+T
r
2,t+1)+
β 2
2
(T r1,t+2+T
r
2,t+2) (2.4
∗)
Now suppose that in period t, after citizen 2 is identified as the propose, the best
response by the ruler is to buy off citizen 1 and punish citizen 2, i.e., (T r1,t 6 0,T r2,t =
µ). Then in all the following periods, citizen 2 would never raise proposal again.
If the new tax policy in period t could be accepted by citizen 1, i.e., d1,t = 0, the
expected continuation value for the ruler and citizen 1 are given by:
VR,t(T r2,t = µ|p2,t = 1,d1,t = 0)
= (µ+T r1,t)+βE[VR,t+1(T
r
2,t = µ|p2,t = 1,d1,t = 0)] (2.5∗)
V1,t(d1,t = 0|p2,t = 1,T r2,t = µ)
= (1+T r1,t)+βE[V2,t+1(d1,t = 0|p2,t = 1,T r2,t = µ)] (2.6∗)
In period t+1 and all the following periods, since citizen 2 would never propose
again, if citizen 1 would not raise a proposal either, i.e., p1,t+1 = 0, the continuation
value for citizen 1 is given by:
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V1,t+1(p1,t+1 = 0|T1,t+1, p1,t+1 = 0; p2,t = 1,T r2,t = µ)
=
1
1−β −T1,t+1−βT1,t+2−β
2T1,t+3− ... (2.7∗)
While in period t +1, if citizen 1 raises a proposal, since he is the only one who
proposes, he would definitely be identified as the proposer, i.e., p1,t+1 = 1. In this
case if the best response by the ruler is to punish citizen 1 and buy off citizen 2, i.e.,
(T r1,t+1 = 1,T
r
2,t+1 6 0), it shows that in the stage game Γ(Kˆ) at each period, the best
response for the ruler is to always punish the one who is identified as the proposer.
Thus in the stage game Γ(Kˆ)) at any period following period t + 1, neither citizen
1 nor citizen 2 would propose again, hence the initial tax policy (T1,T2) would be
sustained in all the following periods. Therefore given (T r1,t+1 = 1,T
r
2,t+1 6 0), if
citizen 2 chooses to accept the new tax policy, i.e., d2,t+1 = 0, the continuation value
for him is given by:
V2,t+1(d2,t+1 = 0|p1,t+1 = 1,T r1,t+1 = 1; p2,t = 1,T r2,t = µ)
= µ−T r2,t+1+
β
1−β (µ−T2) (2.8
∗)
It is clear that citizen 2 would choose to accept the new tax policy if and only
if (2.8∗) > µ1−β , i.e., T r2,t+1 6
−βT2
1−β . Since T
r
2,t+1 > −1, it is clear that (T1,T2) is
sustainable if and only if βT21−β 6 1. let T r2,t+1 =
−βT2
1−β , we can derive that condition on
βT2
1−β 6 1, the new tax policy (T r1,t+1 = 1,T r2,t+1 =
−βT2
1−β ) would be accepted by citizen
2, thus the ruler’s payoff in period t+1 is given by:
VR,t+1(T r1,t+1 = 1|p1,t+1 = 1,d2,t+1 = 0; p2,t = 1,T r2,t = µ) = 1+
β
1−β T1 (2.9
∗)
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However, if in period t + 1, after citizen 1 is identified as the proposer, the ruler
chooses to buy off him, it shows that no matter who is identified as the proposer, the
best response for the ruler is always to buy off citizen 1, thus in all the following
periods, citizen 2 would always refrain from proposing, while citizen 1 would always
propose as long as T1 > 0. Thus if citizen 1 chooses to accept the new tax policy, then
in period t+1, the payoffs for the ruler and citizen 1 are given by:
VR,t+1(T r1,t+1 = 0|p1,t+1 = 1,d1,t+1 = 0; p2,t = 1,T r2,t = µ)
= µ+T r1,t+1+β (µ+T
r
1,t+2)+β
2(µ+T r1,t+3)+ ... (2.10
∗)
V1,t+1(d1,t+1 = 0|p1,t+1 = 1,T r1,t+1 = 0; p2,t = 1,T r2,t = µ)
= 1−T r1,t+1+β (1−T r1,t+2)+β 2(1−T r1,t+3)+ ... (2.11∗)
It is clear that T r1,t+1 = T
r
1,t+2 = T
r
1,t+3 = ...= T
r
1 , thus we have:
V1,t+1(d1,t+1 = 0|p1,t+1 = 1,T r1,t+1 = 0; p2,t = 1,T r2,t = µ) =
1
1−β (1−T
r
1 ) (2.12
∗)
It is obvious that citizen 1 would chooses to accept the new tax policy if and only
if: (2.12)> 11−β , i.e., T r1 > 0. Let T r1 = 0 and substitute into equation (2.12), we can
derive that:
VR,t+1(T r1,t+1 = 0, .|p1,t+1 = 1,d1,t+1 = 0; p2,t = 1,T r2,t = µ) =
µ
1−β (2.13
∗)
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Since T1 6 1, it is obvious that k1−β > 1+
β
1−β T1 i.e.: (2.13
∗) > (2.9∗). This
inequality means that if citizen 2 is punished for raising a proposal in period t, then
in period t + 1, it is a dominant strategy for the ruler to buy off citizen 1 after he is
identified as the proposer. This follows that if citizen 2 is punished for proposing in
period t , then in period t +1 and all the following periods, it is a dominant strategy
for citizen 1 to raise the proposal as long as τ1 > 0, thus we can derive that:
E[VR,t+1(T r2,t = µ|p2,t = 1,d1,t = 0)] =
µ
1−β (2.14
∗)
E[V1,t+1(d1,t = 0|p2,t = 1,T r2,t = µ)] =
1
1−β (2.15
∗)
Combining (2.5∗), (2.6)∗ , (2.14)∗ and (2.15)∗, we can derive:
VR,t(T r2,t = µ|p2,t = 1,d1,t = 0; p2,t = 1)
= (k+T r1,t)+β (
k
1−β ) (2.16
∗)
V1,t(d1,t = 0|p2,t = 1,T r2,t = k; p2,t = 1,T r2,t = µ)
= (1−T r1,t)+β (
1
1−β ) (2.17
∗)
It is clear that in period t, citizen 1 would choose to accept the new tax policy if
and only if (2.15∗)> 11−β , thus we have T r1,t > 0. Let T r1,t = 0 and substitute into the
above two equations, we can derive:
VR,t(T r2,t = µ|p2,t = 1,d1,t = 0, .) =
µ
1−β (2.18
∗)
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V1,t(d1,t = 0|p2,t = 1,T r2,t = µ) =
1
1−β (2.19
∗)
It is obvious that (2.18∗) > (2.3∗) and (2.18∗) > (2.4∗). The above analysis
shows that given any initial tax policy (T1,T2) in a period, after citizen 2 is identified
as the proposer, it is a dominant strategy for the ruler to punish him and buy off
citizen 1. Hence anticipating the response from the ruler, citizen 2 would never raise
a proposal to remove the ruler from power. Similar to the above analysis, we may
infer that if citizen 1 proposes and is identified as the proposer, then the best response
by the ruler is always to buy off him, thus anticipating the response from the ruler,
citizen 1 will always propose as long as T1 > 0.
5) Prove Lemma 3.1.
Proof: Given any uniform tax policy:
Tm+1 = Tm+2 = ...= Tn+3
2
= TB 6 1
The problem of maximizing the total tax revenue from the non-ally group is given
by:
Max
m,(T1,...,Tn)
Π=
n+3
2
∑
i=m+1
Ti
s.t. Ti 6
1−β
β
(−T rB), where T rB =−
W
n+1
2 −m
and Ti 6 1 for i = m+1,m+2, ...,
n+3
2
It is clear that Ti that maximize Π is given by T ∗i = min{1, 1−ββ ( Wn+1
2 −m
)}. When:
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1−β
β
W > n+1
2
−m,
the optimal uniform tax policy imposed on the non-ally group could be sustained
along the equilibrium path is given by:
T ∗m+1 = T
∗
m+2 = ...= T
∗
n+3
2
= 1
It is obvious that this uniform tax policy dominates any non-uniform tax that
could be imposed on the non-ally group. Now let’s consider the case that 1−ββ W <
n+1
2 −m. In this case, the optimal uniform tax policy is given by:
T ∗m+1 = T
∗
m+2 = ...= T
∗
n+3
2
= TB =
1−β
β
(−T rB)< 1,
given which, the total tax revenue from the non-ally group is given by:
Π= (
n+3
2
−m)TB
Now suppose that the ruler chooses a citizen l from the non-ally group, where
l = m+1,m+2, ..., n+32 , and set T˜l = TB+σ on him, where σ > 0 and σ → 0. The
ruler imposes uniform tax on the rest (n+12 −m) citizens, denoted by T¯ > 0. Then
given the non-uniform tax policy: T˜l on citizen l and T¯ on the rest (n+12 −m) citizens,
the ruler must ensure that he can raise a new tax policy to buy off (n+12 −m) citizens,
after he is challenged.
If citizen l raises the proposal, the ruler will set T rl = 1, and in order to buy off
the rest (n+12 −m) citizens in the non-ally group, the ruler will set T ri = T rB on each of
them, where i 6= j; while if any other citizen k, where k 6= j, from the non-ally group
raises the proposal, the ruler will set T rk = 1 on this citizen, and in order to buy off
all the rest (n+12 −m) citizens, the ruler will set T rl =−(−T rB + βσ1−β ) on citizen l, and
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set T ri =−(−T rB−
βσ
1−β
n+1
2 −m−1
) on the rest citizens, where i 6= j,k. Since:
min{−T rB ,(−T rB−
βσ
1−β
n+1
2 −m−1
)}=−T rB−
βσ
1−β
n+1
2 −m−1
,
to ensure that whoever raises the proposal, the ruler can always buy off n+12 −m
citizens, the lump-sum tax T¯ must satisfy the following constraint:
T¯ 6 1−β
β
(−T rB−
βσ
1−β
n+1
2 −m−1
) = TB− σn+1
2 −m−1
,
where TB − σn+1
2 −m−1
< TB < 1. Thus the optimal tax is given by T¯ = TB −
σ
n+1
2 −m−1
. Therefore, if the ruler raises Tl from TB to TB +σ , the total tax revenue
from the non-ally group is given by:
Π˜= (TB+σ)+ [TB− σn+1
2 −m−1
](
n+1
2
−m)
= (
n+3
2
−m)TB− σn+1
2 −m−1
<Π,
which shows that if the ruler raises the tax on citizen l from TB to TB+σ , this will
lead a decrease in the total tax revenue from the non-ally group. Similarly, we can
show if the ruler reduces the tax on citizen l from TB to T˜l = TB−σ , the optimal tax
on the rest citizens in the non-ally group would be given by TB. Hence, the total tax
revenue from the non-ally group is given by:
Π˜= (TB−σ)+(n+12 −m)TB
= (
n+3
2
−m)TB−σ <Π,
which shows that if the ruler reduces the tax on citizen l from TB to TB− σ ,
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this will also lead a decrease in the total tax revenue. Therefore, given the optimal
uniform tax policy, on matter the ruler raises or reduces the tax on any one of the
citizens in the non-ally group, the total tax revenue will drop.
Now, suppose that the ruler raises the tax on h citizens in the non-ally group, and
imposed uniformed decreased tax T¯g on the rest g citizens, where h+ g = n+32 −m.
Here, denote the tax on the h citizens by T˜i = TB+σi, where i=m+1,m+2, ...,m+h,
and σi > 0 and at least one of them is large than 0; Now rearrange those h citizens
as the first h citizens in the non-ally group. Given the above tax policy, the total tax
revenue is given by:
Π˜=Πh+Πg,
where Πh = ∑m+hi=m+1 T˜i and Πg = gT¯g. Similar to the above reasoning process, we
can show the optimal uniform tax T¯g is given by:
T¯g = TB− 1n+1
2 −m−h
(
m+h
∑
i=m+1
σi).
Hence, given the new tax policy, the total tax revenue from the non-ally group is
given by:
Πh+Πg = hTB+(
m+h
∑
i=m+1
σi)+ [TB− 1n+1
2 −m−h
(
m+h
∑
i=m+1
σi)](
n+3
2
−m−h)
= (
n+3
2
−m)TB− 1n+1
2 −m−h
(
m+h
∑
i=m+1
σi),
where Πh +Πg < Π, which shows that the total revenue decreases, if the ruler
raises that tax on h citizen, and imposes a decreased uniform tax on the rest g citizens.
If the ruler repeats the above tax changing procedure on those g citizens, similarly,
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we can show given the new tax policy, the tax revenue from those g citizens will
decrease. This procedure can be repeated to raise or reduce the tax on any number of
the citizens in the non-allying group, while the total revenue from the non-ally group
is always less than that from the uniform tax policy.
Therefore, Given any value of m, the tax policy maximizing the total tax revenue
from the non-ally group is given by a uniform tax policy:
Tm+1 = Tm+2 = ...= Tn+3
2
= TB, where TB = min{1, 1−ββ (
W
n+1
2 −m
)}.
6) prove: m
m− n+12
< 0 when m < mˆ.
Proof: it is clear that:
n+1
2
− mˆ = n+1
2
− 2βn− (n−1)
2β
=
(n−1)(1−β )
2β
> 0
Hence, n+12 > mˆ. Given m < mˆ, we always have m <
n+1
2 . Therefore,
m
m− n+12
< 0.
7) Prove Proposition 3.3
Proof: Given m < mˆ, we can derive:
∂ΠN
∂TA
=
m
m− n+12
< 0,
which means when m < mˆ, the ruler can always increase the total tax revenue
along the equilibrium path by increasing the transfer to the citizens in the ally group.
It is easy to show TˆA > T˜A if and only if:
m >
2βn− (n−1)
2
≡ m˜, (3.1∗)
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where 0 < m˜ < mˆ. Let int(m˜) = M1. Suppose m = M1, we have m 6 m˜, mˆ, thus
TˆA 6 T˜A. Then given m = M1, TA that maximizes ΠN is given by:
T ∗A = T˜A,
given which,
TB = (
1−β
β
)[
n−1
2 +M1
n+1
2 −M1
]≡ T˜B; (3.2∗)
and,
ΠN =
1−β
β
[
n−1
2
+
n−1
2 +M1
n+1
2 −M1
]≡ Π˜N . (3.3∗)
Now suppose m = M1+1. Given the constraint m 6 mˆ, it could be a solution to
the above maximization if and only if M1+16 mˆ, i.e., M1 6 mˆ−1, which gives:
M1 6
(2β −1)(n−1)
2β
= Mˆ1 (3.4∗)
When M1 6 Mˆ1, we have m˜ < m6 mˆ, thus TˆA > T˜A. Then given m = M1+1, TA
that maximizes ΠN is given by:
T ∗A = TˆA =−[
2βn− (n−1)
2β (M1+1)
−1]≡ Tˆ ′A, (3.5∗)
where Tˆ ′A >−1−ββ , and given T ∗A = Tˆ
′
A, we have:
TB = 1;
and,
ΠN =−2βn− (n−1)2β +
n+3
2
≡ ΠˆN . (3.6∗)
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Given the solution vector {m = M1,T ∗A = T˜A}, it is impossible to raise ΠN by
increasing TA or decreasing m, and the only possible way to raise ΠN is to increase
m. When M > Mˆ, m = M1 + 1 is not a valid solution to the above maximization
problem, thus it is impossible to increase ΠN by increasing m from M1 to (M1+1).
Therefore, we can infer that when M1 > Mˆ1, the optimal solution vector is given by:
{m∗ = M1,T ∗A = T˜A}
When M1 6 Mˆ1, {m = M1 + 1,T ∗A = Tˆ ′A} is a valid solution vector to the above
maximization problem. Given {m=M1+1,T ∗A = Tˆ ′A}, it is impossible to raiseΠN by
increasing TA or m. The only possible way to raiseΠN is to decrease m. If we decrease
m from (M1 + 1) to M1, the solution vector is given by {m = M1,T ∗A = T˜A}. Based
on the above analysis, we can infer that when M1 6 Mˆ1, the optimal solution vector
that maximizes ΠN is given by either {m = M1,T ∗A = T˜A} or {m = M1+1,T ∗A = Tˆ ′A},
depending on the relative values of Π˜N and ΠˆN . Let ΠˆN > Π˜N , which gives:
−2βn− (n−1)
2β
+
n+3
2
> 1−β
β
[
n−1
2
+
n−1
2 +M
n+1
2 −M
]
M 6 2βn− (n−1)
2
= m˜
Hence, given M 6 m˜, we always have: ΠˆN > Π˜N . Therefore, when M1 6 Mˆ1, the
optimal solution vector is given by:
{m∗ = M1+1,T ∗A = Tˆ ′A}
When M1 > Mˆ1, the optimal solution vector is {m∗ =M1,T ∗A = T˜A}, which means
that the ruler will put M1 citizens in the ally group, and the average amount of transfer
to each citizen in this group is given by 1−ββ . This implies that the ruler will provide
a uniform equilibrium transfer 1−ββ to M1 citizens in the ally group, i.e.: T1 = T2 =
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...= Tm =−1−ββ .
When M1 6 Mˆ1, the optimal solution vector is {m∗ = M1 + 1,T ∗A = Tˆ ′A}, which
means that the ruler will put (M1 + 1) citizens in the ally group, and the average
transfer is given by ˆ|T ′A| < 1−ββ . Since a citizen in the ally group will never raise a
proposal to remove the ruler from power, we can infer that any of the tax policy on
the ally group in the following policy vector can be sustained along the equilibrium
path: Φ1 = {(T1,T2, ...,Tm)|∑mj=1 Tj = (M1+1)Tˆ ′A and − 1−ββ 6 Tj 6 0}.
Base on the above analysis, we can derive Proposition 3.3.
8)
       Table I.1: Numerical Examples 
             Number  of  Citizens 
 
 
 
Discount Factor  β 
          n=3        n=4        n=5 
                   
       1 3  
          ( 1,      1,      1 ) 
          ( 1*,   - 
1
2
,   - 
1
2
 ) 
 
    ( 1,   1,      1,      1 ) 
    ( 1*,  1,    - 
1
2
 ,  - 
1
2
 )                
 ( 1,   1,   1,     1,     1 ) 
(1*,   1,  - 
1
2
 ,  - 
1
2
 ,  - 
1
2
 )                
                  
            𝟕
𝟏𝟐  
          ( - 
2
7
,     1,      1 ) 
           (   
2
5
,   1*,    - 
7
5
 )       
     ( 
5
7
 ,     
5
7
,      
5
7
,     1 ) 
     ( 1*,   - 1,   - 1 ,  1 )                
  (- 
4
7
 ,  1,    1,     1,   1 ) 
  ( 
 4
5
,   1*,  - 
7
5
 ,  - 
7
5
,  1 )                
 
  
        𝟐 3  
           (- 
1
2
,    1,      1 ) 
           ( 1,    1*,    -2 ) 
      ( 0,   1,     1,      1 ) 
      ( 0,   1*,   - 2,    1 ) 
   ( 0,  0,   1,    1,    1 ) 
   ( 0,  0,   1*,  -2,   1 )  
 
     
        𝟒 𝟓  
           ( - 
1
4
,    
1
2
,      
1
2
 ) 
            (  1,   1* ,    -2) 
     (- 
1
4
 ,    
3
4
,      
3
4
,     1 ) 
     ( 1,     1*,   - 3,    1 )                
  ( - 
1
4
 , −
1
4
,   1,    1,   1 ) 
  ( 1,     1,  1*,  - 4,  1 )                
 
Note: in each cell  of the above table, the first tax policy is the MPE tax policy,  and the second 
one is the off-equilibrium revised tax policy  to sustain the kleptocracy. The number with ‘*’ is 
the revised  tax  imposed on the citizen who is identified as the proposal. 
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9) The analytical result when n is an even number:
Given n is an even number,
a) When β 6 12 , the MPE tax policy is given by:
T e1 = T
e
2 = ...= T
e
n = 1;
b) When β > 12 , i) if M2 > Mˆ2, where M2 = int(
n(2β−1)
2 ) and Mˆ2 =
2β (n−1)−n
2β ,
the MPE tax policy is given by any tax policy that satisfies the following condition:
the tax on (n2 − 1) citizens is one; the tax on M2 citizens is (−1−ββ ) and the tax on
(n2 +1−M2) citizens is 1−ββ (n+2M2n−2M2 );
ii) if M2 6 Mˆ2, the MPE tax policy is given by any tax policy that satisfies
the following condition: the tax on (n−M2− 1) citizens is one; rearrange the rest
(M2+1) citizens as the first (M2+1) citizens, then the tax policy on these (M2+1)
citizens falls in the following policy vector: Φ2 = {(T1,T2, ...,TM2+1)|∑M2+1j=1 Tj =
(M2+1)Tˆ
′′
A and − 1−ββ 6 Tj 6 0}, where, Tˆ
′′
A =−[ n(2β−1)2β (M2+1) −1].
Please refer to Appendix I.8 for numerical examples.
10) Prove Proposition 4.1:
Proof: Suppose that following the tax policy (T1,T2) announced by the ruler,
citizen j, where j = 1,2, raises the proposal and he is identified as the proposer.
Observing the action taken by citizen j, the best response by the ruler is given by
(T ri = −1,T rj = 1). It is easy to show citizen i will choose to accept the new tax
policy if and only if:
Ti 6
1−β −θ
β
≡ T B, (4.1∗)
where T B > 0 if and only if:
θ 6 1−β ≡ θˆ ; (4.2∗)
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and T B >−1 if and only if:
θ 6 1. (4.3∗)
Base on inequality 4.2∗, we can infer that when θ 6 θˆ , we have T B > 0, hence,
the ruler can ally with a citizen and prevent him from supporting the proposal by
imposing zero tax on him in each period; while if θ > θˆ , we have T B < 0, thus
in order to ally with a citizen and prevent him from supporting the proposal, the
ruler must provide (−T B) unit of surplus in each period. Inequality 4.3∗ implies that
because the maximum amount of transfer could be provided by the ruler is one, an
allying tax policy would not be applicable when θ > 1. When θ 6 1, the kleptocracy
could be sustained by either of the two optimal allying tax policies in the following
policy vector:
{(T1 = 1,T2 = T ∗),(T1 = T ∗,T2 = 1)},
where T ∗ = min{0,T B}. When θ 6 θˆ , we have T B > 0, hence T ∗ = 0. Then
given either of the optimal allying tax policies, we have:
CR = 1 (4.4∗)
When θˆ < θ 6 1, we have T B < 0, thus T ∗= T B. Then given either of the optimal
allying tax policies,
CR =
1−θ
β
≡ CˆBR , (4.5∗)
where CˆBR > 0. Since
∂CˆBR
∂θ =− 1β < 0, this shows that CˆBR is monotonically decreas-
ing on θ . Because when θˆ < θ 6 1, if the ruler adopts either of the optimal allying
tax policies, the increase in the expected bonus for removing the ruler will raise the
cost to ally with one of the citizens, thus decreasing the payoff for the ruler.
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It is easy to show the optimal non-allying tax policy for the ruler is given by:
(T1 = T2 =
1−β −θ
β
),
given which,
CR =
2(1−β −θ)
β
≡ C˜BR , (4.6∗)
where C˜BR > 0 if and only if θ < θˆ . This means that the above non-allying tax
policy is sustainable if and only if θ < θˆ . Since ∂C˜
B
R
∂θ =− 2β < 0, this shows that C˜BR is
monotonically decreasing on θ . Because if the ruler adopts the optimal non-allying
tax policy, the increase in the expected bonus will decrease the tax imposed on both
citizens, thus decreasing his payoff. It is clear that C˜BR 6 1 if and only if:
θ > 2−3β
2
≡ θ˜ , (4.7∗)
where θ˜ < θˆ , and it is clear that θˆ > 0 if and only if β < 23 . Hence, when θ 6 θˆ
and β > 13 , we always have θ > θ˜ , thus C˜BR < 1, which means the optimal allying tax
policy dominates the optimal non-allying tax policy; When θ˜ 6 θ 6 θˆ and β < 23 , we
have C˜BR 6 1, thus the former weakly dominates the latter; When θ < θ˜ and β < 23 ,
we have C˜BR > 1, hence, the latter is a dominant strategy. Therefore, we can derive
proposition 4.1.
11) Prove Proposition 4.2
Proof: Now suppose following the tax policy (T1,T2), announced by the ruler,
citizen j, where j = 1,2, has made a proposal to remove the ruler and he is identified
as the proposer. Since the cost to sustain the kleptocracy is given by Z, the maximum
transfer could be provided by the ruler is (1−Z) unit of surplus. If given (T1,T2) and
the new tax policy (T rj = 1,T
r
i =−(1−Z)) announced by the ruler, citizen i, where
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i 6= j, declines the proposal, the continuation value for citizen i is given by:
V Ki = 2−Z+
β [(1−Ti)+λ (1−Tj)]
1−β . (4.8
∗)
It is clear that citizen i will decline the proposal if and only if (4.8∗) > (4.4),
which gives:
Ti 6
1
β
[(1−β )(1−λ −Z)−λβTj]≡ T A. (4.9∗)
Now suppose (T1,T2) is an allying tax policy. Let Tj = 1, and substitute it into
inequality 4.9∗, we can derive:
Ti 6
(1−β )(1−Z)−λ
β
≡ Tˆ A (4.10∗)
where Tˆ A > 0 if and only if:
λ 6 (1−β )(1−Z)≡ λm, (4.11∗)
and Tˆ A >−(1−Z) if and only if:
λ 6 1−Z ≡ λ h, (4.12∗)
where 0 < λm < λ h < 1. Based on the above analysis, we can infer that an
allying tax policy could be implemented by the ruler if and only if λ 6 λ h. When
λm < Z 6 λ l , the optimal allying tax policy is given by either one in the following
policy vector:
{(T1 = Tˆ A,T2 = 1),(T1 = 1,T2 = Tˆ A)}
given which:
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CR =
1−Z−λ
β
≡ CˆAR . (4.13∗)
It is clear CˆAR > 0 if and only if λ 6 λ h, which means the above allying tax policies
are sustainable if and only if λ 6 λ h. When λ 6 λm, the optimal allying tax policy
is given by either one in the following policy vector:
{(T1 = 0,T2 = 1),(T1 = 1,T2 = 0)}
given which:
CR = 1−Z, (4.14∗)
It is clear when λ > λm, it is impossible for the ruler to sustain the kleptocracy
by any non-allying tax policy. When λ 6 λm, the optimal non-allying optimal tax
policy is given by:
(T1 = T2 = Tˆ A).
given which,
CR =
2[(1−β )(1−Z)−λ ]
β
−Z ≡ C˜AR . (4.15∗)
It is easy to show C˜AR > 0 if and only if:
λ 6 1−β − 2−β
2
Z ≡ λ ∗, (4.16∗)
where λ ∗ < λm, and λ ∗ > 0 if and only if:
Z <
2−2β
2−β ≡ Zˆ, (4.17
∗)
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where 0 < Zˆ < 1. Hence, we can infer that the optimal allying tax policy is
sustainable if and only if Z < Zˆ and λ 6 λ ∗, i.e., the cost to sustain the regime is
relatively small and the degree of altruism is relatively low; Otherwise, when Z > Zˆ,
or Z < Zˆ and λ > λ ∗, it is impossible for the ruler to sustain the regime by any allying
tax policy. Since ∂ Tˆ
A
∂λ = − 1β < 0, this implies that when Z < Zˆ and λ 6 λ ∗, given
the optimal non-allying tax policy, the higher the degree of altruism, the less surplus
could be extracted from each of them. When Z < Zˆ and λ 6 λ ∗, if the ruler opts for
the optimal allying tax policy, his payoff in a period is (1−Z), while if he chooses
the optimal non-allying tax policy, his payoff in a period is C˜AR . It is easy to show that
when Z < Zˆ and λ 6 λ ∗, C˜AR > 1−Z if and only if:
λ < (1−β )(1−Z)− β
2
≡ λ l, (4.18∗)
where λ l < λ ∗, and λ l > 0 if and only if:
Z <
1− 32β
1−β ≡ Z˜, (4.19
∗)
where Z˜ < Zˆ, and Z˜ > 0 if and only if β < 23 . Therefore, we can infer that the ruler
will opt for the optimal non-allying tax if and only if the following three constraints
are satisfied: i) β < 23 , ii) Z < Z˜, and iii) λ < λ
l . Therefore, we can derive proposition
4.2.
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[Appendix II:]
1) Prove Proposition 1.2
Proof: When λ2 6 λ h, we have Tˆ2 > 0, thus the optimal allying tax policy is given
by:
(T1 = τ,T2 = 0),
given which,
CR = τ > 0, (1.1∗)
When λ2 > λ h, we have Tˆ2 < 0, thus the optimal allying tax policy is given by:
(T1 = τ,T2 = Tˆ2),
given which,
CR =
τ−λ2
β
. (1.2∗)
where CR > 0 if and only if λ2 6 τ . Hence, when λ2 > λˆ , the optimal allying tax
policy (T1 = τ,T2 =
(1−β )τ−λ2
β ) is sustainable if and only if λ2 6 τ .
Similar to the analysis in the Subsection 2.2.1, we can infer the optimal non-
allying tax policy for the ruler is given by:
(T1 = min{τ, Tˆ1},T2 = min{τ, Tˆ2})
It is clear that when Tˆ1 > 0 and Tˆ2 > 0 if and only if:
λ1 6 λ h, (1.3∗)
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which implies that the optimal non-allying tax policy is sustainable if and only if
λ1 6 λ h. It is easy to show Tˆ1 6 τ if and only if: ??
β > τ−λ1
2τ
≡ β l, (1.4∗)
and Tˆ2 6 τ if and only if:
β > τ−λ2
2τ
≡ β h, (1.5∗)
Given λ2 < λ1 < λ h, we have: 12 > β
h > β l > 0. Therefore, when λ1 6 λ h,
i) if β > β h, we have: Tˆ2 6 τ and Tˆ1 < τ , thus the optimal non-allying tax policy
is given by:
(T1 = Tˆ1,T2 = Tˆ2),
given which:
CR =
2(1−β )τ− (λ1+λ2)
β
; (1.6∗)
ii) if β l 6 β < β h, we have: Tˆ1 6 τ and Tˆ2 > τ , thus the optimal non-allying tax
policy is given by:
(T1 = Tˆ1,T2 = τ),
given which:
CR =
1−λ1
β
; (1.7∗)
iii) if β < β l , we have: Tˆ1 > τ and Tˆ2 > τ , thus the optimal non-allying tax policy
is given by:
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(T1 = τ,T2 = τ),
given which:
CR = 2τ. (1.8∗)
Based on the above analysis, we can infer that when λ2 > τ , it is impossible for
the ruler to sustain the regime by any tax policy. When λ2 6 τ and λ1 > λ h, no non-
allying tax policy is not sustainable, thus the ruler has no choice but implementing
the optimal allying tax policy: i) if λ h < λ2 6 τ , the optimal allying tax policy is
(T1 = τ,T2 = Tˆ2); ii) while if λ2 6 λ h, it is (T1 = τ,T2 = 0).
When λ1 6 λ h, we must have λ2 < λ h, thus the sustainable optimal allying tax
policy is given by: (T1 = τ,T2 = 0). When λ1 < λ h and β < β l , both the optimal
allying tax policy and the optimal non-allying tax policy are sustainable, but the latter
brings higher payoff for the ruler, hence, the ruler will opt for the latter.
When λ1 < λ h and β l 6 β < β h, we can derive: (1.7∗) > (1.1∗), thus the ruler
will opt for the non-allying tax policy: (T1 = Tˆ1,T2 = τ). When λ1 < λ h and β > β h,
it is easy to show: (1.1∗)> (1.6∗) if and only if:
λ1+λ2 > τ(2−3β )> 0. (1.9∗)
Based on the above analysis, we can derive Proposition 1.2.
2) Prove Proposition 1.3
Proof: It is clear that the optimal allying tax policy is given by one of the tax
policies in the following policy vector:
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{(T1 = τ1,T2 = min{0, (1−β )τ1−λβ }),(T1 = min{0,
(1−β )τ2−λ
β
},T2 = τ2)}
where (1−β )τ2−λβ > 0 if and only if:
λ 6 (1−β )τ2 ≡ λˆm, (1.10∗)
and (1−β )τ1−λβ > 0 if and only if:
λ 6 (1−β )τ1 ≡ λˆ h. (1.11∗)
Given τ1 > τ2, we have λˆ h > λˆm. It is easy to show:
i) when λ > τ1, neither of the above two allying tax policies are sustainable;
ii) when λˆ h < λ 6 τ1, the optimal allying tax policy is given by:
(T1 = τ1,T2 =
(1−β )τ1−λ
β
),
given which: CR = τ1−λβ ;
iii) when λ 6 λˆ h, the optimal allying tax policy is given by:
(T1 = τ1,T2 = 0),
given which: CR = τ1;
Similar to the analysis in Subsection 2.1.1, we can infer that the optimal non-
allying tax policy for the ruler is given by:
(T1 = min{τ1, (1−β )τ2−λβ },T2 = min{τ2,
(1−β )τ1−λ
β
}),
which is sustainable if and only if:
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λ < λˆm. (1.12∗)
It is clear that:
∂ λˆm
∂τ2
= 1−β ,
which shows that λˆm is monotonically increasing on τ2. This implies that when
the ruler has less control over the endowment of the citizen with lower maximum tax,
it will become more difficult for him to implement the non-allying tax policy. Given
β > 12 , we have:
(1−β )τ2−λ
β < τ1. While
(1−β )τ1−λ
β > τ2 if and only if:
λ < (1−β )τ1−βτ2 ≡ λˆ l, (1.13∗)
where λˆ l > 0 if and only if:
τ1 >
βτ2
1−β .≡ τˆ1. (1.14
∗)
Based on the above analysis, it is easy to show when τ1 6 τˆ1, or τ1 > τˆ1 and
λ > λˆ l , the optimal non-allying tax policy for the ruler is given by:
(T1 =
(1−β )τ2−λ
β
,T2 =
(1−β )τ1−λ
β
),
given which CR =
(1−β )(τ1+τ2)−2λ
β ; It is clear τ1 >
(1−β )(τ1+τ2)−2λ
β if and only if:
τ2 6
(2β −1)τ1+λ
1−β ≡ τˆ2 (1.15
∗),
Given β > 12 , we must have τˆ2 > 0. Therefore, when: i) τ1 6 τˆ1, or ii) τ1 > τˆ1 and
λ > λˆ l , if τ2 6 τˆ2, it is a weakly dominant strategy for the ruler to adopt the optimal
allying tax policy {T1 = τ1,T2 = 0}; while if τ2 > τˆ2, it is a strict dominant strategy
for the ruler to adopt the optimal non-allying tax policy.
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When τ1 > τˆ1 and λ < λˆ l , the optimal non-allying tax policy is given by:
(T1 =
(1−β )τ2−λ
β
,T2 = τ2),
given which CR = τ2−λβ ; It is obvious that τ1 >
τ2−λ
β if and only if:
τ2 6
λ
1−β ≡ τ˜2 > 0 (1.16
∗).
Based on the above analysis, we can derive Proposition 1.3.
3) Prove: When λ > λB, we have (2.23)> (2.7), i.e., −2(τ− 2λ1−β )>− τ−2λβ .
Proof : It is easy to show−2(τ− 2λ1−β )>− τ−2λβ if and only if λ > (2β−13β−1)[ (1−β )τ2 ].
Given β > 12 , we have: 3β − 1 > β , thus (2β−13β−1)[ (1−β )τ2 ] < λB. Therefore, when
λ > λB, we have (2.23)> (2.7).
4) Note: 1 represents the most free and 7 the least free rating.
Table 1: Freedom Index of Worst of the Worst 2011 
Country Political Rights Civil liberty Combined Average 
Belarus                 7                  6               6.5 
Burma                 7                  7                 7 
Chad                 7                  6               6.5 
China                 7                  6                6.5 
Côte d’Ivoire                 7                  6               6.5 
Cuba                 7                  6               6.5 
Equatorial Guinea                 7                  7                 7 
Eritrea                 7                  7                 7 
Laos                 7                   6               6.5 
Libya                 7                  7                 7 
North Korea                 7                  7                 7 
Saudi Arabia                 7                  6                6.5 
Somalia                 7                  7                  7 
Sudan                 7                  7                  7 
Syria                 7                  6                6.5 
Turkmenistan                 7                  7                  7 
Uzbekistan                 7                  7                  7 
(Source: Freedom House.)
168
[Appendix III:]
 
 1) 
              Graph 1:  Game Tree of Military Interventions 
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 2) 
                   Graph 2:  Game Tree of Economic Sanctions 
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3) Prove: (1.22)> (1.3) i.e., (1−β )−m[(1−p)(1−β )−φ(1−βpi)]+β (1−pi)pm(1−βpi)(1−β ) >
(p+φ)m
1−β
Proof: Let (1−β )−m[(1−p)(1−β )−φ(1−βpi)]+β (1−pi)pm(1−βpi)(1−β ) >
(p+φ)m
1−β , we have:
(1−β )−m(1− p)(1−β )−mφ −m(p+φ)+β pm> βpi[mφ + pm− pm−mφ ]
(1−m)(1−β )> 0
It is clear that given m,β < 1, the above inequality always holds. Therefore, we
have (14)>W hg .
4) Prove: when ω > ωˆ and ϒˆ> ϒ˜> ϒ, V ls (θ = θˆ)>V ls (θ = θ˜)>V ls (θ > θˆ) if
and only if pi > pˆi .
Proof: When ω > ωˆ and ϒˆ> ϒ˜> ϒ, we have: ∆1 < 0 and ∆2 < 0. We can show:
∆2−∆1
=
1− p
(1−β )(1−βpi){φm[η
h(1−βpi)−η l(1−β )]−β (1−pi)[ω+φ(1−λ )−ϒ]}
It is clear that ∆2 > ∆1 if and only if:
pi > 1− φm[η
h(1−βpi)−η l(1−β )]
β [ω+φ(1−λ )−ϒ] ≡ pˆi
Therefore, when ∆1 < ∆2 < 0, we have: V ls (θ = θˆ)>V ls (θ = θ˜)>V ls (θ > θˆ).
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5) Prove: 0 < pˆi < 1, where pˆi = 1− φm[ηh(1−βpi)−η l(1−β )]β [ω+φ(1−λ )−ϒ] .
Proof: Since ηh > η l and (1−βpi)> (1−β ), we have: ηh(1−βpi)> η l(1−β ).
Given ϒ< ϒ˜=ω+φ [1−λ −ηhm], we can derive that ω+φ(1−λ )−ϒ> φηhm >
0. Hence, it is obvious that:
φm[ηh(1−βpi)−η l(1−β )]
β [ω+φ(1−λ )−ϒ] > 0.
Therefore, pˆi < 1. It is clear to prove pˆi > 0 is equivalent to prove that:
φm[ηh(1−βpi)−η l(1−β )]< β [ω+φ(1−λ )−ϒ]
Since ϒ< ϒ˜= ω+φ [1−λ −ηhm], we can derive:
β [ω+φ(1−λ )−ϒ]> φmβηh
Since ηh > η l , we can derive:
φm[ηh(1−βpi)−η l(1−β )]< φm[ηh(1−βpi)−ηh(1−β )] = φmβηh(1−pi)
Given pi > 0, we have:
φmβηh(1−pi)< φmβηh
Hence, we can infer that φm[ηh(1− βpi)−η l(1− β )] < β [ω + φ(1− λ )−ϒ],
Therefore, pˆi > 0.
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6)
Figure 1: FDIs in Burma: 1995-2005 (UD$ Million) 
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1000
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
European
Union
UK
USA
Total FDIs
Source:  IMF 
7)
 
Figure 2: Exports of Goods and Services  
(US$ Million) 
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8)
Figure 3: GDP Growth in Burma 1991-2010 (%) 
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9)
Figure 4: GDP per Capita of Burma 1999-2010 (PPP US$) 
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10)
Figure 5: Burma’s GDP Composition by Sectors 
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